Experimental research in financial accounting (original) (raw)
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Perspectives on experimental research in managerial accounting
In this paper, I discuss the importance of conducting experimental research in managerial accounting and provide a framework for understanding and assessing the contributions of research in this area. I then use this framework to organize, integrate, and evaluate the existing experimental managerial accounting research. Based on my review and synthesis of the literature, I suggest numerous avenues for future experimental research in managerial accounting.
An Experimental Market's Investigation of Discretionary Financial Disclosure
Abacus, 1996
The extent to which market forces can induce full financial disclosure by managers has long been an issue of interest to regulators. Investigating this phenomenon with naturally occurring data produces a major obstacle: since managers' private information sets are unknown, it is necessary to make assumptions about them in order to interpret the nature (e.g., favourable or unfavourable, income increasing or income decreasing) of the information that is disclosed. The validity of the inferences relies critically on the validity of these assumptions. The present study uses a laboratory experiment to test three hypotheses derived from prior analytical and empirical research: (H1) When disclosure costs are zero, managers voluntarily disclose all (good and bad) news; (H2) When disclosure costs are positive. managers only disclose news which exceeds some threshold: and (H3) The mandatory disclosure of non-proprietary information induces an increase in the disclosure of correlated. proprietary information. One hundred and fifty-six subjects participated in markets with one firm manager and three investors. Over thirteen independent periods, the managers decided whether to truthfully disclose the liquidation value of the asset under their stewardship, and the investors submitted competing bids for the asset. With costless disclosure. investors price-protected themselves when managers withheld information, but the price penalty that they imposed was insufficient to induce full disclosure. With positive disclosure cost, investors reduced the price penalty that they imposed for non-disclosure, and managers disclosed proportionally fewer of the less extreme good news. Finally, mandatory disclosure of information had no significant impact on the voluntary disclosure of correlated proprietary information. Discussion centres on our failure to support the (equilibrium) prediction from analytical research that full disclosure should obtain when disclosures are costless. Several limitations of the study are examined. and it remains an open question whether additional trials (periods) in the present study might have provided full disclosure.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 2005
This study uses experimental markets to investigate how moral reasoning influences auditor reporting under different levels of economic incentives. In each multiperiod market, auditor subjects could either (1) misreport low observed outcomes as high and thereby reap economic advantages at the expense of third-party investors, or (2) truthfully report low observed outcomes as low but thereby forgo the economic advantages of misreporting. We extend the Calegari, Schatzberg, and Sevcik 1998 experimental-markets setting to incorporate moral reasoning, and test hypotheses based on the economic model of Magee and Tseng 1990 and the neo-Kohlbergian moral reasoning framework of Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, and Thoma 1999. We document a significant effect of moral reasoning on auditor behavior. Specifically, we find that misreporting and premium fees are more likely with higher than with lower moral reasoning subjects, and the moral reasoning effect diminishes as economic penalties increase in the market. These findings provide valuable insights for specifying the determinants of auditor misreporting, the observable behaviors that signal its existence, and the institutions that can prevent its occurrence in the market. We conclude that the relation between moral reasoning and behavior is more complex than commonly assumed in the accounting literature, and identify directions for future research.
