Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations (2017) (original) (raw)
Related papers
This special issue will consist of six full-length articles by leading and up-and-coming philosophers on the topic of intellectual humility, a topic which has attracted a growing interest in the recent philosophical literature. While it is widely in regarded that intellectual humility is among the intellectual virtues, a cluster of questions demanding increasing attention are: why this is so, what does possessing and exercising intellectual humility consists in, how it should be best understood as advancing our epistemic goals, and how it might connect with an appreciation of how the success of our inquiries depends importantly on features of our social and physical environment beyond our control. This volume will bring together a range of different philosophical perspectives on these and related questions to do with intellectual humility with an aim to contributing importantly to this important and recent debate.
Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2015
In the preface to Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick wonders why philosophical writings seem so arrogant:. . .the usual manner of presenting philosophical work puzzles me. Works of philosophy are written as though their authors believe them to be the absolutely final word on their subject. But it's not, surely, that each philosopher thinks that he finally, thank God, has found the truth and built an impregnable fortress around it. We are all actually much more modest than that. For good reason. Having thought long and hard about the view he proposes, a philosopher has a reasonably good idea about its weak points; the places where great intellectual weight is placed upon something perhaps too fragile to bear it, the places where the unraveling of the view might begin, the unprobed assumptions he feels uneasy about. 1 Although Nozick does not use these words, we might say that, by his lights, most philosophical writings display an astounding lack of intellectual humility. In her widely-acclaimed book, I Don't Know, Leah Hager Cohen relates a conversation with her students about a "well-read" and "incredibly smart" colleague named "Mary". Mary routinely exhibits an unusual response when 1
Limitations-Owning and the Interpersonal Dimensions of Intellectual Humility
Scientia et Fides
According to one prominent account of intellectual humility, it consists primarily of a disposition to “own” one’s intellectual limitations. This account has been criticized for neglecting the interpersonal dimensions of intellectual humility. We expect intellectually humble persons to be respectful and generous with their interlocutors and to avoid being haughty or domineering. I defend the limitations-owning account against this objection. I do so in two ways: first, by arguing that some of the interpersonal qualities associated with intellectual humility are qualities expressive of virtues other than intellectual humility; and second, by arguing that, when properly described, the kind of limitations-owning characteristic of intellectual humility in fact is robustly interpersonal. The result is a considerably broader and richer notion of the limitations the owning of which is characteristic of intellectual humility.
Intellectual Humility – a Moral Construct, an Intellectual Virtue
SERIES VII - SOCIAL SCIENCES AND LAW, 2021
The present literature review brings together conceptualizations and study results obtained from extensive work that has been done on the virtue of Intellectual Humility (IH) for the pasts 9 years. While philosophers don't settle yet to a single point of view on intellectual humility, psychologists take a pragmatic stance on the construct and evaluate possible implications IH can have on personal, social, and professional levels. The term is being extended to organizations, teams and organizational culture and studied in the intricate relationships established in the corporate culture. Studies in leadership also provide an insight of how organizations can benefit from the vision and culture a humble leader promotes.
Intellectual Humility: An Interpersonal Theory (Published in Ergo)
In this paper, I will argue in contrast with much of the existing literature, that humility and intellectual humility are interpersonal (as opposed to personal) virtues. Also in contrast with what has been said before, I will further argue that the fruits of intellectual humility are external to the virtue holder. The paper begins with a review of the literature on humility and intellectual humility. I then offer my alternative account, answer some objections, and briefly propose a compromise position to appease those who are sympathetic to traditional conceptions.
Intellectual humility: an old problem in a new psychological perspective
Current Issues in Personality Psychology, 2021
Though having been emphasised by philosophers and theologians for centuries, it is only in the last few years that the concept of intellectual humility has been explicitly defined and studied by empirical psychology. However, it has been long enough to recognise the prominent role that being intellectually humble plays for humane functioning, both at an intra- and inter-individual level. Having started with a broader philosophical and historical context, the present paper discusses the psychological conceptualisations of intellectual humility. Then the recent empirical studies are reviewed, including four strands of research referring to personality traits, cognitive functioning, social relations and religiosity. After presenting selected results, the prospects of psychological research on intellectual humility are discussed, including the limitations and challenges of measurement techniques as well as possible directions for future studies.
