The Ukraine Crisis and the End of the Post-Cold War European Order: Options for NATO and the EU (original) (raw)
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NATO and Russia’s Security Dilemma Within the European Union’s Far Neighbors
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After the collapse of the bipolar international order, NATO has been focused on its desire to eradicate Cold War divisions and to build good relations with Russia. However, the security environment, especially in Europe, is still dramatically changing. The NATO Warsaw Summit was focused especially on NATO’s deteriorated relations with Russia that affect Europe’s security. At the same time, it looked at bolstering deterrence and defence due to many concerns coming from eastern European allies about Russia’s new attitude in international relations. The Allies agreed that a dialogue with Russia rebuilding mutual trust needs to start. In the times when Europe faces major crisis from its southern and south-eastern neighbourhood - Western Balkan countries, Syria, Libya and Iraq - and other threats, such as terrorism, coming from the so-called Islamic State, causing migration crises, it is necessary to calm down relations with Russia. The article brings out the main purpose of NATO in a tr...
The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on their eastern and south-eastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived as its ‘shared neighbourhood’ with Russia and NATO its ‘eastern flank’, Moscow is exhibiting a growingly assertive military posture. The context of the Baltic and the Black Sea regions differs, but Russia’s actions in both seem to be part of the same strategy aiming to transform the European security order and its sustaining principles. The Kremlin seems to follow similar policies and tactics, mainly through the militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea as the centrepiece of its strategy of power projection vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. An all-out war remains an unlikely scenario, but frictions or accidents leading to an unwanted and uncontrolled escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Tensions and military developments take place in both the Baltic and Black seas, but are not only about them. Russia is testing the Euro-Atlantic response and resilience at large. To assess how far it might be willing to go, it is necessary to evaluate how Russia perceives the West and its actions, taking into account the deep and entrenched clash of perceptions between Brussels and Moscow, and the worldview of the latter.
NATO'S PROSPECTS IN THE LIGHT OF THE UKRAINE WAR
Annuaire de la Faculté de Philosophie, 2022
The war on Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022 with the invasion of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, is an event with a potential to cause tectonic changes in the current political, security and economic international order, including the possibility of a nuclear conflict. As it is the case with the other international and regional organizations, NATO too is enforced to reconsider its position in the multipolar world. The research problem of this paper is delimiting the reality from the myth of NATO that has rested for decades. It focuses on the search for the Alliance's real power in a multipolar international system, as well as seeking answers about the future of the European security order (especially through the prism of NATO-EU relations). The key hypothesis is that the course of events (in Ukraine but also the definite rise of multipolar international system) has been predictable. The reasons for the war were deeply embedded in the foundations of the hybrid international system. The preliminary conclusion is that NATO (albeit seemingly strengthened and expanded) will likely face with its irrelevance in a multipolar order. The thesis of a "global NATO" is just a veil that covers the restricted NATO mission primarily as an instrument of the US policy in Europe. Due to the Ukraine, EU (but also OSCE) is likely to see the shattered dreams of its own security system. It means it will be economically, politically and militarily completely dependent on Washington. NATO enlargement is reaching its peak, along with its primarily European reach. Globally, the United States will rely on its own forces and on alliance of the willing, now referred to as the "Collective West."
A clash of narratives - Russia, NATO and European Security
New Eastern Europe, 2020
In the clash of narratives between Russia and NATO states, Moscow has clearly gained an upper hand. Russian success stems not only from the fact that the Kremlin has been able to send a much clearer and more coherent message than the Alliance, but also because NATO states do not have one narrative, or counter-narrative. One of the central concerns when analysing international security and its history is how to explain certain events and their impact on international politics. For policy-makers and societies it is crucial to define "who we are" and "what kind of world order we want". The passing decade has been marked by a return to a crisis between the West and Russia (sometimes referred to as the New Cold War), with conflict over Russian aggression in Ukraine being the most striking example. Yet the indirect confrontation between NATO and Russia should be measured not only in political disputes, economic calculations and military build-up, but also in terms of the competing narratives that have shaped the understanding or misunderstanding of partners and adversaries alike. One of the ways that the Kremlin gains political and diplomatic ground in international affairs is by putting a wedge between NATO allies, namely, between the United States and its European partners. This was quite evident in the recent intra-NATO rift over Turkey's decision to purchase S-400 missile systems from Russia and deploy military troops, hand in hand with Russian forces, in Syria last October. Simultaneously, even a glance at Europe reveals challenges to its security and stability: Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Algeria, Iran, Turkey-to name just a few states that lay in the so-called arc of instability, and which are influenced, to a certain extent, by the direct policies of the Russian Federation.
