The Univocity of Being: with special reference to the doctrines of John Duns Scotus and Martin Heidegger. (original) (raw)

Integrative Perspective MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND THE QUESTION OF BEING

Journal of Integrative Humanism (JIH), 2017

This work is a critical exposition of Martin Heidegger's life, times and exploration into the question of Being. The work surveys the background of Heidegger's philosophizing, his principal interest in ontology, his attack on traditional metaphysics, his adoption of the Husserlian phenomenology as a method and his use as his starting point Dasein, the only being who understands what it means to be, the being for whom his being is in question and is of special interest to him. The work also made an exhaustive critique of Heidegger's analysis of human existence especially with regard to Dasein's mode of being, its tripartite ontological structure of existentiality, facticity and fallenness; its authentic and inauthentic existence and the comprehensive concept of care. The work further examined Heidegger's other themes discussed in his search for the meaning of Being, these include: temporality, historicity and nothingness. The work observed that Heidegger's failure to rise above what he condemned in traditional metaphysics left him confused and unable to complete his major work Being and Time and forced him to make a turn. This turn (die kehre) which initiated his later philosophy, though still preoccupied itself with the question of Being , followed a less rigorous means. This new way is the use of poetic language to make Being unconcealed. The work in conclusion observed that Heidegger's preoccupation with the question of Being by his methods and themes left him a phenomenological ontologist, an existentialist, a humanist and an atheist while leaving the question of Being unanswered.

Heidegger’s Being and Time

The American Journal of Semiotics, 1990

At the beginning of the thesis, a brief review of the development of the term phenomenology in the history of Western philosophy reveals the development of phenomenology and the history of Western philosophy. This article takes the seventh section of Introduction to Being and Time as the main research object. Through the review of the overall thought of the introduction, through the combing of the first few chapters of the introduction, the important position of phenomenology in this book is determined. The methodological guide to problem solving and the highlights of Heidegger's phenomenological thoughts in the first few chapters of the introduction. Finally, through the combing and understanding of Heidegger's thoughts in the article, combined with some specific expressions, he has developed an understanding of Heidegger's phenomenological method, that is, phenomenology is a scientific technical means for studying and dealing with problems.

What is Missing? The Incompleteness and Failure of Heidegger’s Being and Time

Lee Braver, ed., Being and Time, Division III, Heidegger's Unanswered Question of Being (MIT Press), 2015

In this essay, I first consider several prevalent interpretations of the fragmentariness and “failure” of Being and Time, including three of Heidegger’s divergent and at times conflicting self-interpretations. I then turn to questions of hermeneutics that are provoked by this incompleteness and its reception in relation to Heidegger’s approach to hermeneutics as the art of interpretation. Heidegger’s practice and elucidation of destructuring, creative, and violent interpretations that intend to liberate the “unthought” in the text appear to clarify his own subsequent depictions of Being and Time. But there remains a discrepancy and distance between the contingent incompleteness of Being and Time owing to the circumstances of its publication and the role this incompleteness is later given as part of the history of being. I accordingly examine the “gap” between the thought (or unthought) and the contingent empirically or ontically existing “author.” I conclude that Heidegger’s best interpretations of the significance of Being and Time in his philosophical journey entail a different understanding of the relationship between “life and work” than the one Heidegger himself maintained—one that is closer to the hermeneutical perspective and interpretive strategies, which embrace critical autobiographical and biographical reflection, encouraged by Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Misch.

The Three "Fundamental Deceptions" of Being and Time: Heidegger's Phenomenology Revisited

Research in Phenomenology, 2023

In his private notes written in 1936 (now published as GA82), Heidegger enumerates three "fundamental deceptions" at play in Being and Time (1927). The thrust of these deceptions is twofold: that Dasein is something given and that the task of phenomenology is to describe Dasein in its givenness. These are deceptions, Heidegger claims in 1936, because Dasein is not something given, but can only be reached in a leap, and because the task of phenomenology is not to describe Dasein in its givenness, but to bring about Dasein and the "there," the site of Being's happening, through a creative leap-in. Scholars might be inclined to read these deceptions as further evidence for the view that Heidegger in the 1930s abandons phenomenology understood as a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness. This paper argues, to the contrary, that phenomenology for the young Heidegger was never a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness, but always, however obliquely presented throughout the 1920s, a way of participating in the creative unfolding of the site of Being's happening.

Understanding the Concept of Being in general: From Being and Time back to Young Heidegger

Conatus, 2024

This paper exhibits a way of understanding Heidegger's concept of being in general [Sein überhaupt] -the central aim of Being and Time's questioning- by getting insight into his early years. I argue that the term "being" [Sein] as Heidegger understands it in the early 1920s describes the meaningful relation between humans and the things of their surrounding world which is given to us as a fact. I maintain that Sein überhaupt refers to this fact, i.e., the fact that every particular being is always with a certain meaning for us. I come to this conclusion by exploring (1) Heidegger's early analysis of Umwelterlebnis, (2) his early description of medieval transcendentia, (3) his critique of formalization and the introduction of formal indication. Lastly, (4) I observe the way Heidegger introduces the concepts of Sein and Sein überhaupt pointing to the simple fact of beings' being in meaningful relation to us.