From Revolution to War: State Relations in a World of Change (original) (raw)

France, Russia, Usa: On Hegemony, Revolutions and Wars

2018

It is widely accepted that revolutions, i.e. sudden and violent regime changes occurring beyond the established legal framework and supported by a significant portion of the society can increase the likelihood of becoming involved in an interstate conflict1. Two critical bodies of research on postrevolutionary conflicts are Maoz’s Domestic Sources of Global Change (1996: 71–124) and Stephen M. Walt’s Revolution and War (1996: 18–46). Both authors observe an increased likelihood of an interstate conflict following a revolution2. They also describe the struggle between established status-quo powers and new revolutionary regimes which seek to disturb the ‘balance of threat’ (Walt 1996: 19) in their vicinity. Current research, however, does not examine the relationship between a revolution and instigating a war versus becoming a target. The main research question is, thus, why do some revolutions lead to becoming a target of military operations and others to their initiation? One hypoth...

the concurrence of powers in French and American revolutions

How did American and French revolutionaries concur in the invention of a republican regime "without precedent"? Abstract: At the end of the eighteen century, many revolutionaries read Montesquieu as an “oracle” (Madison) who could bring endless lights to their deliberations in a time of great political uncertainty. In their views, the well-documented “balance of power” was the key-piece of a limited government ruled by liberal principles such as separation of powers, division of functions, elective representation and public deliberation. In United-States and France, nevertheless, the constituents were facing new issues because they wanted to found an extended republican regime. While deliberating at the American “Convention” and at the French “Constituante”, they realized how deep and “without precedent” was their political crisis, especially when they had to build up a mechanism for allocating military powers. In both cases, they favored a new political system based on the “concours des pouvoirs” (Mirabeau) or “concurrence” of powers (James Wilson). Such a system was slightly different from the British regime as described by Montesquieu and Blackstone – two very influent thinkers at this time. In this paper, I will set a comparison between American and French parliamentary deliberations during the revolutionary era – a “Sattelzeit” according to Reinhart Koselleck – in order to identify the historical and theoretical reasons of this conceptual revolution. I try to understand why and how revolutionaries questioned liberal principles and reinvented republican regime in a time of widespread crisis when all political forms – ancient democracies, city-state, limited government, nation-state, universal empire and absolute monarchy – were deeply challenged. The system of “concurrence of powers” emerged as a solution to the crisis of sovereignty – when king and people were claiming to its sole exercise -, the crisis of political liberalism – when the competition of ambitions failed at regulating both limited monarchies and European system -, and the crisis of early republicanism, - when direct government and popular control on Legislature was unsuccessful at coping with economic crisis and public debts.

Domestic Revolutionary Leaders and International Conflict

World Politics, 2013

There is a strong scholarly consensus that domestic revolutions create conditions ripe for international conflict. Traditionally scholars have treated revolutions as events, after which there is a period of time during which international conflict is more likely. Yet some states experience significant international conflict only during and in the immediate aftermath of a revolution, whereas other states continue to engage in conflict for many years and even decades afterward. This article seeks to explain the persistence of conflict for some but not all revolutionary states by differentiating the concept of revolutionary leaders from that of revolutions as events, both theoretically and empirically. The author shows that existing theories linking revolution to international conflict underemphasize an important mechanism through which revolution leads to conflict: by selecting conflict-prone leaders through the dynamics of revolutionary politics. He argues that revolutionary politics allow leaders with certain characteristics, including high risk tolerance and strong political ambition to alter the status quo, to obtain executive office because individuals without these characteristics generally do not succeed in leading revolutions. Having obtained power, revolutionary leaders have aggressive preferences that make their states more likely than nonrevolutionary states to instigate international conflict.

Revolutions as a Cause of War Initiation and Becoming a Target

The mainstream literature on revolutions points to the conclusion that within about five years from the onset of a revolution the probability that a given country will be involved in a military interstate dispute rises dramatically. However, there are no clear conclusions regarding the probability of becoming an instigator or a target of a conflict. The aim of my project is to examine which variables determine the exact type of military actions that the post-revolutionary state becomes involved in. My working hypothesis is that the geopolitical and economic factors, which shape a given states influence within its immediate international surrounding, play a pivotal role. Thus I arrive at a twofold typology of revolutions. The " hegemonic revolutions " (China, Russia, France) are generally more rare, however, when they do occur they create a powerful incentive on the part of the local hegemon to reshape its whole regional environment and thus become an instigator of military conflicts. The " peripheral revolutions " , on the other hand, are seen by local hegemons as a threat to their influence and thus make the post-revolutionary regimes a likely target of aggression. Interestingly, the same set of variables that contribute to a revolutionary overflow in the international environment create strategic incentives for both spreading revolutions and trying to quenching them depending on the geopolitical situation. In my work I draw both from the recent quantitative databases on revolutions and present case studies ncluding recent conflicts in Ukraine.