Virtue Epistemology and Developing Intellectual Virtue (original) (raw)

Virtue Epistemology and Developing Intellectual Virtue [Penultimate Draft]

Book Chapter (The Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology), 2019

Virtue theorists have recently been focusing on the important question of how virtues are developed, and doing so in a way that is informed by empirical research from psychology. However, much of this recent work has dealt exclusively with the moral virtues. In this paper, we present three empirically-informed accounts of how virtues can be developed, and we assess the merits of these accounts when applied specifically to intellectual (or epistemic) virtues.

CULTIVATING INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES

The topic of the educational role of the intellectual virtues is explored. It is argued that the overarching epistemic goal of education is the development of intellectual character, and it is further proposed that the relevant notion of intellectual character is virtuous intellectual character. Virtuous intellectual character is contrasted in this regard with an alternative character-based conception of the overarching epistemic goal of education in terms of critically rational intellectual character. Finally, some of the main issues facing this conception of the educational role of the intellectual virtues are considered, especially regarding the concern that educating for the intellectual virtues is problematic because it involves inculcating in students certain core values.

Intellectual Virtue and Knowledge

Virtue epistemology defines knowledge in terms of intellectual virtues. Virtue-Reliabilists, led by Ernest Sosa, argue that intellectual virtues are reliable dispositions. Virtue-Responsibilists, led by Linda Zagzebski, argue that they are acquired character traits for which the agent is (partly) responsible. This chapter contends that Sosa's definition of knowledge, in terms of Reliabilist virtue, is better-suited to analyze passive knowledge, while Zagzebski's definition, in terms of Responsibilist virtue, is better-suited to analyze active knowledge. It also argues that virtue epistemology has already begun to expand the way we analyze knowledge. Breaking with mid-and late-twentieth century analytic epistemology, it puts active knowledge back on the epistemological map, and encourages us to explore probabilistic connections between active knowledge and intellectual virtue.

The Cognitive Demands of Intellectual Virtue

2013

This Article pre-print is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu. Repository Citation Baehr, Jason, "The Cognitive Demands of Intellectual Virtue" (2013). Philosophy Faculty Works. 17. http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil\_fac/17

Educating for Intellectual Virtue: A critique from action guidance

Episteme

Virtue epistemology is among the dominant influences in mainstream epistemology today. An important commitment of one strand of virtue epistemology – responsibilist virtue epistemology (e.g., Montmarquet 1993; Zagzebski 1996; Battaly 2006; Baehr 2011) – is that it must provide regulative normative guidance for good thinking. Recently, a number of virtue epistemologists (most notably Baehr, 2013) have held that virtue epistemology not only can provide regulative normative guidance, but moreover that we should reconceive the primary epistemic aim of all education as the inculcation of the intellectual virtues. Baehr’s picture contrasts with another well-known position – that the primary aim of education is the promotion of critical thinking (Scheffler 1989; Siegel 1988; 1997; 2017). In this paper – that we hold makes a contribution to both philosophy of education and epistemology and, a fortiori, epistemology of education – we challenge this picture. We outline three criteria that any putative aim of education must meet and hold that it is the aim of critical thinking, rather than the aim of instilling intellectual virtue, that best meets these criteria. On this basis, we propose a new challenge for intellectual virtue epistemology, next to the well-known empirically-driven ‘situationist challenge’. What we call the ‘pedagogical challenge’ maintains that the intellectual virtues approach does not have available a suitably effective pedagogy to qualify the acquisition of intellectual virtue as the primary aim of education. This is because the pedagogic model of the intellectual virtues approach (borrowed largely from exemplarist thinking) is not properly action-guiding. Instead, we hold that, without much further development in virtue-based theory, logic and critical thinking must still play the primary role in the epistemology of education.

EDUCATION AS THE SOCIAL CULTIVATION OF INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE

Social Virtue Epistemology, (eds.) M. Alfano, C. Klein & J. de Ridder, (Routledge,)

The recent literature has seen a burgeoning discussion of the idea that the overarching epistemic goal of education is the cultivation of the intellectual virtues. Moreover, there have been attempts to put this idea into practice, with virtue-led educational interventions in schools, universities, and even prisons. This paper explores the question of whether--and, if so, to what degree--such intellectual virtue-based approaches to education are essentially social. The focus in this regard is on the role of intellectual exemplars within this approach, and in particular the extent to which direct social interaction with such exemplars is crucial to the implementation of this educational methodology.

VIRTUOUS INTELLECTUAL CHARACTER AS THE EPISTEMIC GOAL OF EDUCATION

Educating for Moral and Intellectual Maturation: Toward Greater Social Justice Through Initiatives of Excellence in Undergraduate Education,, 2024

The Anteater Virtues project at the University of California, Irvine (UCI) is devoted to bringing the cultivation of virtuous intellectual character into the heart of the curriculum. In so doing, it represents the first time that a leading R1 university has attempted to such an endeavor. For while there have been a number of projects at higher education level that have focused on educating for virtuous character more generally, and also projects at other educational levels (such as high school) that have focused on virtuous intellectual character specifically, this is the first of its kind to attempt to bring educating for virtuous intellectual character into the pedagogical culture of a leading higher education institution. The project is not only rooted in contemporary research on the importance of educating for virtuous intellectual character, but is also contributing to this literature. In particular, alongside the curriculum reform there is a comprehensive empirical study of the pedagogical effects of this educational intervention, one that draws on the extensive database that forms part of UCI’s Measuring Undergraduate Student Trajectories (MUST) project. This project has already led to some significant empirical results. The aim of this paper, however, is not to focus on the empirical basis for this project but rather its theoretical grounding. In particular, it describes the theoretical case for thinking of virtuous intellectual character as being a fundamental goal of any well-conducted educational practice.