Data from introspective reports: Upgrading from common sense to science (original) (raw)
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The Empirical Case against Introspection
This paper assesses five main empirical scientific arguments against the reliability of belief formation on the basis of introspecting phenomenal states. After defining 'reliability' and 'introspection', I discuss five arguments to the effect that phenomenal states are more elusive than we usually think: (1) The argument on the basis of differences in introspective reports from differences in introspective measurements; (2) The argument from differences in reports about whether or not dreams come in colours; (3) The argument from the absence of a correlation between visual imagery ability and the performance on certain cognitive tasks; (4) The argument from our unawareness of our capacity of echolocation; (5) The argument from inattentional blindness and change blindness. I argue that the experiments on which these arguments are based do not concern belief formation on the basis of introspection in the first place or fail to show that it is unreliable, even when limited to introspection of phenomenal states.
2017
My dissertation proposes a new model of introspection by examining those aspects of the nature of introspection that have been neglected in the contemporary literature, such as the ones determining variables or mental phenomena in accordance with specific cases of introspection. I assert that these neglected aspects are the very ones which provide a precise account of the way we are aware of our mental life and help us arrive at self-attributions. I begin by raising issues already extant in the epistemology of introspection, and not only argue against skeptical doubts about the reliability of introspection but also provide empirical evidence for its accuracy. I then discuss leading models of introspection, such as the inner-sense view and the acquaintance view, and show that both of these views fail to provide an explanation of the exact nature of introspection and to distinguish between different modes of introspective awareness. I finally offer a new model according to which introspection operates as what I call a cognitive superposition of mental phenomena-namely, a particular function of combining and integrating variables. It is by introspection that we become aware of the character and contents of our mental states as well as the changes, transitions, and boundaries among them. Yet while my own model of introspection builds on specific pluralist approaches which contend that introspection involves several cognitive processes, my model also shows that the operation of introspection remains distinct from the operation of other cognitive processes such as perception, attention, or inference, and thus cannot be reducible to them. v Acknowledgments Among many debts I wish to acknowledge, let me begin with those to the Mexican National Council for Science and Technology (Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología, CONACYT) for their three-year fellowship in support of my Ph.D. studies at The Graduate Center, City University of New York, and to The Graduate Center for its one-year Dissertation Fellowship. It is a special pleasure to thank my principal advisor, Jesse Prinz, for his support, guidance, and encouragement at all stages of my research. From his initial belief in my project to the commitment and attention he devoted to its many stages, I greatly appreciate his patience, respect, and responsiveness, unfailingly reflected in challenges and comments of the highest caliber. He has helped me to develop my own ideas and immeasurably improved my work, teaching me along the way to be a better philosopher and better person. I am particularly grateful for the support of my professors and dissertation committee Saul Kripke, Eric Mandelbaum, Susanna Siegel, and Iakovos Vasiliou, as well as for their insightful feedback and constructive questions. The guidance that Susanna Siegel and Iakovos Vasiliou have provided during my Ph.D. studies has inspired me to pay attention to what is important, and they have been ideal interlocutors. As my project has drawn to a close, their support has been essential as well.
The Meaning of Introspection: Introspection, Scientific Psychology and Neuroscience
The Meaning Of Introspection, 2022
This paper examines the meaning and evidential role of reports of introspection in cognitive psychology. A theory of scientific introspection aims to detail the nature, scope and limits of reports of subjective experience in science. Introspective reports best function as experimental data when combined with objective methods of stimulus control and the more recent, developing methods of brain scanning and brain imaging—which are having a invigorating effect on both theory and experimental practice. Introspection has been controversial and variously conceived in the history of psychology: sometimes endorsed as central and crucial to scientific psychology and sometimes rejected outright as subjective. Introspective methods were very prominent in the structuralist origins of experimental psychology, and also important in the origins of functional psychology; but it was subsequently rejected or minimized by the dominant behaviorism of the twentieth century. In common usage, “introspective” often means “reflective,” and related practices may take on broad significance in personal life. This popular (or philosophical) meaning occasionally intrudes problematically into scientific discourse. In particular it tends to license undue confidence in stand-alone introspection. In Wilhelm Wundt’s experimental psychology, emphasis was placed on “stimulus control.” Reports of introspection were regarded as scientifically useful only if the experimentalist could control the sensory stimulus. This effectively limited experimental introspection to situations corresponding to ordinary reports of perceptual observation (though it is reasonably, if carefully extended in particular experimental designs). On the other hand, competing conceptions of introspection extended it to include unchecked, unfalsifiable and poorly replicated results. There has been a modest return of introspection in recent cognitive psychology—chiefly supplemented by techniques of brain imaging and brain scanning. As will be argued, this combination with objective methods is needed; and it will be briefly argued that some account will also be needed of the semantics of the descriptions of conscious contents.
On the possibility and reality of introspection
Conflicting claims have been made about whether introspection can be made reliable at all. Lots of objections have been formulated against it in classical and modern literature. We thus list these objections and outline some replies, in addition to some theoretical rebuttals based on contemporary philosophy of science. We further point out that these objections target an abstract image of introspection rather than introspection per se. Accordingly, we describe one of the currently available methods that we ourselves practice: the elicitation (or microphenomenological) interview method. Our aim is to show that, irrespective of its alleged theoretical “impossibility”, introspection is made real by this kind of method which incorporates replies to most standard objections.
Elimination of bias in introspection: Methodological advances, refinements, and recommendations
New Ideas in Psychology, 2020
Building on past constructive criticism, the present study provides further methodological development focused on the elimination of bias that may occur during first-person observation. First, various sources of errors that may accompany introspection are distinguished based on previous critical literature. Four main errors are classified, namely attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error. Furthermore, methodological recommendations for the possible elimination of these errors have been determined based on the analysis and focused excerpting of introspective scientific literature. The following groups of methodological recommendations were determined: 1) a better focusing of the subject’s attention to their mental processes, 2) providing suitable stimuli, and 3) the sharing of introspective experience between subjects. Furthermore, the potential of adjustments in introspective research designs for eliminating attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error is discussed. Keywords: #introspection; #first-person methods; #introspective methods; #first-person experiments; #consciousness; #mental processes; #self-observation; #self-observer; #self-awareness; #bias; #methods; #philosophy of mind; #phenomenology; #Brentano; #Husserl; #bracketing; #self; #attention; #memory; #memory retrieval; #attributions; #cognitive distortions; #meta-cognition; #metacognition; #meta-cognitive awareness; #metacognitive awareness; #meta-cognitive monitoring; #metacognitive monitoring MeSH Headings: Mental Processes; Consciousness; Self; Awareness; Cognition; Metacognition; Imagination; Attention