The Development of Emotional Responsivism in the Munich-Göttingen Circle (pre-proofs, please refer to the published version) (original) (raw)
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The development of emotional responsivism in the Munich-Göttingen circle
The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, 2024
One recent, promising approach in the philosophy of emotion is ‘responsivism,’ which claims that emotions are not ‘value-perceptions,’ but rather are responses to such perceptions. The literature has aptly shown that this view is historically rooted in the Munich-Göttingen Circle’s affective phenomenology. However, it has failed to recognize that such ‘early responsivism’ is not limited to the Munich side of the Circle (Reinach, Scheler, von Hildebrand), but also includes the Göttingen figures of Stein and Ingarden, albeit with their own peculiarities; emotions, they assert, fulfill the value-intentions to which they respond. This paper bridges this gap and reveals the importance of Husserl’s influence on Göttingen responsivism.
A promising approach in recent philosophy of emotions is ‘responsivism’, which claims that emotions are not ‘perceptions of value’ but responses to such perceptions. It has been established that this conception has its historical roots in the affective phenomenology of the Munich-Göttingen Circle. The goal of the paper is to demonstrate that early responsivism is actually more diverse and more widespread than assumed so far. On the one hand, I show that von Hildebrand’s perspective is quite dissimilar to Scheler’s. On the other hand, I argue that responsivism is not limited to the Munich side of the Circle, represented, besides Scheler and von Hildebrand, by Reinach, but includes as well, despite their specificities, the ‘Göttingen’ figures of Stein and Ingarden. In doing so, I point out the crucial influences of the two mentors of the Circle, Lipps and Husserl, respectively on the ‘Munich’ and on the ‘Göttingen’ camps.
Phenomenology and Mind, 2022
How are we able to experience values? Two sides are competing in contemporary literature: 'Meinongians' (represented notably by Christine Tappolet) claim that axiological properties are apprehended in emotions, while 'Hildebrandians' (represented in particular by Ingrid Vendrell Ferran) assert that such experiences of value (or valueceptions) are accomplished in special 'value feelings', and that emotions are only responses to these felt values. In this paper, I study the Husserlian viewpoint on this issue. I reveal that, contrary to what almost all scholars have assumed so far, Husserl's position is not reducible to Meinong's and must on the contrary be regarded as an innovative and stimulating approach that helps unifying the two standard frameworks. It indeed recognizes (with Hildebrandians) the existence of non-emotional value feelings, while maintaining (with Meinongians) that originary axiological experiences are necessarily emotional.
Phenomenology & Mind, 2022
The present paper investigates the nature of our experience of values (or valueception). In recent literature, two main standpoints have emerged on this issue. On the one hand, the 'Meinongian' side (represented notably by Christine Tappolet) claims that axiological properties cannot be apprehended except in emotions. On the other hand, the 'Hildebrandian' side (represented in particular by Ingrid Vendrell Ferran) asserts that valueceptions are accomplished in special 'value feelings', emotions being only responses to the values thus unveiled. In this paper, I study the Husserlian viewpoint on this puzzle. I reveal that, contrary to what almost all scholars have assumed so far, Husserl's position cannot be reduced to Meinong's and must on the contrary be regarded as an innovative and stimulating approach that helps unifying the two standard frameworks: it indeed acknowledges (with the Hildebrandians) the existence of non-emotional value feelings, while maintaining (with the Meinongians) that originary axiological experiences are necessarily emotional.
University of Würzburg, 2021
The acknowledgment of the intentional character of emotions (or at least of some of them) immediately raises the question of the specificity of affective intentionality: what distinguishes it from the paradigmatic "aboutness" of perceptions or beliefs? In contemporary philosophy of emotions, two distinct replies are suggested: one may first locate this originality in the content, that is, in the intentional object, of affective experiences, stating for instance that emotions are directed towards axiological facts ; or, contrariwise, one may assert that affective acts are not primarily defined by a particular type of content, but by a special attitude vis-à-vis their intentional object. In this presentation, I focus on Husserl's solution to this issue. I first reveal that his phenomenology of affectivity is actually crossed by two antithetic ambitions: from the perspective of pure psychology, the attitudinal conception of emotions is privileged to the extent that it permits an eidetic distinction between affective and intellectual acts ; yet, from the perspective of a universal theory of reason, the contentual theory is favored, since it explains our knowledge of values. The second part of the presentation is dedicated to an original approach to this antinomy. I unveil how the consideration of what Husserl calls Gefühlsempfindungen, affective sensations, like sensual pleasures or pains, which are not consciousness-of by themselves, but lie at the basis of all intentional emotions, allows a reconstruction of affectivity that accounts both for its specificity and for its intuition of values.
