REVIEW Derk Pereboom - Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (original) (raw)
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Challenging Physicalism - a First-Personal Defence of Phenomenal Consciousness
In this paper I challenge the physicalist claim, that everything that exists in the universe can be reduced to a physical explanation, and hence, consciousness is reducible to a physicalist explanation as well. I show some of the weaknesses of this argument, and introduce some classic objections to it, but also argue that such objections are not enough to overthrow physicalism and that something more is needed. In the second part of the paper I attempt to show what that something more could be, and show how we can study consciousness from a first-person perspective through methods such as introspection and phenomenology. In the third and last part, I take on naturalized phenomenology in the form of neurophenomenology, and argue that although we can, and should, study consciousness from a first-person perspective if we want a complete picture, or theory, of consciousness, we still can't bridge the explanatory gap, due to problems and differences in terminology between the third-personal (objective) sciences, and the first-personal (subjective) sciences.
Consciousness regained? Philosophical arguments for and against reductive physicalism
This paper is an introductory overview of recent discussions concerning the mind-body problem, which is being addressed at the interface between philosophy and neuroscience. It focuses on phenomenal features of consciousness or “qualia,” which are distinguished from various related issues. Then follows a discussion of various influential skeptical arguments that question the possibility of reductive explanations of qualia in physicalist terms: knowledge arguments, conceivability arguments, the argument of multiple realizability, and the explanatory gap argument. None of the arguments is found to be very convincing. It does not necessarily follow that reductive physicalism is the only option, but it is defensible. However, constant conceptual and methodological reflection is required, alongside ongoing research, to keep such a view free from dogmatism and naivety. Keywords: Consciousness, philosophy of mind, qualia, reductionism, knowledge argument, conceivability argument, multiple realization, explanatory gap, relation between philosophy and neuroscience
E-Physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness - Table of Contents & Introduction
Bernal, R. J. (2012). E-physicalism. A Physicalist Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness. Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag/De Gruyter. , 2013
This work advances a theory in the metaphysics of phenomenal consciousness, which the author labels “e-physicalism”. Firstly, he endorses a realist stance towards consciousness and physicalist metaphysics. Secondly, he criticises Strong AI and functionalist views, and claims that consciousness has an internal character. Thirdly, he discusses HOT theories, the unity of consciousness, and holds that the “explanatory gap” is not ontological but epistemological. Fourthly, he argues that consciousness is not a supervenient but an emergent property, not reducible and endowed with original causal powers, with respect to the micro-constituents of the conscious entity. Fifthly, he addresses the “zombie argument” and the “supervenience argument” within the e-physicalism framework. Finally, he elaborates on the claim that phenomenal properties are physical and discusses the “knowledge argument”.
Conceptualizing Physical Consciousness
Theories which combine physicalism with phenomenal concepts abandon the phenomenal irrealism characteristic of 1950s physicalism, thereby leaving physicalists trying to reconcile themselves to concepts appropriate only to dualism. Physicalists should instead abandon phenomenal concepts and try to develop our concepts of conscious states. Employing an account of concepts as structured mental representations, and motivating a model of conceptual development with semantic externalist considerations, I suggest that phenomenal concepts misrepresent their referents, such that if our conception of consciousness incorporates them, it needs development. I then argue that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) of a purely cognitive account of the distinction between phenomenal and physical concepts combines physicalism with phenomenal concepts only by misrepresenting physical properties. This is because phenomenal concepts carry ontological commitment, and I present an argument to show the tension between this commitment and granting ontological authority to physical concepts only. In the final section, I show why phenomenal concepts are more ontologically committed than PCS theorists can allow, revive U.T. Place’s notion of a ‘phenomenological fallacy’ to explain their enduring appeal, and then suggest some advantages of functional analyses of concepts of conscious states over the phenomenal alternative.
Melnyk provides a rigorous analysis of the notion of realization with the aim of defining Physicalism. It is argued here that contrary to Melnyk’s Realization Physicalism, the idea that mental phenomena are realized by physical phenomena fails to capture the physicalist belief that the former obtain in virtue of the latter. The conclusion is not that Physicalism is false, but that its truth is best explained with some notion other than realization in Melnyk’s sense. I also argue that the problems with Melnyk’s brand of Realization Physicalism generalize to other potential attempts to express Physicalism in terms of realization. The burden of proof is on the Realization Physicalist to show that physicalist intuitions can be adequately captured with the notion of realization.
The Conscious Mind Violates Physical Laws: A New Argument against Physicalism
According to the laws of physics, the state of a physical system can only be measured by another system (usually a particular measuring device) via a physical interaction. However, when our brain is in a conscious mental state, it can in principle output its physical state based on the psycho-physical correspondance between the mental state and the physical state. It is arguable that this indicates that the conscious mind violates physical laws and it is not physical as physicalism claims.
Consciousness and Consequences: The physical nature of mind
“Aspects of Consciousness: Essays on Physics, Death and the Mind.” Ingrid Fredricksson, editor. McFarland, 2013., 2013
Science investigates phenomena in nature that are either experienced or observed by people. However, some special classes of phenomena are generally considered outside of the realm of science if not just plain unscientific, i.e., unworthy of scientific investigation by the majority of scientists. Science has generally dismissed or ignored any phenomena directly associated with mind or consciousness, which amounts to a scientific bias against these concepts. Even psychology, the science of mind, neither directly studies nor even speculates on the ultimate nature of mind and consciousness, but hides behind behaviorism. This shortcoming of science is actually a historical artifact inherited from the earlier break between science and religion and the subsequent separation of human thought into the two realms of MIND and MATTER, but it is also likely that the unintended consequences of adopting a physical theory or model of consciousness are more than science has been willing to accept. The present shortcomings of science in this regard were institutionalized at the end of the eighteenth century by the adoption of positivistic philosophies by the majority of scientists and scholars. But nature has had her way in spite of the best intentions and efforts of science to the contrary: New research and recent discoveries point directly to the conclusion that science has reached a point in its normal advancement beyond which it cannot pass until it distinguishes between matter and the consciousness that is perceiving and interpreting matter, thus necessitating the first ever theories of both consciousness and matter. Keywords: Life, Mind, Consciousness, matter, survival of consciousness, afterlife, quantum theory, relativity, four-dimensional, space, five-dimensional, space-time, metric, memory, electromagnetism, scalar potential, vector potential, magnetic potential, physical reality