Toward an understanding of collective intellectual humility
Trends in Cognitive Science, 2024
The study of intellectual humility (IH), which is gaining increasing interest among cognitive scientists, has been dominated by a focus on individuals. We propose that IH operates at the collective level as the tendency of a collective’s members to attend to each other’s intellectual limitations and the limitations of their collective cognitive efforts. Given people’s propensity to better recognize others’ limitations than their own, IH may be more readily achievable in collectives than individuals. We describe the socio-cognitive dynamics that can interfere with collective IH and offer the solution of building intellectually humbling environments that create a culture of IH that can outlast the given membership of a collective. We conclude with promising research directions.
Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility
Nature Reviews Psychology, 2022
In a time of societal acrimony, psychological scientists have turned to a possible antidote-intellectual humility. Interest in intellectual humility comes from diverse research areas, including researchers studying leadership and organizational behaviour, personality science, positive psychology, judgement and decision-making, education, culture, and intergroup and interpersonal relationships. In this Review, we synthesize empirical approaches to the study of intellectual humility. We critically examine diverse approaches to defining and measuring intellectual humility and identify the common element: a meta-cognitive ability to recognize the limitations of one's beliefs and knowledge. After reviewing the validity of different measurement approaches, we highlight factors that influence intellectual humility, from relationship security to social coordination. Furthermore, we review empirical evidence concerning the benefits and drawbacks of intellectual humility for personal decision-making, interpersonal relationships, scientific enterprise and society writ large. We conclude by outlining initial attempts to boost intellectual humility, foreshadowing possible scalable interventions that can turn intellectual humility into a core interpersonal, institutional and cultural value.
Personality and Individual Differences, 2018
Recent scholarship in intellectual humility (IH) has attempted to provide deeper understanding of the virtue as personality trait and its impact on an individual's thoughts, beliefs, and actions. A limitations-owning perspective of IH focuses on a proper recognition of the impact of intellectual limitations and a motivation to overcome them, placing it as the mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility. We developed the Limitations-Owning Intellectual Humility Scale to assess this conception of IH with related personality constructs. In Studies 1 (n = 386) and 2 (n = 296), principal factor and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a three-factor model – owning one's intellectual limitations, appropriate discomfort with intellectual limitations, and love of learning. Study 3 (n = 322) demonstrated strong test-retest reliability of the measure over 5 months, while Study 4 (n = 612) revealed limitations-owning IH correlated negatively with dogmatism, closed-mind-edness, and hubristic pride and positively with openness, assertiveness, authentic pride. It also predicted openness and closed-mindedness over and above education, social desirability, and other measures of IH. The limitations-owning understanding of IH and scale allow for a more nuanced, spectrum interpretation and measurement of the virtue, which directs future study inside and outside of psychology.
The Development and Validation of the Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale
Journal of Personality Assessment, 2015
A series of studies was conducted to create the 22-item Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale on the basis of theoretical descriptions of intellectual humility, expert reviews, pilot studies, and exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses. The scale measures four distinct but intercorrelated aspects of intellectual humility, including independence of intellect and ego, openness to revising one's viewpoint, respect for others' viewpoints, and lack of intellectual overconfidence. Internal consistency and test-retest analyses provided reliable scale and subscale scores within numerous independent samples. Validation data were obtained from multiple, independent samples, supporting appropriate levels of convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity. The analyses suggest that the scale has utility as a self-report measure for future research.
Development and validation of a multi-dimensional measure of intellectual humility
This paper presents five studies on the development and validation of a scale of intellectual humility. This scale captures cognitive, affective, behavioral, and motivational components of the construct that have been identified by various philosophers in their conceptual analyses of intellectual humility. We find that intellectual humility has four core dimensions: Open-mindedness (versus Arrogance), Intellectual Modesty (versus Vanity), Corrigibility (versus Fragility), and Engagement (versus Boredom). These dimensions display adequate self-informant agreement, and adequate convergent, divergent, and discriminant validity. In particular, Open-mindedness adds predictive power beyond the Big Six for an objective behavioral measure of intellectual humility, and Intellectual Modesty is uniquely related to Narcissism. We find that a similar factor structure emerges in Germanophone participants, giving initial evidence for the model’s cross-cultural generalizability.
