From Selfhood to Social Solidarity; From a Mind towards the Collective Thinking and Working Bodies: A Marxist Approach (original) (raw)
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Ratio Juris, 2008
The individual freedom has been an imperative, for the achievement of all the aims that the human life involves. In the same way, it is the autonomy, essential piece for the correct construction of the personality of every man. Consequently, the existen ce of the man has revolved through history around the satisfaction of these values. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze in which moment these elements of so much worth were overshadowed by illusory promises that the modernism brings and how, without being aware, we beco me part of a collective mind that found in the comfort the chains that tie it to the Slavism of not thinking by itself.