The issue on the status of the propositions of Kant's special metaphysics of natural science (original) (raw)
Related papers
Concept Construction in Kant's "Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
1995
Kant's reasoning in his special metaphysics of nature is often opaque, and the character of his a priori foundation for Newtonian science is the subject of some controversy. Recent literature on the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science has fallen well short of consensus on the aims and reasoning in the work. Various of the doctrines and even the character of the reasoning in the Metaphysical Foundations have been taken to present insuperable obstacles to accepting Kant's claim to ground Newtonian science. Gordon Brittan and Gerd Buchdahl, amongst others, have argued that Kant's stated aims in this case are not to be taken at face value, and that prior ontological commitments play a hidden but central role in Kant's special metaphysics. Michael Friedman (1992) has shown how Kant's stated aims can be taken seriously with his ingenious reconstruction of the Metaphysical Foundations as a demonstration of the a priori basis for our thinking bodies to be in true motion and in absolute space. However, Friedman does not address the issue of matter theory-despite the importance of the issue to Kant. I argue that a strict reading of both the stated aims and doctrines of the Metaphysical Foundations is possible, since much of Kant's reasoning about the empirical concept of matter can be explained by his views on how the construction of empirical concepts is possible. Kant's quasi-mathematical constructions are pivotal in Friedman's interpretation. Constructibility is Kant's criterion of acceptability for the concepts of natural science. Yet Kant notoriously fails to construct the dynamical concept of matter, and accepts this failure with an equally notorious complacency. I argue that Kant's criteria of empirical concept construction, apart from any prior ontological commitments, are enough to generate his views on matter. Kant's failure to construct the requisite concept of matter can be ascribed to a missing law of nature, a law of the relation of forces the discovery of which Kant thought imminent. I conclude that matter theory is central to the Metaphysical Foundations, but that this does not undermine Kant's stated aim of giving the a priori ground of Newtonian science.
Apriority, Metaphysics, and Empirical Content in Kant's Theory of Matter
Kantian Review, 2012
This paper addresses problems associated with the role of the empirical concept of matter in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, offering an interpretation emphasizing two points consistently neglected in the secondary literature: the distinction between logical and real essence, and Kant's claim that motion must be represented in pure intuition by static geometrical figures. I conclude that special metaphysics cannot achieve its stated and systematically justified goal of discovering the real essence of matter, but that Kant requires this failure for his larger philosophical presentation of the dialectic that ‘irremediably attaches to human reason’ (A298/B354).
KANT ON METAPHYSICS AS SCIENCE
Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, 2022
My paper focuses on what and how Kant had accomplished with his intended "reform of metaphysics" through "reason's entering the secure path of science". In this respect, I will argue that the influence of (pure) sciences on Kant's programme was a major one, and this may be best highlighted if one assumes that he developed his mature theory only in the B edition of his Critique (1787), where the influence of the model of pure a priori sciences turn to be decisive. This influence, as we already know, is closely related to the "reform of metaphysics" by "reason's entering the secure path of science". My claim is upheld also by the historical argument that only in the Prolegomena (1783) and in the B edition of the Critique Kant explicitly conceived the idea of "metaphysics as science". Therefore, the necessary steps in dealing with "metaphysics as science" must consider the A Critique, the Prolegomena, and the B Critique in this precise order. Assuming this order, my approach will involve three parts: in the first I will investigate the idea of the reform of metaphysics from the A Critique, in the second I will take into account "reason's entering the secure path of science" (in the Prolegomena and the B Critique), i.e., philosophy as science (the discipline within the B Critique); finally, I will argue that understanding Kant's "idea of philosophy as science" can best be achieved by focusing on the role and place that pure sciences have in the transcendental philosophy of the B Critique, where its structure and content are themed and projected within the methodological frame of the "experiment of pure reason".
“Metaphysics about Metaphysics.” Kant on Theoretical, Practical and Practico-Theoretical Metaphysics
Estudos Kantianos [EK], 2021
The essay investigates the relation between metaphysics and practical philosophy in Kant by reconstructing Kant‘s systematic typology of metaphysics as developed in his critical writings. Section 1 deals with Kant’s rigorous reduction of philosophy to metaphysics. The focus here is on the epistemological turn effectuated by Kant with regard to metaphysics (theoretical metaphysics). Section 2 is concerned with Kant’s reconceptualization of (pure) practical philosophy as a metaphysics sui generis. At the center stands here Kant’s supplementation of the metaphysics of nature through a metaphysics of morals based on moral freedom (practical metaphysics). Section 3 addresses the merging of theoretical and practical metaphysics in Kant. The focus here lies on Kant’s introduction of a novel, practically validated form of (quasi-)theoretical metaphysics (practico-theoretical metaphysics). Throughout the essay combines an analytic interest in the forms and functions of metaphysics in Kant wi...
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1983
ontemporary philosophers are not usually enthusiastic about Kant's philoso-C phy of science, and it is not hard t o understand why Kant's discussions of science meet with a lukewarm reception. In the first place, Kant seems to be committed t o the idea that some substantive scientific principles can be known a priori. Second, his apparent attempt t o do a priori science, the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, contains some very unpromising arguments, and its relation to the first Critique is highly obscure. In this paper, I will explore some of Kant's ideas about science, with the aims of understanding whether he is really an advocate of a priori science and of exposing the intended relation between the Critique and the Metaphysical Foundations. I also want to see whether there is anything we can learn from Kant's doctrines about science.
Contemporary Kantian Philosophy of Science
Routledge eBooks, 2023
The chapter explores a Kantian approach to the philosophy of science, focusing on the principle of systematicity, according to which nature is regarded as systematically unified. By introducing Kant’s account of systematicity in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment, the chapter identifies the philosophical issue that it addresses, namely the underdetermination of our scientific view of the world. Against the prevailing methodological reading, it is argued that the demand of systematicity is for Kant a transcendental principle of empirical cognition in general, which concerns the very intelligibility of nature. A discussion of its philosophical significance for contemporary philosophy of science suggests that a Kantian approach is a serious alternative to naturalistic theories of science. A Kantian philosophy of science not only demonstrates the indispensable role of principles of systematicity for our scientific practice, but also offers an attractive explanation for the diversity of the sciences and their relative but irreducible autonomy.