Personality and Individual Differences
Recent scholarship in intellectual humility (IH) has attempted to provide deeper understanding of the virtue as personality trait and its impact on an individual's thoughts, beliefs, and actions. A limitations-owning perspective of IH focuses on a proper recognition of the impact of intellectual limitations and a motivation to overcome them, placing it as the mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility. We developed the Limitations-Owning Intellectual Humility Scale to assess this conception of IH with related personality constructs. In Studies 1 (n = 386) and 2 (n = 296), principal factor and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a three-factor modelowning one's intellectual limitations, appropriate discomfort with intellectual limitations, and love of learning. Study 3 (n = 322) demonstrated strong test-retest reliability of the measure over 5 months, while Study 4 (n = 612) revealed limitations-owning IH correlated negatively with dogmatism, closed-mindedness, and hubristic pride and positively with openness, assertiveness, authentic pride. It also predicted openness and closed-mindedness over and above education, social desirability, and other measures of IH. The limitations-owning understanding of IH and scale allow for a more nuanced, spectrum interpretation and measurement of the virtue, which directs future study inside and outside of psychology.
The Semantic Space of Intellectual Humility
Proceedings of the European Conference on Social Intelligence
Intellectual humility is an interesting but underexplored dis- position. The claim “I am (intellectually) humble” seems paradoxical in that someone who has the disposition in question would not typically volunteer it. There is an explanatory gap between the meaning of the sentence and the meaning the speaker expresses by uttering it. We therefore suggest analyzing intellectual humility semantically, using a psycholexical approach that focuses on both synonyms and antonyms of ‘intellectual humility’. We present a thesaurus-based method to map the semantic space of intellectual humility as a heuristic to support philosophical and psychological analysis of this disposition. We find three semantic clusters that compose intellectual humility: the sensible self, the discreet self, and the inquisitive self; likewise, we find three clusters that compose its contraries: the overrated self, the underrated other, and the underrated self.
Distinguishing intellectual humility and general humility
The Journal of Positive Psychology, 2015
Two studies provide evidence for distinguishing intellectual humility (IH) from general humility (GH). Humility involves (a) an Accurate View of Self and (b) the ability to regulate egotism and cultivate an other-oriented stance; IH is a subdomain of humility that involves (a) having an accurate view of one's intellectual strengths and limitations and (b) the ability to negotiate ideas in a fair and inoffensive manner. First, we present a theoretical framework for distinguishing these constructs. In Study 1, with a sample of undergraduate students (N = 1097), we used confirmatory factor analysis to provide empirical evidence for this distinction. We also found that IH predicted unique variance in openness to experience relative to GH. In Study 2, we examined additional evidence of discriminant validity with another sample of college students (N = 355). IH also predicted unique variance in need for cognition, objectivism, and religious ethnocentrism relative to GH.
Intellectual Humility and Assertion
Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy of Humility (eds.) M. Alfano, M. Lynch & A. Tanesini, (London: Routledge).
Recent literature suggests that intellectual humility is valuable to its possessor not only morally, but also epistemically—viz., from a point of view where (put roughly) epistemic aims such as true belief, knowledge and understanding are what matters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, epistemologists working on intellectual humility have focused almost exclusively on its ramifications for how we go about forming, maintaining and evaluating our own beliefs, and by extension, ourselves as inquirers. Less explored by contrast is how intellectual humility might have implications for how we should conduct our practice of asserting. The present entry aims to rectify this oversight by connecting these two topics in a way that sharpens how it is that intellectual humility places several distinctive kinds of demands on assertion, and more generally, on how we communicate what we believe and know.
INTELLECTUAL PRIDE AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY
Pride, 2017
The aim of this paper is to understand the notion of intellectual pride in contrast to the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility. In essence, we claim that pride⎯at least in one of its core senses⎯is to be understood as the vice of excess that corresponds to the virtue of humility. It is argued in turn that humility should be understood as requiring not only an accurate conception of oneself, but also as involving certain characteristic other-regarding dispositions. This is the non-egotistical account of humility. Intellectual virtue is then defined along the same lines. It follows that intellectual pride is the intellectual vice of excess that corresponds to the intellectual virtue of intellectual humility, so understood. We conclude by describing the role of the virtue of humility, intellectual or otherwise, in the good life of flourishing (and, relatedly, how the vice of pride, intellectual or otherwise, is inimical to the good life of flourishing).
