Ioannis Bellas, Bows and arrowheads from ancient Macedonia: from hunters to archers, in Magdalena Pogonskiej-Pol (ed.) Oblicza Wojny (Faces of War) 10, Lodz 2023 (original) (raw)
Related papers
The armed forces that Athens took into the Peloponnesian War had four distinct corps. The two with the longest lists of modern studies are the cavalry and the navy. The same level of focus is now paid to the hoplite corps. In contrast to these three branches the archers continue to be largely unstudied. Indeed the last study that was dedicated to the archer corps was published in 1913. This neglect of the archers by military historians is totally unjustified. The creation of this corps in the late 480s was a significant military innovation. For the rest of the fifth century Athens constantly deployed archer-corps-members in a wide range of important roles. In the late 430s the state spent just as much on them as it did on the cavalry-corps. Nevertheless this neglect accounts for the fact that 4 problems about the archers remain unresolved. The first problem is why the Athenians took the unprecedented step of creating such a corps. In fact very few military historians recognise this as the problem that it is. The second problem is that many archer-corps-members were actually citizens. It is likely that acute personal poverty had ruled out their service as hoplites. But this leaves unexplained why they did not chose the navy, because naval service was cheaper still and earned a lot much esteem. The third problem is the role that the 10 tribes played in the archer corps’s organisation. Certainly horsemen and hoplites fought in tribal units. But there is ongoing debate about whether archers did the same. The fourth problem is this branch’s disappearance after only 80 years. The one explanation that there is was made by A. Plassart more than a 100 years ago. Since his study epigraphy has hugely increased what we know about this branch. This new evidence shows that Plassart’s explanation is no longer valid. This seminar’s main goal is to resolve these 4 problems. In doing so it seeks to redress the archer corps’s neglect in ancient Greece’s military history.
The armed forces that Athens took into the Peloponnesian War had four branches. The two of them with the longest lists of modern studies are the cavalry and the navy. The same level of focus is now paid to the hoplite corps. In contrast to them the archers continue to be largely unstudied. Indeed the last study that was dedicated to this branch was published in 1913. There is no justification for the neglect that military historians have shown the archer corps. The creation of it in the late 480s represented a significant military innovation. For the rest of the fifth century Athens constantly deployed archer-corps-members in a wide range of important roles. In the late 430s the state spent just as much on them as it did on the cavalry-corps. The scholarly neglect of archers may be unjustified. But it does accounts for the fact that four problems about them remain unresolved. The first problem is why the Athenians took the unprecedented step of creating this corps. Few military historians are even aware of this problem. The second is the certainty that many archer-corps-members were citizens. It is likely that acute poverty had ruled out their service as hoplites. But this leaves unexplained why they did not chose the navy, especially as naval service was cheaper still and sailors earned a lot more esteem. The third problem is the role that the ten tribes played in the archer corps’s organisation. Certainly horsemen and hoplites fought in tribal units. But there is ongoing debate about whether archers did the same. The fourth problem is this branch’s disappearance after only 80 years. The only explanation is the one that Plassart made more than a hundred years ago. Since his study epigraphy has hugely increased what we know about this branch. This new evidence shows that Plassart’s explanation can no longer be sustained. This paper’s main goal is to resolve these problems. In doing it helps to redress the archer corps’s neglect in the writing of classical Athens’s military history.
David M. Pritchard 2018, 'The Archers of Classical Athens', Greece and Rome 65.1, 86-102.
The armed forces that Athens took into the Peloponnesian War had four distinct corps. The two that have been studied the most are the cavalry-corps and the navy. The same level of focus is now paid to the hoplite corps. In contrast to these three branches the archers continue to be largely unstudied. Indeed the last dedicated study of this corps was published in 1913. This neglect of the archers by military historians is unjustified. The creation of the archer corps in the late 480s was a significant military innovation. For the rest of the fifth century Athens constantly deployed archers in a wide range of important combat-roles. In the late 430s the state spent just as much on them as it did on the cavalry. Nevertheless this neglect explains why four problems about them remain unresolved. The first problem is why the Athenians took the unprecedented step of creating such a corps. Very few military historians recognise this as the problem that it is. The second problem is that many military archers were actually Athenian citizens. It is likely that poverty had ruled out their service as hoplites. But this leaves unexplained why they did not chose the navy, because naval service was cheaper still and earned, as we shall see, a lot more esteem. The third problem is the role that the ten tribes played in the archer corps’s organisation. Certainly horsemen and hoplites fought in tribal units. But there is ongoing debate about whether the rest of the armed forces was organised by tribes. The fourth problem is this branch’s disappearance after only 80 years. A. Plassart attempted to explain it more than a hundred years ago. Since his study epigraphy has hugely increased what we know about this branch. This new evidence shows that Plassart’s explanation is no longer valid. This article’s main goal is to resolve these four problems. In doing so it seeks to redress the archer corps’s neglect in military history.
The Use of Artillery by Philip II and Alexander the Great
Ancient World, 1994
This study suggests that not all Greek states in the IV B.c., but only Macedonia, "regarded artillery as essential" and pursued a policy of extensive and deliberate use of artillery. Although artillery seems never to have been decisive for Philip or Alexander, it did contribute to their success and distinguish their efforts at large-scale conquest from other or previous attempts, as we will show herein. In an investigation which proceeds from a primarily technological outlook, details such as the shape and position of the arms of the bow, the origin of the propulsive force, and other matters of mechanics, are of significance and relevance. Here, the only technical development which is of significance is the surpassing of previous missile weapons (slings, bows and the like) in range and power. Thus, this study examines primarily not the growth of technical expertise, but the attested uses of artillery during and before the time of Alexander. In light of these results, I attempt to draw conclusions about the reception of artillery by his predecessors and by Alexander. To the extent that from the evidence for systematic development, procurement, and use, one can infer policy, it then becomes sensible to speak of the policy of the Hellenic states of the IV B.C. Only Dionysios I, Philip II, and Alexander can be said to have had an artillery policy.
