The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the Composition of the United States Fleet (original) (raw)
2017
: This paper provides a brief overview of U.S. Navy policy, strategy, plans and operations. It discusses some basic fundamentals and the Navy's three major operational activities: peacetime engagement, crisis response, and wartime combat. It concludes with a general discussion of U.S. naval forces. It was originally written as a contribution to an international conference on maritime strategy and security, and originally published as a chapter in a Routledge handbook in 2015. The author is a longtime contributor to, advisor on, and observer of US Navy strategy and policy, and the paper represents his personal but well-informed views. The paper was written while the Navy (and Marine Corps and Coast Guard) were revising their tri-service strategy document A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, finally signed and published in March 2015, and includes suggestions made by the author to the drafters during that time.
Mariners Mirror, 2011
T he roles and functions of navies are shaped and changed within the strategic constraints and opportunities in which they are used and operated. At the same time, a navy's capabilities and tasks in carrying out its roles and functions are interrelated and governed by the interaction of its direction and its capacity. This interaction involves the effectiveness of its leaders, with their expertise and foresight, along with the social, political, logistical, and economic factors that together create a navy's resource flows, organizational capabilities, and operational effectiveness. 2 In the modern era, the complex design and high cost of warships and weaponry require applications of constantly developing technologies, vast sums of money, and many years for both development and construction. To remain useful for as long as possible, complex modern naval vessels must be designed with a prudent assessment about the nature of their future operations, directly linking this to procurement plans. As this approach has developed and been refined for the United States Navy in the late twentieth century, the naval staff is called upon to reassess continually a long-term evaluation of the strategic situation. 3
U.S. Navy Transformation: Sea Basing as Sea Power 21 Prototype
2005
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Running silent and algorithmic : the U.S. Navy strategic vision in 2019 / author Sam J. Tangredi
2019
A s of January 2019, the U�S� Navy does not possess a coherent, public, strategic vision� 1 The official statement of strategy, or the Navy's strategic concept, to use a term inspired by the late Samuel P� Huntington's term, remains A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower: Forward, Engaged, Ready of March 2015, whose acronym is CS21R (R for revised)� 2 The Department of the Navy (DON) leadership has never declared CS21R to be superseded, nor has anything been published to supplant it� 3 However, CS21R was written to support (and possibly shape) the foreign policy proclivities of the administration of President Barack H� Obama; its predecessor document, CS21 of October 2007, was released during the administration of President George W� Bush� Both of these presidents endorsed engagement with the international community (albeit in contrasting forms)� 4 The public statements of President Donald J� Trump appear to indicate that some of the principles articulated in CS21R may no longer be a good fit, and indeed the emergence of an international system dominated by great-power competition is now more apparent� Outsiders who study the policies of the U�S� Navy are well aware of this disconnect� 5 Yet the U�S� Navy does, in fact, have a strategic vision that reflects the tenets of former Secretary of Defense James N� Mattis's National Defense Strategy (NDS)� Within the Chief of Naval Operations staff (OPNAV), this strategic document has been referred to as "the Navy's response to the NDS" or "the Navy's contribution to the joint force� " Like the NDS, it is classified "Secret" and not available publicly� Unlike the NDS, however, the Navy document does not have an unclassified summary, and there is little indication that one eventually will be prepared� If the Navy's strategic vision is not available publicly, how can we make sense of the service's future policies, resource requirements, dispositions and deployments, and budget submissions? Likewise, how can the U�S� Navy convince the