Educating for Intellectual Humility
Jason Baehr (ed.), Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology (London: Routledge, 2015), 54-70.
Many contemporary philosophical virtue theorists have begun to restore the sense of an intimacy between virtue, character, and ‘the good life’, and, in turn, philosophers of education explore the ways that educational practice could contribute to the cultivation of virtuous character. Certainly many philosophers and educationalists will agree with Ben Kotzee that it is ‘obvious’ that education ought to ‘form good intellectual character’ (2013: p.163). I am sympathetic to this claim, but also sensitive to the worries of those sceptics who ask about the practical, pedagogical, and philosophical issues it raises.. My purpose in this chapter is to contribute to the revival of aretaic conceptions of education, but in a way sensitive to those sceptics’ concerns. Specifically, I offer an account of the specific virtue of intellectual humility, then show its integral role in a range of familiar educational practices and concerns, and finally describe how certain entrenched educational attitudes and conceptions marginalise or militate against the cultivation and exercise of this virtue.
Cognitive and interpersonal features of intellectual humility
Abstract: Four studies examined intellectual humility—the degree to which people recognize that their beliefs might be wrong. Using a new Intellectual Humility Scale, Study 1 showed that intellectual humility was associated with variables related to openness, curiosity, tolerance of ambiguity, and low dogmatism. Study 2 revealed that participants high in intellectual humility were less certain that their beliefs about religion were correct and judged people less on the basis of their religious opinions. In Study 3, participants high in intellectual humility were less inclined to think that politicians who changed their attitudes were “flip-flopping,” and Study 4 showed that people high in intellectual humility were more attuned to the strength of persuasive arguments than those who were low. In addition to extending our understanding of intellectual humility, this research demonstrates that the Intellectual Humility Scale is a valid measure of the degree to which people recognize that their beliefs are fallible.
Related topics
Cited by
Does Epistemic Humility Threaten Religious Beliefs?
Journal of Psychology and Theology
In a fallen world fraught with evidence against religious beliefs, it is tempting to think that, on the assumption that those beliefs are true, the best way to protect them is to hold them dogmatically. Dogmatic belief, which is highly confident and resistant to counterevidence, may fail to exhibit epistemic virtues such as humility and may instead manifest epistemic vices such as arrogance or servility, but if this is the price of secure belief in religious truths, so be it. I argue, however, that even in a world full of misleading evidence against true religious beliefs, cultivating epistemic humility is the better way to achieve believers’ epistemic aims. The reason is that dogmatic belief courts certain epistemic dangers, including to the true religious beliefs themselves, whereas epistemic humility empowers believers to counter them.
Citizens and Collective Deliberation in Social Science
Manuscrito
It is argued that, in certain particular conditions related to the intellectual character of the deliberators and their cognitive diversity, small research teams that engage in deliberation in the analysis of data and involve citizens can better promote good epistemic results than those teams which do not involve citizens. In particular, it is argued that certain communities within the social sciences that lack the relevant cognitive diversity among their professionals can take advantage of the diversity found in the citizenry to increase the epistemic quality of their research, as long as the citizens possess the relevant virtues.
Wise reasoning, intergroup positivity, and attitude polarization across contexts
Nature Communications
We hypothesized that a wisdom-based reasoning process comprised of epistemic humility, accounting for context, and integrating different perspectives and interests, would be helpful in overcoming intergroup bias and attitude polarization in societal conflicts. Here we test the hypothesis using both the Situated Wise Reasoning Scale and experimental induction. In each study, we recruited participants who self-identified as members of a group implicated in an ongoing intergroup situation. In five correlational studies (Studies 1-5) we examined the relations between measured wise reasoning and intergroup positivity and attitude polarization. In two experiments, we tested the effects of a brief online wise-reasoning thought exercise on intergroup positivity and polarization (Studies 6-7), and charitable behaviors to an outgroup (Study 6). We found that wise reasoning relates to more positivity toward outgroups and less attitude polarization across different groups and conflicts. The res...
