Galen's Institutio Logica and al-Fārābī's Logic. A reassessment of parallelisms that show a possible influence (original) (raw)
Related papers
Logic Functions in the Philosophy of Al-Farabi
2018
Al-Farabi (870-950 AD), peripatetic philosopher came to be known as the Second Teacher (al-Mou'allim al-Thani), Aristotle being the first. His most contributions were clarifying the functions of logic as follows: defined logic and compared it with grammar in a unique and useful manner; made the study of logic easier by dividing it into two categories: idea and proof; believed that the objective of logic is to correct faults we may find in ourselves and in others; and if we do not comprehend logic, we must either have faith in all people, or mistrust all people, or differentiate between them. In this paper, I will analyse his logical works, Kitab al-lhsa al 'Ulum (Enumeration of the Sciences), Kitab al-qiyas (Book on the Syllogism), Kitab al-jadal (Book on Dialectic), Kitab al-burhan (Book on Demonstration), and Fusus al-Hikam (The Ring stones of Wisdom), in order to present his contributions in field of logic.
This paper examines al-Fārābī’s logical thought within its Arabico-Islamic historical background, and attempts at conceptualizing what this background contributes to his logic. After a brief exposition of al-Fārābī’s main problems and goals, I shall attempt at reformulating the formal structure of Arabic linguistics (AL) within ontological and formal characteristics where the Arabic logic is built upon. Having discussing the competence of al-Fārābī in the history of the AL, I will propose further three interrelated theses about al-Fārābī’s logic those are logico-linguistic conception, the project of logicization, and nuclear logic whereby I will attempt to redefine his logic. The final question that will arise is how Aristotle’s logic could be built upon the AL which has a contrary nature to logic. The present paper also contributes examining our traditional research habits in the Arabic studies.
The present article aims to show that the treatise On the Harmonization of the Opinions of the Two Sages the Divine Plato and Aristotle cannot have been written by al-Fārābī. It considers to this end four crucial issues treated in this work, concerning (1) divine Providence and the particulars, (2) Platonic Ideas and the divine Intellect, (3) creation ex nihilo and (4) the divine attribute of 'will'. It establishes in each case that the thesis defended by the author is contrary to al-Fārābī's doctrine and akin to that of Yah *yā ibn 'Adī. This twofold result prompts us to suggest that the author should be associated with Ibn 'Adī and his milieu; it also suggests a new periodization of 10th century Arabic philosophy. Rather than imagining a Kindian phase followed by a ''school of Baghdad'' extending from al-Fārābī's masters to the age of Avicenna, we should postulate that some of al-Fārābī's followers returned to al-Kindī in the field of cosmology, for theological reasons.
Abu l-Barakat al-Baghdadi and the Traditions of Arabic Logic
Studia graeco-arabica, 2021
In the anonymous al-Nukat wa-l-fawāʾid, a summa of Avicennan philosophy written around 1200, a partisan of Avicenna accuses Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) of having come under the influence of the reprehensible Leader of the Jews, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī (d. c. 1165). The reasons for the anonymous author’s antipathy toward Abū l-Barakāt relate to the way Avicenna’s contribution to logic is both pillaged and pilloried in stretches of al-Kitāb al-muʿtabar. The claim that Abū l-Barakāt exercised direct influence over Faḫr al-Dīn is, at least in logic, unlikely to be true. Nonetheless, Abū l-Barakāt’s presentation and methods highlight significant changes in the methods of the later traditions of Arabic logic.
Al-Farabi's Typology of Intellect in the Light of Logic of Kazimierz Twardowski
2019
Despite the fact that there is more than one century between the Middle Ages and the modern age, this does not take away the direct or indirect continuity between them. Even if within the same discipline medieval and modern thinkers thought differently, we can still find a lot in common in their thoughts and concepts. And it should be noted that the deeper and broader the scope of their mental activity, the closer thinkers of the Middle Ages and modern times become. These words are also true in relation to two prominent philosophers – Abu Nasr al-Farabi and Kazimierz Twardowski.
Apples and Oranges: The Logic of the Early and Later Arabic Logicians
Islamic Law and Society, 2010
... Also see Michael E. Marmura, “Ghazali's Attitude to the Secular Sciences and Logic,” in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. George F. Hourani (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1975), 100–9. 39) al-Ghazālī, Deliverence, 65. ...
Nazariyat, 2019
In logic, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Razī was broadly an orthodox Avicennan. However, in his enormously influential commentary on al-Urmawī’s logic handbook Maṭāliʿ al-anwār, he explicitly criticizes Avicenna and advances a novel analysis of atomic propositions. As a later addition that only survives in two manuscripts shows, Quṭb al-Dīn was troubled by traditional accounts of the syntax and semantics of atomic propositions. For him, the main problem was a confused understanding of the copula. In atomic propositions of the form “A is B,” the copula is the word that indicates that B is predicated of A (“is” in English, “esti” in Greek, but not usually expressed in Arabic). Avicenna had maintained, for lack of an Arabic equivalent to Aristotle’s “esti,” that the Arabic pronoun “huwa” should be used to form complete atomic propositions (e.g., “Jīm huwa bā’”). Quṭb al-Dīn considers this to be mistaken on several levels. To straighten out the mistake, he disambiguates the predicative nexus of a proposition from its judgment, formulates a unified notion of unsaturatedness for predicates, and gives an account of the judgment-nexus. An upshot of this novel analysis is a reinterpretation of the Aristotelian distinction between secundum adiacens and tertium adiacens propositions.