Matters of definition in the demystification of mental imagery (original) (raw)
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On the demystification of mental imagery
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1979
What might a theory of mental imagery look like, and how might one begin formulating such a theory? These are the central questions addressed in the present paper. The first section outlines the general research direction taken here and provides an overview of the empirical foundations of our theory of image representation and processing. Four issues are considered in succession, and the relevant results of experiments are presented and discussed. The second section begins with a discussion of the proper form for a cognitive theory, and the distinction between a theory and a model is developed. Following this, the present theory and computer simulation model are introduced. This theory specifies the nature of the internal representations (data structures) and the processes that operate on them when one generates, inspects, or transforms mental images. In the third, concluding, section we consider three very different kinds of objections to the present research program, one hinging o...
A Journey Through the Concept of Mental Image
This article defines the mental image (MI) as an operative synthesis that allows us to act in a dynamic cognitive context that can be a real or imaginary situation, making a distinction between perception and MI. A dynamic cognitive context is the confluence of several mental capacities acting simultaneously to create products: perceptual, imaginary, affective, proprioceptive,
Perception & Psychophysics, 2000
A series of experiments considers the extent to which the interrelations among subjective magnitudes aroused by images corresponds to those for subjective magnitudes aroused by physical stimuli. In Experiment 1,68 undergraduates typed phrases in response to graded categories regarding the imagined magnitude of lights, sounds, and smells. In Experiment 2, 5 undergraduates and, in Experiment 3, 3 graduate students then magnitude estimated the image intensity aroused by each of these stimulus phrases. In Experiments 4 and 5, the same subjects performed cross-modality matches between phrases arousing images for different attributes (light, sound, and smell). Statistical analysis indicates that estimates based on images display many of the same patterns as those based on physical stimuli. The major exception involves sequence effects, present for actual stimuli but not for images. An outstanding issue in cognitive psychology centers on the degree to which the subjective magnitude aroused by an image corresponds to that aroused by the physical stimulus itself (Finke, 1985; Kosslyn, 1987; Shepard & Cooper, 1982). Empirical evidence supports the view that many of the brain structures underlying perceptual, primarily visual, processes are the same as those responsible for imagery (
The heterogenous and dynamic nature of mental images: An empirical study
Belgrade Philosophical Annual
This article addresses the problem of the nature of mental imagery from a new perspective. It suggests that sign-theoretical approach as elaborated by C. S. Peirce can give a better and more comprehensive explanation of mental imagery. Our empirical findings follow the methodology of cognitive semiotics and they show that (i) properties of mental images are heterogenous in nature; (ii) properties of mental images are dependent on the characteristics of object-stimulus; (iii) properties of mental images are dependent on individual differences in imaginary capacities. This suggests that, contrary to representational accounts, mental imagery is not based on one dominant representational format. Imagery constitutes a complex system of signs consisting of several sign elements and dynamic relations. A sign-theoretical account may give a better explanation of the nature of mental imagery, as it accommodates heterogenous evidence from this experiment.
Comments on “The Imagery Debate Revisited: A Computational Perspective”
Computational Intelligence, 2007
Glasgow is surely correct in asserting the usefulness of a computer science perspective on mental imagery. The arguments here are familiar ones, and are as persuasive in this domain as they have been in many others. Psychological data allow a detailed characterization of mental imagery, which we can use as a base for developing new programming tools, or new modes of data representation. At the same time, a computer science perspective can inform psychological research. Computer models can obviously guide the development of psychology theory, by demanding a precise and explicit characterization of knowledge representations and processes. Likewise, computer simulations provide a useful source of data, e.g., data about the utility and accessibility of this or that mode of
The demands of mental travel: demand characteristics of mental imagery experiments
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1979
What might a theory of mental imagery look like, and how might one begin formulating such a theory? These are the central questions addressed in the present paper. The first section outlines the general research direction taken here and provides an overview of the empirical foundations of our theory of image representation and processing. Four issues are considered in succession, and the relevant results of experiments are presented and discussed. The second section begins with a discussion of the proper form for a cognitive theory, and the distinction between a theory and a model is developed. Following this, the present theory and computer simulation model are introduced. This theory specifies the nature of the internal representations (data structures) and the processes that operate on them when one generates, inspects, or transforms mental images. In the third, concluding, section we consider three very different kinds of objections to the present research program, one hinging on the possibility of experimental artifacts in the data, and the others turning on metatheoretical commitments about the form of a cognitive theory. Finally, we discuss how one ought best to evaluate theories and models of the sort developed here.
A cognitive model in which representations are images
Cognitive Systems Research, 2005
Interpretations of images of the brain are starting to reveal the conceptual tasks in which the person was engaged at the time of imaging. Existing mathematical models can explain the patterns of activity observed in such images in terms of the coherent activity of large populations of neurons, but not in terms of cognition. This paper is an early investigation into how such patterns might provide the internal representations for a cognitive system. Probes, working memories and memories are all represented as images. The accompanying process model describes how attention is set according to the contents of working memory, how attention determines what parts of the probe are memorised, how memories are activated according to similarity to the probe in areas in attention, and how working memory is managed. The model is demonstrated on re-creations of classic simulations of recognition memory and categorisation.