Understanding decline: perceptions and realities of British economic performance. Edited by Peter Clarke and Clive Trebilcock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xvi+313. ISBN 0-521-56317-8. £40.00 (original) (raw)

1999, The Historical Journal

This volume is a collection of essays presented to Barry Supple, the distinguished economic historian who is now director of the Leverhulme Trust in London. A rarity among Festschriften, Understanding Decline sticks to a theme-British economic decline as a problem of perception as well as reality. The challenge was laid down in Supple's 1993 presidential address to the Economic History Society, "Fear of Failing," reproduced here as the ªrst chapter. For more than a century, Supple noted, British political debate has been dominated by the assumption that the country was either on the verge, or in the midst, of severe economic decline, when the reality has been that things "are going from not so bad to something somewhat better" (8). How can this discrepancy be understood? Several of the contributors elaborate and extend Supple's paradox. Donald Winch shows that this rhetorical tendency goes at least as far back as the eighteenth century, quoting Adam Smith's complaint that "ªve years have seldom passed away in which some book or pamphlet has not been published. .. pretending to demonstrate that the wealth of the nation was fast declining, that the country was depopulated, agriculture neglected, manufactures decaying, and trade undone" (30). Scrolling forward to the twentieth century, a half dozen chapters join the chorus, demonstrating that reports of Britain's decline have been greatly exaggerated. Jay Winter compares London with Paris and Berlin during the years 1870 to 1930, ªnding little sign of deterioration. Trebilcock looks at the insurance industry during the interwar period, reporting resilience and responsiveness, not rigidity and failure. In separate essays, Clarke and José Harris debunk the notion that John Maynard Keynes, William Henry Beveridge, and the New Jerusalem programs of the 1940s can be blamed for poor economic performance in the postwar era. Similarly, Charles Feinstein and Tony Hopkins demonstrate that the loss of empire in the 1950s and 1960s-a development linked to decline in the popular perception-was in no way a burden on the