Accounting Information Disclosure: Single Versus Multiple Benchmark
Hasanuddin Economics and Business Review
This study aims to analyze the level of estimation bias made by investors based on the form of disclosure of single and multiple benchmark accounting information. The research design uses an experimental laboratory (between-subject). Respondents in this study used 40 students who had attended capital market schools on the Indonesia Stock Exchange as a representation of novice investors. The results of hypothesis testing indicate that the disclosure of accounting information in the form of multiple benchmarks is better than the form of single benchmark information. This is indicated by the smaller error rate of estimation made by investors in predicting future earnings. Thus, the bias in decision making can be minimized by presenting more comprehensive accounting information using multiple benchmark forms.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2007
Insights on how ordinary, less-sophisticated investors interpret and process management-issued pro forma earnings numbers are useful to regulators because of concerns that pro forma disclosures are misleading to ordinary investors. Two recent experimental studies [Frederickson, J. R., & Miller, J. S. (2004). The effects of pro forma earnings disclosures on analysts' and nonprofessional investors' equity valuation judgments. The Accounting Review, 79(3), 667-686; Elliott, W. B. (2006). Are investors influenced by pro forma emphasis and reconciliations in earnings announcements? The Accounting Review, 81(1), 113-133] find that the existence of a pro forma number in the earnings press release as well as the relative placement of the pro forma and GAAP earnings figures within the press release affect the judgments of less-sophisticated investors but not those of more-sophisticated investors. Experimental and archival methodologies complement one another and results that persist in both settings are likely to be robust to both internal and external validity concerns. Therefore, we complement experimental evidence using trade-size-based proxies constructed from intraday transactions data to distinguish the trading activities of less-sophisticated investors from more-sophisticated investors. Our results suggest that less-sophisticated investors rely significantly more on quarterly earnings press releases that include a pro forma number than on those that do not, while more-sophisticated investors exhibit the opposite behavior. This result is consistent with Frederickson and Miller's experimental evidence. Further, consistent with Elliott's results, we find that less-sophisticated investors rely more on the pro forma figure when it is placed before the GAAP earnings number in the press release, while more-sophisticated investors' trading behavior is unaffected by
Auditing , Governance and Reporting : An Experimental Investigation
2007
We use a controlled laboratory setting to experimentally examine the role of auditing and market-based-governance in restraining managerial expropriation and inaccurate financial reporting. Managerial expropriation is broadly defined as the enabling of all actions that opportunistically transfer wealth from investors to managers through understatement of realizable income. Similarly, auditing is broadly defined as all the auditing and governance systems that increase the likelihood of accurate reporting of realizable income. Market-based governance is operationalized by a device (poison pill) that entrenches managers. The results of the experiment reveal that the market converges to equilibrium even without auditing. However, auditing reduces expropriation, attracts more capital and thereby increases the overall welfare, after accounting for the cost of auditing. Further, we show that poison pill adoption results in a demand for more audit and lower net inflow of capital. The effect...
2009
We design an experiment to examine the influence of audit experience on subsequent reporting decisions when auditors become managers of audited firms. In contrast to the independence issues that can arise when auditors and their clients are related by prior affiliation, we focus this study on the more common case in which auditors assume subsequent employment with other firms’ clients. In a bi-matrix experimental game that captures key features of the strategic tension between auditors and reporters, we find that reporters who have prior experience as an auditor, particularly the experience of having been a diligent auditor, are more sensitive to large penalties for aggressive reporting than are reporters whose experience is exclusively as a reporter. Our results suggest implications for regulators in predicting the effects of reporting penalties and for firms in considering the effects of CPA experience when hiring for reporting positions.
Does the earnings quality matter? Evidence from a quasi-experimental setting
Finance Research Letters, 2016
Investor preference for local stocks provides a quasi-experimental setting to investigate whether the market rewards firms that comply with generally accepted accounting principles. We show firms with low earnings quality trade at a premium compared to firms in compliance with accounting principles; the difference in values is greater when the role of local investor over-trading is stronger in stock price-formation, in other words for the more isolated firms. The value of the information not conveyed to the market through accounting disclosure accounts for 30% of the market-to-book. Results are robust to earnings quality definition, and show while non-local investors are sensitive to the quality of accounting information, local and better-informed investors are not. Overall, accounting quality matters.
We investigate the frictions that impede individual investors' use of accounting information and, in particular, their costs of monitoring and acquiring accounting disclosures. We do so using an archival setting in which individuals are presented with automated media articles that report both current earnings news and past stock returns. Although these investors have earnings information readily available, we find no evidence that their trades * Foster incorporate it. Instead we find that their trading responds to the trailing stock returns presented in the articles. Our study raises questions about the efficacy of regulations that aim to aid less sophisticated investors by increasing their awareness of and access to accounting information. JEL codes: D83; G12; G14; M41