Cognitive and Interpersonal Features of Intellectual Humility
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2017
Four studies examined intellectual humility—the degree to which people recognize that their beliefs might be wrong. Using a new Intellectual Humility (IH) Scale, Study 1 showed that intellectual humility was associated with variables related to openness, curiosity, tolerance of ambiguity, and low dogmatism. Study 2 revealed that participants high in intellectual humility were less certain that their beliefs about religion were correct and judged people less on the basis of their religious opinions. In Study 3, participants high in intellectual humility were less inclined to think that politicians who changed their attitudes were “flip-flopping,” and Study 4 showed that people high in intellectual humility were more attuned to the strength of persuasive arguments than those who were low. In addition to extending our understanding of intellectual humility, this research demonstrates that the IH Scale is a valid measure of the degree to which people recognize that their beliefs are fal...
Intellectual humility in mathematics
2018
In this paper I explore how intellectual humility manifests in mathematical practices. To do this I employ accounts of this virtue as developed by virtue epistemologists in three case studies of mathematical activity. As a contribution to a Topical Collection on virtue theory of mathematical practices this paper explores in how far existing virtue-theoretic frameworks can be applied to a philosophical analysis of mathematical practices. I argue that the individual accounts of intellectual humility are successful at tracking some manifestations of this virtue in mathematical practices and fail to track others. There are two upshots to this. First, the accounts of the intellectual virtues provided by virtue epistemologists are insightful for the development of a virtue theory of mathematical practices but require adjustments in some cases. Second, the case studies reveal dimensions of intellectual humility virtue epistemologists have thus far overlooked in their theoretical reflections.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
In this short essay, we sketch a theory of faith that features resilience in the face of challenges to relying on those in whom you have faith. We argue that it handles a variety of both religious and secular faith-data, e.g., the value of faith in relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness, how the Christian and Hebrew scriptures portray pístis and ʾĕmûnāh, and the character of faith as it is often expressed in popular secular venues.
Neuromedia, cognitive offloading, and intellectual perseverance
Synthese, 2022
This paper engages in what might be called anticipatory virtue epistemology, as it anticipates some virtue epistemological risks related to a near-future version of brain-computer interface technology that Michael Lynch (2014) calls 'neuromedia.' I analyze how neuromedia is poised to negatively affect the intellectual character of agents, focusing specifically on the virtue of intellectual perseverance, which involves a disposition to mentally persist in the face of challenges towards the realization of one’s intellectual goals. First, I present and motivate what I call ‘the cognitive offloading argument’, which holds that excessive cognitive offloading of the sort incentivized by a device like neuromedia threatens to undermine intellectual virtue development from the standpoint of the theory of virtue responsibilism. Then, I examine the cognitive offloading argument as it applies to the virtue of intellectual perseverance, arguing that neuromedia may increase cognitive effi...
Virtue theory of mathematical practices: an introduction
Synthese, 2021
Until recently, discussion of virtues in the philosophy of mathematics has been fleeting and fragmentary at best. But in the last few years this has begun to change. As virtue theory has grown ever more influential, not just in ethics where virtues may seem most at home, but particularly in epistemology and the philosophy of science, some philosophers have sought to push virtues out into unexpected areas, including mathematics and its philosophy. But there are some mathematicians already there, ready to meet them, who have explicitly invoked virtues in discussing what is necessary for a mathematician to succeed. In both ethics and epistemology, virtue theory tends to emphasize character virtues, the acquired excellences of people. But people are not the only sort of thing whose excellences may be identified as virtues. Theoretical virtues have attracted attention in the philosophy of science as components of an account of theory choice. Within the philosophy of mathematics, and math...
