2014. “Rising Powers’ Responsibility for Reducing Global Distributive Injustice”, Journal of Global Ethics 10/3, 1–8 (original) (raw)
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Global Distributive Justice and Political Responsibility
SOFIA PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, 2005
This article considers some issues concerning the responsibility of people to global distribution of wealth and resources. Skeptics of global redistribution argue that there is no obligation of distributive justice across boundaries. This is because, they say, the poor of developing countries are responsible for their plight, which is induced by misguided economic policies of the governors they elected. Brian Barry is among those who argue against the legitimacy of global obligations of distributive justice on the ground of the political responsibility of the poor. 1 I argue that Barry's arguments against duties of global distributive justice are far from convincing. Before denying assistance to the poor, we should have a clear conception of electoral processes of developing countries and the implications of economic punishment within the context of global distributive justice.
Empire, Race, and Global Justice, ed. Duncan Bell (Cambridge University Press), 2019
In this chapter I argue that scholars who are concerned about global justice should draw on perspectives from the global south. This claim rests on a modified version of standpoint theory, which I explain and defend. The term "global justice" describes normative theories about the sources and extent of obligations to combat economic inequality, human rights abuses, and poverty in poor countries. The title of one influential article captures the core concern of this approach succinctly: what do we owe to the global poor? 1 Drawing on Kantian or utilitarian frameworks, this literature urges people living in wealthy countries to examine their obligations to distant others. Before explaining the limitations of this approach, I want to emphasize its value. This way of posing the question forces students and scholars to consider themselves as agents who are at least partially responsible for the unfair distribution of burdens and benefits in the world. There are different ways of construing this responsibility. Some writers describe the source of this responsibility as the wealthy world's failure to meet the basic needs of the poor, and others emphasize that inequalities are actually produced by economic and political structures that benefit the privileged. 2 These philosophical arguments about responsibility call on the reader to respond, to think about global poverty, and to think about it in a way that gives it a sense of urgency and proximity. Furthermore, while early contributions such as Peter Singer's may have relied on problematic analogies and may have overlooked political and economic analysis, this is much less true of recent debates, which have focused
Global inequality and injustice
Journal of International Development, 2009
In this paper I shall argue that much of the existing global inequality is unjust, and that this injustice is not only because reducing inequality could serve the important goal of poverty reduction. I reject arguments of John Rawls and Thomas Nagel that limit the importance of distributive egalitarianism to states. I argue in contrast that a commitment to respect for human dignity has egalitarian distributive implications for the global economy. Injustice in the existing institutional order provides reasons for reforming the global institutional structure to reduce inequality.
Global Justice, Neo-imperialism, and Poverty
Running Head: Neo-imperialism, Global Justice, and Poverty IPM117/150049736 This essay will answer the question of how neo-imperialism has aggravated poverty and inequality globally, in light of the moral problem that this poses in the world. Global justice scholars have asserted that poverty and inequality in the world are unjust, and more can and should be done to alleviate the problem. This issue becomes problematic, nevertheless, as the notion of post-colonial neo-imperialism presents a deeper problem.
The Discussion on Global Justice: A Missing Premise
Global Rectificatory Justice
During the last few decades we have witnessed a significant increase in the literature on global justice. Scholars in philosophy, political science, international relations, and other disciplines are turning their attention to global relations and in particular the implications of globalization on ethics and international politics. Globalization implies global interdependence. Decisions taken in one place reverberate in another place far away and thus the scope of our responsibility is widening. People from different parts of the world come closer and we learn about the lifestyles and living conditions of peoples far away. Widespread poverty and the gaps between the global "haves" and the global "have-nots" challenge our sense of justice. These global injustices have been enduring since colonial times. Yet, strangely enough, ethicists involved in the discussion on global justice have almost entirely focused on one aspect of justice, namely distributive justice, and neglected the history behind the global injustices we encounter today. As I argue in this chapter, there is a missing premise in much of the argumentation. Obviously, questions of distributive justice are crucial for the normative discussion of global justice but, as I argue throughout this book, the discussion on global justice should also be informed by a historical perspective. In this chapter I show that the legacy of colonialism provides an important background to the main issues in the present discussion on global justice. In the first part of the chapter I raise the question of whether some key issues in the global justice discussion-global poverty, global inequality, and global migration-are related to the legacy of colonialism. Then, in the next section, I introduce Thomas Pogge's theoretical notion of an "international resource privilege" and argue that this privilege has its origin in colonialism.