The Siegecraft of Philip V of Macedon
It is clear from the works of Polybius and Livy that much of Philip V’s military effort was spent in capturing towns from his enemies, and for this reason the topic of later Macedonian siegecraft surely deserves our attention. Equally, in order to produce an accurate picture, it is preferable to study the evidence methodically, rather than adopting a casual approach based on a few well-known events. Such a systematic enquiry requires the compilation of a catalogue of sieges, in which each action is classified according to outcome and procedure. By tabulating the results, it is hoped that any trends and variations can easily be identified.
The shooting methods of the archers of the Ancient Greek World 1400 BC - 400 BC
The National Association of Archery for all Organization (WTAF, Cheonan City, Chungnam-do, Republic of Korea), 2014
The Ancient Greek Warfare - as been presented to the public by the modern scholars -is a multi-dimentional kind of war with various kind of troops , tactics and applications. Recent researches have emerged the importance of archery to the Ancient Greeks as a platform of "flexible - war" absolutely necessary to most of the famous Battles of the era. Greek Archery from the end of the Middle Greek Bronze Age (1400 BC) to the end of the Classical Period (400 BC) presented a wealth of important elements. The various shooting methods of the archers - as been depicted in archaeological findings (pottery ,statues, fragments, depictions) - present us a culture that has been very familiar to this weapon and has developed several ways of using it, depended on the needs of war. In this study we will not focus only on ethnically Greek archers but generally the archers of the Greek world, comprising all of them who fought along with the Greeks in their armies. Taking into account that the surviving literal sources of the drawing techniques areextremely limited, we will try to emerge our conclusions through artistic representations of the era under research. Shooting techniques, as the "Greek Draw" the "Mediterranean Draw", the "Reverse Draw", the "Thumb technique" and all the variations of those, we will be presented in a detailed way, based on various depictions.
Archers, Antiochos VII Sidetes, and the 'BE' Arrowheads
Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research , 2018
Bronze arrowheads featuring barbs, a tang, and a nodule at the base of the head were widespread throughout the Mediterranean region from the 6th century BCE to the end of the Hellenistic period. This article investigates a variant of the main type bearing a stamped device in the form The general arrowhead form is often called “Cretan,” and previous studies have specifically associated the stamped type with Cretan archers in the service of the Ptolemaic queen, Berenike II. By looking at the distribution and physical attributes (including through X-ray fluorescence analysis) of the stamped arrowheads, this article provides fresh insight into the social organization of bow-armed fighting units in the Levant during the late Hellenistic period. In doing so, the authors challenge some long-held assumptions and interpretations about the arrowhead type. Relying on a mix of literary, iconographic, and archaeological evidence, the article demonstrates that the stamped arrowhead type should be associated with a body of archers involved in the campaigns of the Seleukid king Antiochos VII Sidetes (138-129 BCE).
"Archers, Antiochos and the 'BE' arrowheads." BASOR 380 (pp. 205-229)
Bronze arrowheads featuring barbs, a tang, and a nodule at the base of the head were widespread throughout the Mediterranean region from the sixth century BCE to the end of the Hellenistic period. This article investigates a variant of the main type bearing a stamped device in the form BE. The general arrowhead form is often called “Cretan” and previous studies have specifically associated the stamped type with Cretan archers in the service of the Ptolemaic queen, Berenike II. By looking at the distribution and physical attributes (including X-ray fluorescence analysis) of the stamped arrowheads, this article provides fresh insight into the social organization of bow-armed fighting units in the Levant in the late Hellenistic period. In doing so, the authors challenge some long-held assumptions and interpretations about the arrowhead type. Relying on a mix of literary, iconographic and archaeological evidence, the article demonstrates that the stamped arrowhead type should be associated with a body of archers involved in the campaigns of the Seleukid king, Antiochos VII Sidetes (138-129 BCE).
Bulgarian e-Journal of Archaeology, vol. 5, pp. 1-13, 2015
Lead sling bullets are often inscribed with the personal names of military commanders of a unit of slingers. Archaeological sites that have yielded such projectiles provide an opportunity to link the names attested with historical figures known from literary sources. A classic example presents the city of Olynthus that was besieged and taken through treachery by the troops of Philip II of Macedon in 348 BC. Irrefutable evidence of this is provided by the hundreds of sling bullets bearing his name, along with those of several commanders from his army, such as Hipponikos, Potalos, Kleoboulos and Anaxandros. The present article evaluates the significance of inscribed sling bullets as a basic source in reconstructing historical events related to the Macedonian expansion in Thrace during the reign of Philip II. Through the discussion of a number of examples from Thrace, Macedonia and Northern Aegean, including previously unpublished finds, I argue that these objects can serve as a reliable marker of Macedonian mobility abroad. As a major source on the subject I further analyze the primary data generated as a result of the recent archaeological excavations of the Thracian fortified complex near Kozi Gramadi, located in south central Bulgaria. On a broader level, the present survey aims to reinforce the value of sling bullets as a necessary object of study which on account of their multi-layered nature should invite the application of an integrated approach towards antiquity by combining data from archaeology, history and epigraphy.