WHY WE SHOULD NOT BE UNHAPPY ABOUT HAPPINESS VIA ARISTOTLE The functionalist account of Aristotle's notion of eudaimonia (original) (raw)

The purpose of my dissertation is to resolve the ongoing argument in the modern Anglo-American interpretation of Aristotelianism regarding the principle of eudaimonia (εủδαιµονία; happiness). Exlusivist interpretation argues that the principle of eudaimonia is one dominant or exclusive telos (end) consisting of the aretê (excellence or virtue) of theōria (contemplation of the divine). Inclusivist interpretation argues that the principle of eudaimonia is an inclusive or compounded telos containing this and all other Aristotelian virtues in a comprehensive or mixed life ruled by phronēsis (practical wisdom). I offer the functionalist interpretation that goes beyond the dichotomy of inclusivism and exclusivism in arguing that (1) contrary to exclusivism, theōria is functionally linked with all the other activities of the soul throughout the entire Aristotelian corpus and that (2) contrary to inclusivism, theōria is functionally superior to each and all of the other activi-v ties of the soul, making a compound model irrelevant in its incapacity to express the hierarchy within the soul. The soul and polis are both a sustēma (systematic whole) organized by the ruler nous (intuitive reason / active intellect) with its activity (energeia) of theōria (contemplation) via formulating metron (measure). Metron in relation to us depends on metron within the object, and the latter is assumed a priori as a major premiss (the universal) in the practical and speculative syllogisms, while the practical reason is incapable of defining the universal. Eudaimonia is a perfect realization of the function of the ruler. Humans are functionally distinct from other animals precisely by this contemplative ability of a priori assuming the universal within the particular. Soul, as any sustēma, is identified not with the hierarchy of its parts, but with its ruler, and the final virtue is identified with the virtue of the ruler. The passive intellect and the active intellect are accordingly the practical reason and the contemplative reason. The first principle and end (the cause) of action is leisure spent in the disinterested and useless contemplative activity of the ruler-the active intellect. The moral action, which does not reach this end, is not ultimately good-in-itself though outright dutiful. vi CONTENTS on the identification of any sustēma with its highest function 57 3.7 Implications of the hierarchical argument for the teleia aretê passage in NE 1, 7 62 3.8 The argument from the peculiarity of human ergon for the identification of eudaimonia with theōria 65 3.9 Concluding thoughts on the functional nature of happiness 70 Chapter 4 Eudaimonia as incompatible with the maximization of moral virtues and unidentifiable with their compound 4.1 The requirement to limit social interactions and moral / practical virtues involved 75 4.2 The causal priority of eudaimonia: self-love as self-causation and self-causation as eudaimonia 95 4.3 Mutual contemplation as the only true justification of social interaction: EE 7, 12 on the life as knowledge 117 4.4 Man does not need moral duty to prove himself good: NE 9, 9 on the life as knowledge 123 vii 4.5 The requirement to limit the intensity of the most close social interactions 134 4.6 EE 7, 15 on the necessity to limit both extrinsic and intrinsic goods and on theōria as the standard of human life 138 Chapter 5 The significance of the principles of pain and pleasure / leisure for eudaimonia 5.1 Pain inherent in moral virtue: the existential incompatibility between moral virtues and eudaimonia 157 5.2 The passage on the three types of life in NE 1, 5: the significance of the conflation of the moral life with the practical life 162 5.3 NE 10, 6-8 on leisure as the principle of eudaimonia, different from its conditions / additions 173 5.4 NE 10. 8 on theōrētikos being the paradigmatic moral agent most capable of apprehending the facts of life / establishing measure for the sake of leisurely theōria 184 5.5 NE 10. 9 on the role of theōria in the systematization of polis 197 5.6 Politics 8 on the role of theōria in the systematization of polis 203 5.7 The difference between eudaimonia as the contemplation of the measure and the arithmetic mean of the moral virtue 209 Chapter 6 The role of pleasure in making eudaimonia final and self-sufficient. The final reconsideration of the NE 1, 7 passage on the self-sufficiency of eudaimonia 214 Appendix Critical overview of the major interpretations of eudaimonia in the contemporary Aristotelian scholarship A.