Policy Paper 35: Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Fueling Security (original) (raw)
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Energy and Security in Northeast Asia
1996
In conjunction with its meeting in Seoul in September 1996, NEACD hosted a two-day workshop on Northeast Asia energy issues that brought together leading experts from the participating countries on energy demand and supply, nuclear fuel cycle concerns, and how these issues impact upon the security decision-making process in each country in the region. But energy is not only a possible threat, it is also one of the most promising areas for cooperative security. The workshop explored the potential for regional cooperation in energy as a promising MRM in Northeast Asia. These papers were commissioned for the workshop.
Energy in Northeast Asia: Resources for Conflict or Cooperation? An Introduction
East Asia, 2008
Although Northeast Asia typically is seen as an arena for conflict over energy supplies, complementary economic relationships would seem to make the region ripe for energy cooperation: Russia possesses major oil and gas resources, while China, Japan, South and North Korea all depend on imported energy. The four papers in this issue raise a number of important and, at times, neglected issues about the prospects for energy cooperation in Northeast Asia. While focusing on specific projects for energy supply and conservation, the authors implicitly raise broader theoretical questions about the prospects for and consequences of regional energy cooperation.
Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation
1998
Gaining access to energy resources has long been a source of contention among established and rising powers. IGCC Policy Papers 35-37, Energy and Security in Northeast Asia, examine the significance of Northeast Asia's rising energy demands on regional and global energy and security politics. In Policy Paper 35, Kent Calder and Fereidun Fesharaki debated the fundamental issue of whether rising energy demand generates new security dilemmas or whether efficient energy markets mitigate potential security risks arising from increased competition for energy resources. Calder argued that energy rivalry might deepen tensions among the major powers in Northeast Asia. Fesheraki sees manageable market competition where Calder sees more fundamental rivalries. In Policy Paper 36, Fesharaki and his colleagues at the East-West Center's Program on Resources, Energy, and Minerals examined supply and demand projections of fossil fuel usage and argued that markets can solve looming energy crises, obviating the need for multilateral solutions. Their analysis of the inefficacy of certain proposals for regional cooperation regimes based on intra-regional pipelines suggests caution about the prospects of current proposals for multilateral cooperation, highlighting the enormous political and social distrust in the region-the basis of Calder's fears about regional tension and rivalry. Policy Papers 35 and 36 contain two common themes. The contributors to both noted the increasing primacy that Asian economies place on nuclear power as a future energy source, especially relative to the dwindling post-Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear programs elsewhere. They also provided evidence supporting Calder's proposal that energy rivalry not only provides potential for major power tension, but also the opportunity for major power cooperation. In this era of cheap oil supplies and even cheaper development technologies, and with all of the governments in Northeast Asia maintaining a primary goal of economic growth and higher standard of living for their constituents, Northeast Asia has a shared priority in guaranteeing safe, stable energy supplies without risking the shortages that historically led to competition and conflict. 1 Policy Paper 37 introduces prominent proposals for multilateral Northeast Asian nuclear energy cooperation advanced by Kaneko Kumao, Suzuki Atsuyuki and Jor-Shan Choi (an analysis by Suzuki Tatsujiro about lessons from the European experience (EURATOM) appeared in IGCC Policy Paper 24, Energy and Security in Northeast Asia). 2 Cooperation on nuclear energy would have a direct impact on political and security relations among Northeast Asian states. Nuclear power is an attractive alternative for all the Northeast Asian states, especially Japan and South Korea, which have no energy resources of their own and have to import all their fuels. Nuclear energy is much cleaner than that extracted from fossil fuels, and it is a symbol of technological modernity. Nuclear programs raise a series of issues that transcend national borders, including the safety of nuclear energy production; the dangers associated with reprocessing (i.e., risk of diversion for military purposes), the challenges of disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste, and safety issues related to the security of nuclear materials and facilities. Therefore, it is not surprising that as nuclear energy has developed in Northeast Asia, there has been a parallel growth of multilateral cooperative initiatives, including from governments in the region. 3 However, it is not clear that these efforts have yet addressed the full range of concerns encompassed by what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) calls the "new realities" of the fuel cycle. 