Military Keynesianism in the Post-Vietnam War Era: A View from the American States (original) (raw)

Abstract

A prominent explanation for U.S. military spending in the three decades following World War II suggests that state managers used military spending as a countercyclical fiscal policy to stabilize the economy. This military Keynesian argument contends that military spending fluctuates in response to a confluence of interests among capitalist firms in the monopoly sector, organized labor, and politicians who seek to ensure their incumbency in office. With the end of the Cold War and the rise of a "new military " era, with its focus on technologically advanced weapons and a small standing army, military Keynesian arguments have fallen out of favor. On the other hand, the enormity of the military budget and the fact that the livelihoods of millions of citizens are still tied to the military sector renews questions about the role of military spending in shaping economic policy. In this article, we revisit the thesis of military Keynesianism during the post-Vietnam era (1977-2004) using state-level data for 49 U.S. states. Our analysis provides new evidence that military Keynesianism is still relevant in this largely peacetime economy. Several implications of these findings are also discussed.

Gordon Gauchat hasn't uploaded this paper.

Let Gordon know you want this paper to be uploaded.

Ask for this paper to be uploaded.