The Ukraine Crisis and the End of the Post-Cold War European Order: Options for NATO and the EU (original) (raw)

Abstract

The Ukraine Crisis has changed European and US security policy. Irrespective of the impact the crisis will have in the short, medium and long term, the Russian intervention in Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea and the subsequent destabilisation of eastern Ukraine will have far-reaching consequences for the following three reasons: It will reduce strategic warning due to Russia’s will and ability to use armed force in its neighbouring area. It is apparently the definitive Russian departure from the idea of a united, free Europe that began with the Helsinki Process and was realised with the integration of economies and societies after the end of the Cold War. An important element in the idea of a united, free Europe is that conflicts must be resolved by peaceful means and not by force of arms. It demonstrates that a number of the partnerships, etc., that have formed the foundation for EU and NATO policies, have been inadequate. Therefore, the crisis creates a need to rethink Western strategy. In the light of this new risk, the West’s existing policy is inadequate. This does not necessarily mean that the policy hitherto has been mistaken, and it absolutely does not mean that we are facing a new Cold War. However, the West must realise that Russian governance does not have the same general goals as those of the West. Although the West can thus in the short term be content to overcome the crisis, the consequences for the European security policy framework in the medium and long term will be appreciable. These consequences will apply not least to the West itself because the crisis has revealed differences in priorities among the Western powers and challenged the world view that the West’s policy has been based on. Furthermore, the West must acknowledge that Russia is willing to use military means to accomplish its goals. This presents EU foreign policy in particular with a number of fundamental challenges and means that NATO must rethink and thoroughly reconsider its obligations under Article 5, especially with regard to the East European member states, where the Baltic States are particularly vulnerable.

Figures (17)

Source: IISS The Military Balance 2014 Defence spending in Russia, NATO Europe and NATO USA i 2013 (mia. USD)

Source: IISS The Military Balance 2014 Defence spending in Russia, NATO Europe and NATO USA i 2013 (mia. USD)

Source: http://concorde.ua/en/research/market-data/indices Stock market reactions to the Russian occupation of Crimea, early 2014

Source: http://concorde.ua/en/research/market-data/indices Stock market reactions to the Russian occupation of Crimea, early 2014

In justifying the annexation of Crimea in a speech at the Kremlin on 18 March 2014, the president took his point of departure in an international situation that he claimed made it necessary to act strongly and swiftly:

In justifying the annexation of Crimea in a speech at the Kremlin on 18 March 2014, the president took his point of departure in an international situation that he claimed made it necessary to act strongly and swiftly:

Source: The Levada Center, Moscow — http://www.levada.ru/17-03-2014/pozitsii-rossii-na-mirovoi-arene Russians who believe their country is a superpower (%)

Source: The Levada Center, Moscow — http://www.levada.ru/17-03-2014/pozitsii-rossii-na-mirovoi-arene Russians who believe their country is a superpower (%)

Source: The World Bank and CIA World Factbook Average life expectancy for Russian men 1985-2014. Years. It is common to the strategy documents, but perhaps most clear in the national security strategy, that they are based on an organic view of Russia. Russia is depicted as people are depicted in Maslow’s psychological works,'” in which certain basic material needs must be fulfilled before immaterial needs. The whole person and the whole nation must be intact and in good physical health. Russian health, however, was threatened by the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the disintegra- tion of the country. In concrete terms, this has come to An authentic Russia is not an abstraction, on the contrary, it is defined in quite concrete terms. Russia‘s national security strategy thus identifies a number of

Source: The World Bank and CIA World Factbook Average life expectancy for Russian men 1985-2014. Years. It is common to the strategy documents, but perhaps most clear in the national security strategy, that they are based on an organic view of Russia. Russia is depicted as people are depicted in Maslow’s psychological works,'” in which certain basic material needs must be fulfilled before immaterial needs. The whole person and the whole nation must be intact and in good physical health. Russian health, however, was threatened by the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the disintegra- tion of the country. In concrete terms, this has come to An authentic Russia is not an abstraction, on the contrary, it is defined in quite concrete terms. Russia‘s national security strategy thus identifies a number of

The conflict between Russia and the West that Putin de- scribed as a policy of containment is a conflict between two different types of governance for Obama, with the Russian state and the Western states each in its own camp. While the conflict for Putin is an expression of different civilisational and geopolitical realities that cre- ate a conflict between “Fort Russia” and its besiegers, the geopolitical issues for Obama are things that can be overcome if there is agreement to govern the state in a certain way. In Obama’s view, civilisation is a fellowship based on development rather than a point of departure for conflict.

The conflict between Russia and the West that Putin de- scribed as a policy of containment is a conflict between two different types of governance for Obama, with the Russian state and the Western states each in its own camp. While the conflict for Putin is an expression of different civilisational and geopolitical realities that cre- ate a conflict between “Fort Russia” and its besiegers, the geopolitical issues for Obama are things that can be overcome if there is agreement to govern the state in a certain way. In Obama’s view, civilisation is a fellowship based on development rather than a point of departure for conflict.