A Strategic Continuation, a Tactical Change. Russia's European Security Policy
OSW Point of View No. 76, 2019
The collapse of the Soviet bloc’s structures (the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact) and then of the Soviet Union itself in 1989–1991 was a kind of geopolitical earthquake in Europe. The main political and legal successor of the USSR, the Russian Federation, had to determine its place in the European order that was being formed, including the security sphere. The new Russia, which inherited from the USSR its membership in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the newly established North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), declared its attachment to European democratic values, suggesting that it was ready to embark on close co-operation and, at some point in the future, even join the European and EuroAtlantic security structures (including NATO) that had been formed during the Cold War era in opposition to the USSR. However, Russia’s Soviet legacy also included elements of its strategic culture, political concepts and a significant share of personnel whose views had already been formed. This, in turn, meant that both the will and ability of Russia’s most senior state authorities to put these declarations into practice were highly uncertain. Even though, due to the economic crisis and process of disintegration, Russia turned out to be weaker than the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s, it did not relinquish either its status as a powerful state or the related idea – viewed in maximalist terms – of political sovereignty (even from the West). The government elites of the Russian Federation (like the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and his aides before them) wanted to create a new security architecture in Europe. If constructed according to Moscow’s concepts such an architecture would lead to marginalisation or disbanding of the existing Western security structures (especially NATO) and curbing the US presence and influence in Europe. Above all, it would ensure Moscow’s de facto participation in the decision-making processes concerning European security. In addition, Russia did not wish to relinquish its objective of maintaining its zone of influence in the post-Soviet area (temporarily excluding the Baltic states). It was ready to use military force to foment and capitalise on political and ethnic conflicts in this area to achieve this goal. It also launched a political campaign to counter the efforts of Central European countries – the former (involuntary) participants of the Soviet bloc – to join NATO, attempting to create a more or less formal buffer zone in this region. The overriding goals of Russia’s European security policy have remained unaltered, regardless of the various initiatives taken by Moscow: strategic control of the post-Soviet area, the existence of a security buffer zone in Central Europe and the transformation of the existing NATO-based security system in Europe in a manner that would maximise Russia’s political and security influence and minimise that of the USA. What has changed and been diversified are the institutional solutions Moscow has employed in an attempt to achieve these goals: basing European security on the OSCE (predominant in its policy in the 1990s) or as part of a special partnership with NATO (mainly in the first decade of the 2000s) or through attempts to use the European Security and Defence Policy to enhance security co-operation with the EU. Over time, the Kremlin’s ambitions were gradually curtailed after Russian foreign policy had suffered further defeats. When it was launching the campaign against NATO enlargement eastwards, Moscow initially concentrated its efforts on the Visegrad Group countries, then on the Baltic states and finally, as the enlargement process continued, on Ukraine and Georgia. Initially, the security buffer zone in Central Europe was intended to separate the areas of NATO and Russia (and other CIS countries). However, when this proved impossible, it was to be established inside NATO on its eastern flank. From today’s perspective, it can be concluded that none of the strategic goals of Russia’s European security policy have been achieved. Even through Russia has created economic, political and security structures controlled by it in the post-Soviet area, their range, effectiveness and scale of real control of the member states’ policy is far from meeting Russian expectations. The NATO–Russia Founding Act, which imposes quite imprecise restrictions on the deployment of the Allied forces on NATO’s eastern flank, albeit politically dead, is still formally respected by NATO. However, the regular reinforcement of the Allied (and bilaterally US) military presence on the eastern flank – formally as part of the so-called ‘regular rotation’ – undermines the buffer zone idea. Regardless of discussions that recur from time to time, Russia has also been unable to create any European security system as an alternative to the existing one, especially a system that would offer Moscow veto power. Furthermore, the aggressive and revisionist foreign policy that has been sustained since the second half of the 2010s on President Vladimir Putin’s initiative has led to a crisis in relations with the West, in some respects even more serious than the one that prevailed during the Cold War