Ethical Instrumentalism (original) (raw)

2005, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

The present essay offers a sketch of a philosophy of value, what I shall here refer to as 'ethical instrumentalism.' My primary aim is to say just what this view involves and what its commitments are. In the course of doing so, I find it necessary to distinguish this view from another with which it shares a common basis and which, in reference to its most influential proponent, I refer to as 'Humeanism.' A second, more general, aim is to make plausible the idea that, given the common basis, ethical instrumentalism provides a more compelling picture of the philosophy of value than Humeanism does. 2 Ethical instrumentalism (EI) is so called for two reasons. The first is that it involves the claim that there are no values, at least not in any sense that philosophers prefer to call 'realist.' Hence, according to EI, values are not 'facts,' whether of a natural, non-natural, or supernatural kind. Talk of 'values' on this account is a 'useful fiction,' analogous to the status reserved for theoretical entities in those positions in the philosophy of science that also bear the name 'instrumentalist.' 1 Reference to values in our discourse-to such things as 'goodness,' 'rightness,' 'justice,' 'virtue,' 'beauty,' 'sublimity,' 'ridiculousness,' 'wickedness,' 'evil,' and the like-is the convenient, perhaps necessary, means by which we communicate about and reflect upon what matters to us. Value terms-and the propositional structures in which they appear-are among the media of evaluative commerce; the coin of the 1 Instrumentalism in the philosophy of science and the position being discussed in this paper should not be understood to have any deeper connection than that suggested in the text. Being instrumentalist about value in no way commits one to any particular position about theoretical entities generally, let alone those that figure in scientific theories. 2 enchanted realm. The 'enchanted realm' is, of course, the very world in which we live but, according to EI, it is we who enchant it and there is nothing magical about it. Values are the 'product' of our engagement with the world and each other, where that engagement is understood in terms of the interplay of the drives, appetites, attitudes, emotions, concerns, stances, and goals that both serve to unite us and upon which our individuation depends. So understood, support of EI can be found among a number of philosophers, both historical and contemporary. The Protagorean formula that "a human being is the measure of all things," is its most famous-and boldest-statement. 2 Aristotle, reacting to the metaphysical extravagance of Plato, takes the source-and object-of value to be in human nature itself, particularly the passions and the degree to which one is disposed to feel them, and is therefore profitably seen as an instrumentalist in this sense. 3 More obviously, this idea finds eloquent adherence in Hume's declaration that the viciousness of the willful murder cannot be found "till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action." 4 It is of course Hume who is generally considered the most sure proponent for an entire 'school' of thinkers that share this approach to (particularly moral) value. These were the 'British Sentimentalists,' which included in their number the likes of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Adam Smith. The early-to-mid twentieth century saw philosophers displaying their sentimentalist sympathies with the doctrines of 'emotivism' and 'prescriptivism,' with Ayer's presentation in Language, Truth and Logic representing the high watermark of its expression. 5