Benatar’s Anti-Natalism: Philosophically Flawed, Morally Dubious
Philosophia
In the first part of the paper, I discuss Benatar’s asymmetry argument for the claim that it would have been better for each of us to have never lived at all. In contrast to other commentators, I will argue that there is a way of interpreting the premises of his argument which makes all of them come out true. (This will require one departure from Benatar’s own presentation.) Once we see why the premises are true, we will, however, also realise that the argument trades on an ambiguity that renders it invalid. In the second part of the paper, I consider whether discussions of how best to implement the anti-natalist conclusion crosses a moral barrier. I ask whether we can, independently of any philosophical argument, raise a legitimate moral objection to discussions of how best to end all life on earth. I discuss three views concerning the role of our pre-philosophical views and attitudes in philosophical debates: the external view according to which these attitudes set moral barriers ...
Sociopolitical intellectual humility as a predictor of political attitudes and behavioral intentions
Journal of Social and Political Psychology, 2021
Recent research has highlighted the relevance of intellectual humility to politics. Among a U.S. sample (N = 852), we examined self-reported sociopolitical intellectual humility (SIH), a nonthreatening awareness of the fallibility of one’s views about topics central to society and politics. SIH was associated with being less likely to dislike/avoid political discussion, and with more political tolerance, less social dominance orientation, and more values and behavioral intentions focused on social equality, even when controlling political orientation and other relevant factors. SIH was also associated with more positive and less negative views of an individual expressing a political viewpoint. Further, SIH moderated the extent to which initial agreement with a political statement resulted in opinion change on the basis of hearing another person's arguments on the topic. These findings may point to ways SIH is relevant to people's attitudes toward others in society.
Experiência de ensino da ética de virtudes em administração
Revista Eletrônica de Ciência Administrativa
O ensino de ética em Administração envolve inúmeros métodos e perspectivas. Ações éticas têm sido sustentadas por disposições estáveis do caráter: as virtudes. O objetivo deste artigo é discutir como ensinar virtudes em Administração, considerando o caso de estudantes de pós-graduação de uma disciplina eletiva de doutorado. A perspectiva da ética das virtudes desenvolvida em ética empresarial compõe o arcabouço teórico deste estudo, oferecendo métodos de ensino e aprendizagem para se cultivar virtudes morais e intelectuais. Por um estudo de caso de abordagem qualitativa, realizou-se observação participante e entrevista em grupo focal com doutorandos, fornecendo dados que foram codificados e interpretados com o suporte do Atlas.ti. Os resultados evidenciam que discussões teóricas articuladas às atividades experienciais - como aprendizagem baseada na aventura em ambiente natural e análise fílmica - permitem aos estudantes expressar um repertório de virtudes, bem como vivenciar virtude...
Intellectual humility in conversation: Distinct behavioral indicators of self and peer ratings
The Journal of Positive Psychology, 2020
Intellectual humility (IH) has been proposed to be a critical factor facilitating civil discourse. However, wide variability exists concerning what IH actually entails. In this paper, we report a pair of studies investigating how self-ratings and peer-ratings of IH differ in terms of their behavioral associations. In Study 1, students provided round-robin judgments of peers following months of cooperative course work. Self-reported IH was associated with both self-rated and peerrated openness, whereas peer judgments were primarily associated with self-rated and peer-rated agreeableness. In Study 2, small groups from a community sample were formed for 30-minute conversations about a contentious sociopolitical issue. These recorded interactions revealed that although self-reported IH was associated with high levels of engagement, peer-reported IH was characterized by low negativity and positive, supportive statements. These studies provide evidence that the social and epistemic dimensions of IH are used differently when forming either self or peer judgments.
Using self-affirmation to increase intellectual humility in debate
Royal Society Open Science
Intellectual humility, which entails openness to other views and a willingness to listen and engage with them, is crucial for facilitating civil dialogue and progress in debate between opposing sides. In the present research, we tested whether intellectual humility can be reliably detected in discourse and experimentally increased by a prior self-affirmation task. Three hundred and three participants took part in 116 audio- and video-recorded group discussions. Blind to condition, linguists coded participants' discourse to create an intellectual humility score. As expected, the self-affirmation task increased the coded intellectual humility, as well as participants’ self-rated prosocial affect (e.g. empathy). Unexpectedly, the effect on prosocial affect did not mediate the link between experimental condition and intellectual humility in debate. Self-reported intellectual humility and other personality variables were uncorrelated with expert-coded intellectual humility. Implicati...
