Socrates and Gorgias (original) (raw)
Related papers
Plato’s Ambivalence about Rhetoric in the Gorgias
The main thesis of the present paper is that Plato's attitude towards rhetoric appears to have been complex to the point of ambivalent, for as one reads the Gorgias, one cannot avoid getting the impression that in spite of his overt castigation of rhetoric, the philosopher did covertly resort to it in the very dialogue. Thus, the article will seek to demonstrate that even though Platonic Socrates repudiated rhetoric understood as political demagoguery and cynical adulation, he did employ some sort of art of persuasion designed to inveigle his interlocutors into accepting a worldview that must have appeared extremely paradoxical for the then mentality.
The Problem of Rhetoric's Materia in Plato's Gorgias (449c9-d9)
Rhetorica, 2011
In this article I shall concentrate on ten lines in Plato's Gorgias (449c9-d9) dealing with what has come to be known as "rhetoric's materia question." By taking Gorgias as a representative of the first stages of rhetoric in ancient Greek thought, and by a close analysis of Socrates' move in the above section, I shall pinpoint exactly where Plato located rhetoric in the consciousness of Gorgias, and by this offer a new perspective on one of the hot questions in secondary literature nowadays-the origin of τ χνη ητορικ .
The Problem of Rhetoric's Materia in Plato's Gorgias (449c9-d9), Rhetorica 29.1 (2011): 1–22.
Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric, 2011
In this article I shall concentrate on ten lines in Plato's Gorgias (449c9-d9) dealing with what has come to be known as "rhetoric's materia question." By taking Gorgias as a representative of the first stages of rhetoric in ancient Greek thought, and by a close analysis of Socrates' move in the above section, I shall pinpoint exactly where Plato located rhetoric in the consciousness of Gorgias, and by this offer a new perspective on one of the hot questions in secondary literature nowadays-the origin of τ χνη ητορικ .
The object of this treatise is a comparison between Gorgias and Socrates views on rhetoric, namely the truth in rhetoric. The two prominent scholars of Greek antiquity, Gorgias as an expert on rhetoric and Socrates as a well-known philosopher, have attempted to examine the basics of rhetoric. Democracy has made rhetoric a high value of ancient Greek society, as well as an approach to enunciate, review and argue in public on various issues. As a tool of public communication, addressed to the attendees to convince them regarding an issue submitted for discussion and to fulfill its mission in the best to society, rhetoric should have support in the truth. This is the point at which both ancient scholars agree. But the issue is seen from a different point of view, and both defending their own views bring arguments and counter-arguments, which are worth even today. The purpose of this paper is that, through confrontational approach and interpretation, to set diverse views and to reach a conclusion on the truth in rhetoric.
Gorgias Reloaded: A New-found Dialogue between Gorgias and Socrates
2017
In the Elysian Fields, Socrates to his surprise meets his old rhetorical adversary Gorgias-who has, in the meantime, come to think twice about some of the alleged errors that Socrates made him admit to in the Platonic dialogue about their original encounter. Among other things, Gorgias has had the advantage of gathering a few points from a certain young thinker hailing "from up North" (he presumably means Stagira). Thus equipped, he takes Socrates to task about several of his anti-rhetorical pronouncements from back then that Gorgias now feels he is in a position to challenge. SOCRATES Well, if that isn't-you can call me a sophist if that isn't-Gorgias! Old boy! Fancy meeting you herein the Elysian Fields! The Island of the Blessed! The very man who brought that awful nuisance, rhetoric, to Athens! I'd never have thought I'd live to see that. In fact, I didn't. GORGIAS No, you didn't see that one coming, did you, Socrates? And you know, it was only recently that they let us in, me and my gang-you know, the other sophists, Protagoras and Prodicus and Antisthenes and those guys. And why do think that is? You did that to us. You did such a great job dragging our names through the mud, smearing me and the other sophists or rhetoricians, as you call us, and thanks to you most philosophers until this day have detested us. Take a philosopher like John Locke, one of the bright lights who started the so-called Enlightenment-he said this in An Essay on Human Understanding (1690): "It is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publicly taught, and has always been had in great reputation." He also said that rhetoric does nothing but "insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment"
Plato's Phaedrus as a response to Gorgias' criticism to rhetoric - ENGLISH VERSION
Chinese and Foreign Humanism Studies, 2014
This paper aims to discuss to what extent Plato develops in the Phaedrus the idea of a "true rhetoric" which has been brought up several times in the Gorgias (503a-b, 504d-e, 517a, 521d-522a). In addition it will examine which conditions Plato specifies for it being practiced as tekhnē. I will propose that in the Phaedrus Plato attempts to respond straightforwardly to the main objection to rhetoric as flattery, a position advanced by Socrates' character in the Gorgias. According to Socrates, rhetoric, at least as practiced in Athenian democracy, constitutes an irrational activity insofar as (a) it does not understand the nature of the soul to which its speeches are directed nor does it understand the subject of its speeches (that is to say, the just and the unjust, the fine and the shameful, the good and the bad: Grg. 459d); and (b) it is unable to give explanations of each thing and of its own actions (Grg. 465; 501a-b). In the Phaedrus, in turn, Plato advances three methodological principles so that rhetoric can be taught as a tekhnē. If "the rhetorical art as a whole is a kind of psychagōgia by means of speech" (Phdr. 261a8) and if it is directed towards the souls of the listeners, then the rhetor must (i) examine with precision the nature of the soul; (ii) discern the natural actions and affections of the soul; (iii) divide and explain the kinds of speeches and the kinds of soul. He thus must coordinate each kind of soul with the kind of speech appropriate to it, and explain why a certain kind of soul is necessarily persuaded by one particular kind of speech, whereas another one is not (Phdr. 271a-b). This methodology based on division and collection (Phdr. 265d-266b) is precisely the domain of the dialectician as highlighted by Socrates' character (Phdr. 266c). My ultimate aim therefore is to argue that in the Phaedrus Plato subordinates rhetoric to dialectics which are considered to be a sine qua non condition whenever rhetoric is to be taught and practiced as tekhnē. In addition we may read this as Plato's critical response to Isocrates' model of education insofar as Socrates refers to him explicitly at the end of the dialogue (Phdr. 278e-279b).
Between Rhetoric and Sophistry: The Puzzling Case of Plato's Gorgias
Apeiron 53: 59-80, 2020
The case of Gorgias' profession has been an object of ongoing dispute among scholars. This is mainly because in some dialogues Plato calls Gorgias a rhetorician, in others a sophist. The purpose of this article is to show that a solution only emerges in the Gorgias, where Plato presents Gorgias' goals as a rhetorician and its associated arts. On this basis, Plato introduces a systematic division between genuine arts and fake arts, including rhetoric and sophistry, thereby identifying their conceptual differences and similarities. The paper concludes by arguing that Gorgias can be called both a rhetorician and a sophist, provided that the labeling is done from different perspectives.
Socrates's Great Speech: The Defense of Philosophy in Plato's Gorgias
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2021
This paper focuses on a neglected portion of Plato's Gorgias from 506c to 513d during Socrates's discussion with Callicles. I claim that Callicles adopts the view that virtue lies in self-preservation in this part of the dialogue. Such a position allows him to assert the value of rhetoric in civic life by appealing not to the goodness of acting unjustly with impunity, but to the badness of suffering unjustly without remedy. On this view, the benefits of the life of rhetoric depend on the idea that virtue consists in the power to protect oneself from the predations of others. I argue that by challenging this understanding of virtue as self-preservation, Socrates both deprives Callicles of any remaining justification for the rhetorical life in the Gorgias and, at the same time, makes room for his own defense of the life of philosophy.