of the NATO countries has now been aroused. In his speech, Fogh Rasmussen emphasised that “in times like this, when the security of the Euro-Atlantic area is challenged, the North Atlantic Alliance has not wavered. And it will not waver. For 65 years, we have been clear in our commitment to one another as Allies. And to the global security system within which NATO is rooted. "38 For a Secretary-General who had prioritised relations with Russia, the events in Ukraine were a confirma- tion of the need for NATO to formulate a joint strategy regarding Russia instead of seeing Russia in terms of concrete subsidiary challenges regarding other objec- tives that NATO might propose for itself. Fogh Rasmus- sen thus paved the way for NATO to place relations with Russia at the top of the agenda for the first time in many years at the Cardiff summit in September 2014. On the face of things, the choice of Jens Stoltenberg as Fogh Rasmussen’s successor appears to be support for this new order. As the Prime Minister of Norway, Stoltenberg was responsible for a defence policy that prioritised the defence of the Norwegian border with Russia and power projection in the northern areas in the form of new frigates and new fighter aircrafts, and In this view, the consequences of the Russian interven- tion in Ukraine is that NATO must see Russia as part of its future rather than as part of its past. Where Albright talked about Russia’s outdated fear in 1997, the fear

of the NATO countries has now been aroused. In his speech, Fogh Rasmussen emphasised that “in times like this, when the security of the Euro-Atlantic area is challenged, the North Atlantic Alliance has not wavered. And it will not waver. For 65 years, we have been clear in our commitment to one another as Allies. And to the global security system within which NATO is rooted. "38 For a Secretary-General who had prioritised relations with Russia, the events in Ukraine were a confirma- tion of the need for NATO to formulate a joint strategy regarding Russia instead of seeing Russia in terms of concrete subsidiary challenges regarding other objec- tives that NATO might propose for itself. Fogh Rasmus- sen thus paved the way for NATO to place relations with Russia at the top of the agenda for the first time in many years at the Cardiff summit in September 2014. On the face of things, the choice of Jens Stoltenberg as Fogh Rasmussen’s successor appears to be support for this new order. As the Prime Minister of Norway, Stoltenberg was responsible for a defence policy that prioritised the defence of the Norwegian border with Russia and power projection in the northern areas in the form of new frigates and new fighter aircrafts, and In this view, the consequences of the Russian interven- tion in Ukraine is that NATO must see Russia as part of its future rather than as part of its past. Where Albright talked about Russia’s outdated fear in 1997, the fear

This will achieve the effect of harmonising what the EU respectively says and does. An effort in the three areas would dramatically heighten the Union’s credibility, and credibility is exactly what the EU is lacking in relation to Russia. Finance and trade are central aspects of the EU and the EU therefore uses sanctions against Russia as a means to an end. However, the EU must rapidly decide whether sanctions work with regard to states that are governed like Russia.*° This will achieve the effect of harmonising what the EU

This will achieve the effect of harmonising what the EU respectively says and does. An effort in the three areas would dramatically heighten the Union’s credibility, and credibility is exactly what the EU is lacking in relation to Russia. Finance and trade are central aspects of the EU and the EU therefore uses sanctions against Russia as a means to an end. However, the EU must rapidly decide whether sanctions work with regard to states that are governed like Russia.*° This will achieve the effect of harmonising what the EU

European dependency on import of russian gas (% of total import of natural gas, 2012)

European dependency on import of russian gas (% of total import of natural gas, 2012)

Partnerships enhance NATO's ability to fulfil its own role (as a force multiplier) around the world. In the European region, partnerships are at the same time the central mechanism for stabilising and promoting neighbouring areas around the territories of the NATO members. After the crisis in Ukraine, which, from 1997, has had a special partnership relation by virtue of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, it is particularly important for NATO to strengthen partnership relations and the formal framework. This applies to partners in Western Europe, especially Finland and Sweden, to partners further east such as Ukraine and Georgia and to NATO's global partnerships in the form of countries (such as

Partnerships enhance NATO's ability to fulfil its own role (as a force multiplier) around the world. In the European region, partnerships are at the same time the central mechanism for stabilising and promoting neighbouring areas around the territories of the NATO members. After the crisis in Ukraine, which, from 1997, has had a special partnership relation by virtue of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, it is particularly important for NATO to strengthen partnership relations and the formal framework. This applies to partners in Western Europe, especially Finland and Sweden, to partners further east such as Ukraine and Georgia and to NATO's global partnerships in the form of countries (such as

Missile defence systems - Missile defence systems have been on NATO's agenda for many years and the US has already installed such defence systems in Poland and Romania that protect parts of NATO against a missile attack. Unlike the Star Wars Programme of the 1980s, NATO's plans for a missile defence system are not intended for defence against an attack by a major power with many missiles, but against an attack from a smaller state, such as Iran, with a few missiles. Never- theless, every defence system will reduce a potential op- ponent's ability to hit the target and not least the ability to conduct a limited nuclear war. Russia has therefore taken the view of NATO's plans for a missile shield that it is a way of disturbing the nuclear balance which is, in a sense, in its place as it was during the Cold War era. NATO has answered that now, when the Cold War has ended, it was difficult to understand Russia’s problem as NATO has no plans to attack Russia and, according to NATO, Russia can hardly feel it is under threat from a system that was designed to counter a threat from Iran and similar states. The discussion has not been very constructive and has basically involved different views of what the European security system is all about.

Missile defence systems - Missile defence systems have been on NATO's agenda for many years and the US has already installed such defence systems in Poland and Romania that protect parts of NATO against a missile attack. Unlike the Star Wars Programme of the 1980s, NATO's plans for a missile defence system are not intended for defence against an attack by a major power with many missiles, but against an attack from a smaller state, such as Iran, with a few missiles. Never- theless, every defence system will reduce a potential op- ponent's ability to hit the target and not least the ability to conduct a limited nuclear war. Russia has therefore taken the view of NATO's plans for a missile shield that it is a way of disturbing the nuclear balance which is, in a sense, in its place as it was during the Cold War era. NATO has answered that now, when the Cold War has ended, it was difficult to understand Russia’s problem as NATO has no plans to attack Russia and, according to NATO, Russia can hardly feel it is under threat from a system that was designed to counter a threat from Iran and similar states. The discussion has not been very constructive and has basically involved different views of what the European security system is all about.

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