Leading with humility in tumultuous times: evidence from the United States
International Journal of Public Leadership, 2020
PurposeWicked problems, cross-sectoral and transregional collaborations, emerging technologies and calls for innovation generate exciting but unpredictable transformations in governance. Emerging research suggests humility, rather than certitude, represents a promising ethos for public leaders working to solve problems in tumultuous times. This study examines the nature, value and practice of humility in public administration (PA) leadership.Design/methodology/approachThis study reviews cross-disciplinary research on the nature and value of humility and emerging findings and debates on humility assessment measures. It analyzes discourse among graduate students in US PA classes and uses ethnographic analysis from workshops with local government leaders to identify institutional dynamics that may influence leaders' willingness to act with humility.FindingsFindings suggest that although PA students and leaders may value humility, they encounter institutional constraints related to ...
Online Echo Chambers, Online Epistemic Bubbles, and Open-Mindedness
Episteme
This article is an exercise in the virtue epistemology of the internet, an area of applied virtue epistemology that investigates how online environments impact the development of intellectual virtues, and how intellectual virtues manifest within online environments. I examine online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles (Nguyen 2020, Episteme17(2), 141–61), exploring the conceptual relationship between these online environments and the virtue of open-mindedness (Battaly 2018b, Episteme15(3), 261–82). The article answers two key individual-level, virtue epistemic questions: (Q1) How does immersion in online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles affect the cultivation and preservation of open-mindedness, and (Q2) Is it always intellectually virtuous to exhibit open-mindedness in the context of online echo chambers and epistemic bubbles? In response to Q1, I contend that both online echo chambers and online epistemic bubbles threaten to undermine the cultivation and preservation of open-mi...
Predictors and consequences of intellectual humility
Nature Reviews Psychology, 2022
In a time of societal acrimony, psychological scientists have turned to a possible antidote-intellectual humility. Interest in intellectual humility comes from diverse research areas, including researchers studying leadership and organizational behaviour, personality science, positive psychology, judgement and decision-making, education, culture, and intergroup and interpersonal relationships. In this Review, we synthesize empirical approaches to the study of intellectual humility. We critically examine diverse approaches to defining and measuring intellectual humility and identify the common element: a meta-cognitive ability to recognize the limitations of one's beliefs and knowledge. After reviewing the validity of different measurement approaches, we highlight factors that influence intellectual humility, from relationship security to social coordination. Furthermore, we review empirical evidence concerning the benefits and drawbacks of intellectual humility for personal decision-making, interpersonal relationships, scientific enterprise and society writ large. We conclude by outlining initial attempts to boost intellectual humility, foreshadowing possible scalable interventions that can turn intellectual humility into a core interpersonal, institutional and cultural value.
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 2024
This paper addresses the question of who should be trusted as an expert and when, particularly in the context of public deliberation. Trust in experts is crucial in making decisions about public policies that involve complex information beyond the expertise of most people. However, fruitful deliberation also requires being able to resist misinformation campaigns, no matter how widespread these might be; being able, in general, to evaluate the evidence at our disposal and form our own opinions. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on this apparent tension between epistemic deference and epistemic independence. The paper has two goals. First, it aims at providing a more nuanced understanding of the question of who should be trusted as an expert by examining cases in which seemingly factual claims are made in public settings by experts. Second, it emphasizes the need to pay attention to the conditions under which we actually trust each other. We suggest that fostering trust in science may be better approached by modifying the conditions under which scientific dialogue takes place, rather than trying to convince the public to trust experts, or blaming them for not doing so.
Rethinking Epistemic Relativism
Metaphilosophy, 2019
Relativism" is often treated as a dirty word in philosophy, but relativistic theories are not entirely unappealing-they have features that might be tempting if they weren't thought to be outweighed by problematic consequences. The aim of this paper is to rethink both our attitude to epistemic relativism and the basic features of the view itself. The paper discusses four objections and uses them to isolate five constraints on a more plausible epistemic relativism. It then sketches out a view that meets all of these constraints. This stratified epistemic relativism offers a complex, socially informed picture of justification that accounts for the many different kinds of roles that epistemic agents act, and think, in accordance with each day, and can serve as a starting point for constructing a more detailed epistemic relativism, which could secure its appealing benefits without incurring the costs traditionally associated with relativist views.