Emotions and Value in Husserl's Phenomenology
Universität Heidelberg, 2023
This presentation summarizes the main results I have achieved in my PhD dissertation focusing on Husserl’s phenomenology of emotions, that I will defend on May 23rd. Husserl starts from a basic epistemological question, which constitutes the fundamental raison d’être of his philosophy of affectivity: how do we access to the worldly beings that are values – the beauty of a statue, the nobility of a behavior? In the eyes of the founder of phenomenology, feeling (Gefühl) is the type of lived experience in which takes place the subjective givenness of axiological entities – a purely intellectual being necessarily remaining blind to it. The purpose of my presentation will be to show how Husserl, through a thorough descriptive investigation, carried out in particular in the recently published Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins, reveals the structures of a specifically affective intentionality that accounts for such a givenness. The talk is divided into three parts. I will first describe the general problem of our access to worldly “values”, and the three main positions on this issue (intellectualism, conativism, sentimentalism). I will then present Husserl’s arguments for “sentimentalism”, and emphasize that such a position raises a huge risk for his phenomenology of emotions, a risk that I will name the “transcendental-phenomenological conflict”. In the third part, I will explore the Husserlian reply to this conflict, by depicting his conception of feeling as an affective episode. In particular, I will show how this episodic approach sheds new light on the phenomenon of “mood” or Stimmung, and on the idea of an affective “evidence”. The conclusion I reach is threefold: 1) There is no opposition between reason and passion in Husserl’s framework: it is on the basis of our capacity to experience affectively that we are able to build an axiological reason paralleling the traditional logical reason ; 2) The myth of an “intellectualist” Husserl is definitively shattered: far from being neglected, the theme of the Gefühl appears as an indispensable component of the transcendental project of a rigorously universal reason ; 3) Finally, Husserl’s position on the epistemology of value proves original vis-à-vis contemporary approaches, as it constitutes a compromise between “cognitivism”, according to which emotion is defined above all as a “knowledge” of values, and the inspiration of William James, according to which emotion is to be identified with the experience of certain bodily changes.
Husserl's Other Phenomenology of Feelings: Approval, Value, and Correctness
Husserl Studies, 2023
This essay is motivated by the contention that an incomplete picture of Edmund Husserl's philosophy of feelings persists. While his standard account of feelings, as it is presented in his major works, has been extensively studied, there is another branch of his theory of feelings, which has received little attention. This other branch is Husserl's rigorous and distinct investigations of the feeling of approval. Simply stated, the goal of this essay is to outline the evolution of this secondary branch of Husserl's philosophy of feelings from 1896 to 1911. I highlight how Husserl's examinations of approval-as an intention that performs both an axiological and a seemingly cognitive function-lead him to extraordinary observations about the execution of feelings and the truth of judgments.
The reasons of Emotions. Scheler and Husserl
2016
Despite the clear differences and reciprocal controversial evaluations, extreme similarities are to be found in Husserl and Scheler’s theory regarding the central question of a phenomenology of the emotions. The essential theoretical characteristic that brings Husserl closer to Scheler is the ethical question as to whether it is possible to regulate one’s own world of values and one’s own rational-affective dimension, and whether such a possibility can be translated into the fundamental motivation for the course of one’s own personal education and creation as an authentic vocation.
The Dawn of the Phenomenology of Feelings
Philosophy Today, 2024
This essay reshapes our understanding of the origin and trajectory of the phenomenology of feelings. In contrast to accepted interpretations, I show that Husserl’s 1896 manuscript, “Approval, Value, and Evidence” – and not his 1901 Logical Investigations – is the foundation of his subsequent phenomenology of feelings, as it is found in Lectures on Ethics and Value Theory, Ideas I, and other manuscripts. This is for two reasons. First, in the 1896 manuscript – published in Studies Concerning the Structures of Consciousness – Husserl introduces the core problem, which continues to motivate his philosophy of feelings. He sees that feelings are not just affective, but also surprisingly rational. Second, Husserl addresses this enigmatic duality, by pioneering the method of analogizing, which he would employ for the next twenty years. In sum, I show that the 1896 manuscript introduces the problems and methods, in the absence of which, Husserl’s later phenomenology of feelings appears inconceivable.