4 Although some proposals for regional nuclear power cooperation include technical assistance on the operation of power plants, particularly dealing with safety, all of them concentrate on the problem of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (please see Appendix A for a description of this, related to what is known as the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle). Each country building nuclear power plants faces the challenge of disposing of radioactive wastes. The political problems of siting such waste repositories are immense, and the international community, particularly the United States, worries about having the waste recycled into military uses. For China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and possibly North Korea to devise a joint solution to the waste disposal problem by establishing a regional temporary or permanent storage site in some remote area would ease fears of nuclear threats and enhance trust throughout the region. For example, public concerns about Japan's excess plutonium supplies emanating from its recycling program would disappear if Japan stored this plutonium in a regional repository, with regional and global safeguards and real-time monitoring-accounting for all waste at all times. Together, Kaneko, Suzuki, and Choi shed light on the diverse range of actors initiating activity in this topic. As Edward Fei characterizes in his analysis of the three proposals, Kaneko's approach is shaped by his long and distinguished career as a diplomat, seeking to develop regional confidence-building measures in a part of the world where major powers lack trust. Kaneko delves into the country-specific problems faced by each Asian country with a civilian nuclear weapons program, conceding that global regimes such as the IAEA or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are not sufficient to address the region's suspicions regarding neighbors' nuclear programs. Iraq and North Korea are examples where IAEA safeguards were insufficient, and the NPT lacks sanctions against violators. Kaneko proposes a regional ASIATOM that would include annual meetings of ministerial-level government representatives, an ASIATOM committee to oversee operations, and functional/technical committees comprised of nuclear technicians. Three centers are proposed, focusing on safety, storage, and research and development. But Kaneko emphasizes that the key aspect of any ASIATOM would have to include a regional safeguards/ inspection system administered by ASIATOM representatives that would complement the existing insufficient NPT/IAEA safeguards. Suzuki's less ambitious proposal belies the perspective of an academic, one of the leading nuclear experts in the region. Suzuki, who was recently named to head up the reform committee of the PNC, Japan's national nuclear program, proposes a regional intermediate storage facility for deep underground storage until long-term issues regarding NIMBY (not in my backyard) concerns are resolved. This would harness the collective financial and technical resources of Northeast Asian countries to solve short-term storage concerns until permanent solutions are devised, either technically or politically, in the next 50 years. In addition, Suzuki suggests a regional facility devoted to research for underground geological nuclear waste disposal, which would be devoted to overcoming technical concerns about permanent underground storage and-more importantly-engage in public education about the safety of geological disposal to overcome NIMBY resistance. Choi lays out the wide realm of possibilities for technical cooperation based on his extensive background as a nuclear engineer. Choi's chapter provides the most extensive documentation about the current status of Northeast Asia's civilian nuclear weapons programs, including the governments' current plans for waste disposal. He identifies many of the same problems that Kaneko does, and supports the formation of a regional cooperative framework soon to resolve current problems hindering civilian nuclear power development in Northeast Asia. Unlike Kaneko, Choi chooses no specific name, such as ASIATOM, but narrows initial membership from all Asian countries to just those areas currently possessing nuclear programs (China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and the Russian Far East). Choi argues that while the six areas share proximity, mutual security interests, interdependent economic objectives, and common energy needs, their distrust stemming from historical hostilities, potential military and territorial disputes, and competition for natural and energy resources makes it vital that the most likely catalyst of such a regime, the United States, be a member too. Choi's proposed compact includes many of the same features suggested by Kaneko and Suzuki: radioactive waste management, nuclear non-proliferation safeguards, safety, and economic cooperation. What distinguishes Choi's proposals is its fixed three-year period devoted to dialogue and information exchange about a regional nuclear compact. Energy policy planners, nuclear experts, nuclear industry representatives, foreign ministry officials, and defense ministry officials would all participate in track two meetings (with government officials participating in their How Could an East Asian Regional Compact for Nuclear Cooperation Help Resolve This and Other Pertinent Nuclear Issues? The effectiveness of U.S. unilateral sanctions of nuclear export imposed on China while other countries (e.g., France) continue to sell these products to China has been debated fiercely. The loss of nuclear sales to China by Westinghouse, General Electric, ABB-Combustion engineering and many smaller companies that would supply material, facilities, or components, during the dwindling U.S. domestic market, is significant. The gain from such export sanction in inhibiting Chinese proliferation, if it can be measured, is quite small. The sanctions imposed are more of a matter of principle rather than an effective means of influencing Chinese behavior. China is an upcoming great power, regionally as well as globally. It should be responsible for its actions within its own sphere of influence. The best means of moderating Chinese behavior to conform...
