The 'Two Truths' Doctrine (Satyadvaya) and the Nature of Upāya in Nāgārjuna (original) (raw)
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Middle Way Buddhist Philosophy & The doctrine of Two Truths
Throughout the history of Buddhism, the doctrine of Two Truths has been utilized as a proper means to evaluate the philosophical views of different schools of this tradition. In this research the doctrine of Two Truths, conventional and ultimate, has been examined with special attention to Middle Way philosophy, the philosophy of Madhyamika School, specifically the ideas of the founder of this school, Nagarjuna (2 nd century CE). The distinction between two truths has been examined on religious, social, moral, epistemological, and ontological aspects. The closing discussion devoted to the opinions of historically well-known commentators of Nagarjuna's treatis (Karikas), Candrakirti (7 th century) and Tsongkhapa (14 th century) who believed that the distinction between two truths is more epistemological, rather than being ontological.
The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā
The Buddhist saint N=ag=arjuna, who lived in South India in approximately the second century CE, is undoubtedly the most important, influential, and widely studied Mah=ay=ana Buddhist philosopher. His many works include texts addressed to lay audiences, letters of advice to kings, and a set of penetrating metaphysical and epistemological treatises. His greatest philosophical work, the M?lamadhyamikak=arik=a--read and studied by philosophers in all major Buddhist schools of Tibet, China, Japan, and Korea--is one of the most influential works in the history of Indian philosophy. Now, in The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way, Jay L. Garfield provides a clear and eminently readable translation of N=ag=arjuna's seminal work, offering those with little or no prior knowledge of Buddhist philosophy a view into the profound logic of the M?lamadhyamikak=arik=a. Garfield presents a superb translation of the Tibetan text of M?lamadhyamikak=arik=a in its entirety, and a commentary reflecting the Tibetan tradition through which N=ag=arjuna's philosophical influence has largely been transmitted. Illuminating the systematic character of N=ag=arjuna's reasoning, Garfield shows how N=ag=arjuna develops his doctrine that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, that is, than nothing exists substantially or independently. Despite lacking any essence, he argues, phenomena nonetheless exist conventionally, and that indeed conventional existence and ultimate emptiness are in fact the same thing. This represents the radical understanding of the Buddhist doctrine of the two truths, or two levels of reality. He offers a verse-by-verse commentary that explains N=ag=arjuna's positions and arguments in the language of Western metaphysics and epistemology, and connects N=ag=arjuna's concerns to those of Western philosophers such as Sextus, Hume, and Wittgenstein. An accessible translation of the foundational text for all Mah=ay=ana Buddhism, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way offers insight to all those interested in the nature of reality.
The Problem of two truths in Buddhism and Vedānta
The Problem of two truths in Buddhism and Vedānta. This book mentions many profound points of Saṁvṛti and Paramārtha. Such as: - Saṁvṛti and Paramārtha in Mādhyamika; - The significance of Prtītyasamutpāda for understanding the relationship between Saṁvṛti and Paramārthasatya in Nāgārjuna; - The Nature of Saṁvṛti and the Relationship of Paramārtha to it in Svātantrika - Mādhyamika and so on... I have been searching this book for many years, I have just got it. Now I share for you, it free, it has many interesting points... try to read it and I am sure you will enjoy it... Have a great time! Bhiksuni T NL
International Journal of Buddhist Thought and Culture, 2017
The two truths theory is usually considered as an indispensable framework for Madhyamaka exponents to maintain a middle position. Based on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MK) and its Indic commentaries, this paper challenges this view and argues that there is a discernible turning point in the exegetic history of the MK concerning the two truths theory and that the practice of establishing the middle position on two truths was not present in the Madhyamaka tradition until Bhāviveka of the sixth century.
Revue d’Études Tibétaines, 2011
ince the time of the Tibetan emperor Khri srong lde'u bstan (reign 755-ca. 800), the Mādhyamika position, originally taught by Nāgārjuna, has represented the supreme philosophical view (dṛṣṭi, lta ba) of Tibetan Buddhism. It is the keystone of Tibetan Buddhist doxographies (siddhānta, grub mtha') that classify Indian Buddhist philosophical schools. One of the Mādhyamika School's primary doctrines, the doctrine of the two truths (satyadvaya, bden gnyis)-relative truth (saṃvṛitisatya, kun rdzob kyi bden pa) and absolute truth (paramārthasatya, don dam gyi bden pa)-represents the quintessence of the "middle path" (madhyamā pratipad, dbu ma'i lam) that avoids all extremes. Inspired by the Buddha's teaching of a middle path that avoids both hedonism and asceticism, the Mādhyamika School articulates a metaphysical middle path that avoids both eternalism and nihilism.
Not Even Absent: Dependent Origination, Emptiness, and the Two Truths in the Thought of Nāgārjuna
2024
As one of the most pivotal thinkers in the history Mahāyāna Buddhism, the writings of Nāgārjuna have long attracted the attention of scholars aiming to interpret in declarative terms the meaning of the arguments contained therein. However, the very aim of such an endeavor that seeks to ascribe to Nāgārjuna a philosophical position is fundamentally at odds with the unwaveringly critical nature of his project. In order to illustrate the singular character of Nāgārjuna's methodology, this article seeks to clarify three crucial points concerning his thought: (1) the central concept in his philosophical works, dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), ironically denotes the non-origination (anutpāda) of any entity (bhāva) whatsoever and is universal in scope; (2) emptiness (śūnyatā) is not a meaningful predicate of any entity, meaning that no entity exists that can be identified as being empty; and (3) the Two Truths (satyadvaya) are not a philosophically significant device for Nāgārjuna and subsequently do not provide a means by which to mitigate the radical consequences of his arguments. As a result, we can understand Nāgārjuna's claim to have no postulative thesis (pratijñā) as a statement that he predicates no quality (dharma) of any subject (dharmin), and that his methodology is strictly critical, offering us no constructive theory by which to make sense of reality.
Nāgārjuna, Madhyamaka, and truth
Asian Journal of Philosophy
In reading Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, one is struck by Nāgārjuna's separation of conventional truth and ultimate truth. At the most basic level, these two truths deal with emptiness and the appearance of fundamental existence, but the meaning of "conventional" lends itself to two key senses: concealing and socially agreed-upon norms and practices. The tension between these two senses and how they relate to truth leads Nāgārjuna's Tibetan commentators in different directions in their exegesis on conventional truth. Based on the debate between Tsongkhapa and Gorampa, I propose a Madhyamaka account of truth as trust. In so doing, I provide a novel account of truth, in which propositions and phenomena are truth-bearers, and one's ability to trust in them establishes their truth-value.