era. The causes of this include: Russia’s de facto withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) regime; undermining the system of measures for building trust and security in Europe (blocking further adaptation of the Vienna Document and violations of the Treaty on Open Skies); the erosion of the system of nuclear weapons control, provoked by Russia due to violating the INF treaty and, most importantly, Russia’s acts of military aggression in Europe (in 2008 against Georgia and in 2014 against Ukraine), involving real territorial annexations and Russia’s numerous military provocations and ‘hybrid’ actions against NATO member states and nonaligned countries. At present, Russia needs to choose: whether it should continue the present confrontational approach in its European security policy or even toughen it, thus taking the risk of increasing political, economic and security costs, or seek détente with the West, probably at the expense of certain concessions (including those as part of the Minsk process covering the conflict with Ukraine in Donbass), and by starting once more to honour at least some of the agreements concerning European security. Moscow’s decisions may be affected by a number of factors. The most essential of these seem to be the factors linked to the domestic situation in Russia, possible personnel changes inside the Russian government and an evolution of the perception and understanding of the international and regional situation by the Russian government. The present aggressive policy pursued by Russia seems incapable of being altered without major changes in these areas.
Russia and the West in the European Security Architecture: Clash of Interests or a Security Dilemma?
OSCE Yearbook 2015, 2016
Russia’s approach towards relations with Ukraine since early 2014 heralds a major shift in Russian foreign policy. It has crossed a Rubicon that it will be difficult – though not impossible – to uncross. Indeed, Russian officials have themselves stated on more than one occasion that Russia’s relationship with Europe and the United States has undergone an irreversible change and will 1 misreading the other’s intentions, or does the conflict in and around Ukraine result from a clash of interests, with each side determined to win and pre- pared to pay the necessary price? This is not an idle question. Our response has profound implications for the process of conflict resolution – both within Ukraine and between Russia and the West. A security dilemma type of con- flict can usually be resolved by confidence-building measures. In such cases, the contradictions are usually not difficult to overcome. In contrast to that, reconciling opposed interests requires a substantive bargain. In the absence of such a bargain, the balance of forces will need to change in order for the controversy to subside. Before that happens, recurrent spikes of tension are to be expected, at times resulting in open hostilities.
2017
The EU and NATO are facing an increasingly uncertain and complex situation on their eastern and southeastern borders. In what the EU has traditionally conceived as its 'shared neighbourhood' with Russia and NATO its 'eastern flank', Moscow is exhibiting a growingly assertive military posture. The context of the Baltic and the Black Sea regions differs, but Russia's actions in both seem to be part of the same strategy aiming to transform the European security order and its sustaining principles. The Kremlin seems to follow similar policies and tactics, mainly through the militarisation of the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea as the centrepiece of its strategy of power projection vis-à-vis NATO and the EU. An all-out war remains an unlikely scenario, but frictions or accidents leading to an unwanted and uncontrolled escalation cannot be completely ruled out. Tensions and military developments take place in both the Baltic and Black seas, but are not only about them. Russia is testing the Euro-Atlantic response and resilience at large. To assess how far it might be willing to go, it is necessary to evaluate how Russia perceives the West and its actions, taking into account the deep and entrenched clash of perceptions between Brussels and Moscow, and the worldview of the latter.
The EU's Common Security and Defense Policy : The Cases of Ukraine and the Baltic States
2017
Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine and annexation of the Crimean peninsula raised security concerns in the Baltic States as potential targets of invasion. This anxiety was strengthened after the EU launched a civilian Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine as a response to Russia’s illegal actions. Such a soft response to Russia’s foray into Ukraine has raised doubts about the EU’s credibility as a significant security actor on the international stage. Even though the EU has capabilities to intervene militarily, it does not use these capabilities at its disposal. This thesis, through the two case studies, tries to find out why the EU is so soft in the Ukrainian crisis and if the EU is credible security actor in the Baltic States. The overarching questions addressed in this paper are why the EU has not intervened militarily in Ukraine and whether the EU’s soft power model would be exercised in the Baltic States in case of Russia’s intervention. In order to answer these questions the ...