Perceptions and Strategies on Energy Security: the case of China and Japan
Energy and Security Cooperation in Asia: Challenges and Prospects is a Monograph published by the Institute for Security and Development Policy. Monographs provide comprehensive analyses of key issues presented by leading experts. The Institute is based in Stockholm, Sweden, and cooperates closely with research centers worldwide. Through its Silk Road Studies Program, the Institute runs a joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. The Institute is firmly established as a leading research and policy center, serving a large and diverse community of analysts, scholars, policy-watchers, business leaders, and journalists. It is at the forefront of research on issues of conflict, security, and development. Through its applied research, publications, research cooperation, public lectures, and seminars, it functions as a focal point for academic, policy, and public discussion. This publication is kindly made possible by support from the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The opinions and conclusions expressed are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Security and Development Policy or its sponsors.
Japan's Quest For Energy Security: Risks and Opportunities in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape
Frankfurt Working Papers on East Asia, 2011
For much of the 20th century, economic growth was fueled by cheap oil-based energy supply. Due to increasing resource constraints, however, the political and strategic importance of oil has become a significant part of energy and foreign policy making in East and Southeast Asian countries. In Japan, the rise of China’s economic and military power is a source of considerable concern. To enhance energy security, the Japanese government has recently amended its energy regulatory framework, which reveals high political awareness of risks resulting from the looming key resources shortage and competition over access. An essential understanding that national energy security is a politically and economically sensitive area with a clear international dimension affecting everyday life is critical in shaping a nation’s energy future.
Energy security and sustainability in Northeast Asia
Energy Policy, 2011
a b s t r a c t ''Energy Security'' has typically, to those involved in making energy policy, meant mostly securing access to oil and other fossil fuels. With increasingly global, diverse energy markets, however, and increasingly transnational problems resulting from energy transformation and use, old energy security rationales are less salient, and other issues, including climate change and other environmental, economic, and international considerations are becoming increasingly important. As a consequence, a more comprehensive operating definition of ''Energy Security'' is needed, along with a workable framework for analysis of which future energy paths or scenarios are likely to yield greater Energy Security in a broader, more comprehensive sense. Work done as a part of the Nautilus Institute's ''Pacific Asia Regional Energy Security'' (PARES) project developed a broader definition of Energy Security, and described an analytical framework designed to help to compare the energy security characteristics -both positive and negative -of different quantitative energy paths as developed using software tools such as the LEAP (Long-range Energy Alternatives Planning) system.
2011
For much of the 20th century, economic growth was fueled by cheap oil-based energy supply. Due to increasing resource constraints, however, the political and strategic importance of oil has become a significant part of energy and foreign policy making in East and Southeast Asian countries. In Japan, the rise of China’s economic and military power is a source of considerable concern. To enhance energy security, the Japanese government has amended its energy regulatory framework, which reveals high political awareness of risks resulting from the looming key resources shortage and competition over access. An essential understanding that national energy security is a politically and economically sensitive area with a clear international dimension affecting everyday life is critical in shaping Japan’s energy future. The direction of the country’s nuclear future after the 11 March 2011 triple disaster including the malfunctioning of the Fukushima nuclear power plant is still unclear.
Introduction to the Asian Energy Security project: Project organization and methodologies
Energy Policy, 2011
The spectacular recent economic growth in the Asia-Pacific region in general, and in many of the economies of Northeast Asia in particular, has spurred a vast expansion in the need for energy services, and an expansion in the demand for the fuels that help to supply these services. Future projections suggest that the growth of fossil fuel use in Northeast Asia, especially in China, will have major consequences for financial and fuel markets and pollution both regionally and globally. Before the project described in this paper was initiated, there was no ongoing forum for energy experts from all of the countries of the region to meet, informally and in an unofficial capacity, to discuss openly and in a targeted fashion the energy situations in their countries, and to work together to evaluate the energy efficiency costs and benefits of different ways of meeting regional demand. The Asian Energy Security (AES) project provides such a forum, and as such constitutes a unique resource in the engagement of the countries of Northeast Asia on the topic of energy security.
University of Vienna, 2019
Since the topics of energy consumption and alternative energies have become prominent issues, so too has energy security stepped back into the spotlight of public discourse. This thesis aims to analyze the energy security situation of three East Asian countries, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. As all three countries feature similar predicaments, being reliant on imports over waterways, having little to no natural reserves, and being high-tech and service-based economies, the author attempts to determine similarities and differences from an energy security perspective. In order to assess these countries, a framework was created with 35 distinct indicators relating to energy security was created. Each country is then analyzed individually by presenting and calculating each indicator systematically. The results are then presented in a table and various graphs to simply illustrate a comparison of each country’s values. Through these results, the largest differences can be observed in energy efficiency and diversification of energy supply. The concluding remarks offer possible avenues for further studies and deliberate on lessons to be learned from these results