The French-Australian Submarine Affair: Can It Sink the EU Indo-Pacific Strategy? (original) (raw)

The AUKUS Affair: What Is Behind France's Anger

IFES Forum, 2021

Australia signed in 2016 a contract with the French shipbuilder Naval Group to buy 12 conventionally-powered attack submarines. But on September 15, 2021, during a joint Australian-British-U.S. meeting, the Australian Prime Minister announced that his country would acquire nuclear submarines from Washington instead, thus nullifying the French contract. This new AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) tripartite cooperation goes beyond providing submarines to Australia and aims at bolstering Australian military capabilities and increasing its cooperation and interoperability with the United States. The whole ordeal is without doubt part of the wider U.S. goal of containing China's bid for regional hegemony. The French, furious at AUKUS betrayal, recalled their ambassadors to Australia and the United States on September 17.

Australia’s relationship with the European Union: from conflict to cooperation

Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2018

After decades of tension, Australia and the European Union (EU) now have a substantive relationship, interacting and cooperating with each other within a wide range of areas. The relationship is currently at a critical turning point. The Framework Agreement has, for the first time, elevated the relationship to a treaty level. It strengthens Australia-EU actions and interests on bilateral, regional and multilateral issues. There is considerable potential for closer cooperation and more extensive pooling of the resources and capacities of both interlocutors on a range of policies and within the multilateral context. This article provides an assessment of the relationship, the current state of play and key challenges facing the relationship as the EU and Australia forge stronger ties through the conclusion of a Framework Agreement and the commencement of discussions on a Free Trade Agreement at the same time as the UK's exit negotiations from the EU. It demonstrates that, although there are challenges facing the relationship, there are also significant opportunities to further develop and strengthen ties.

Strategy under the surface of the Australia–Japan sub deal

East Asia Forum, 2016

The ‘competitive evaluation process’ Australia is now applying to decide who manufactures the country’s future submarines looms as a potential tipping point for the Japan–Australia strategic partnership. If the two countries were to enter into a long term relationship to build these submarines, a closer strategic partnership across the board becomes more likely. But if Australia opts for a German or French partnership, the momentum in Australia–Japan security relations could be seriously eroded.

Australia and the European Union: Towards Deeper Engagement

Faculty of Arts, The University of Melbourne, 2019

The relationship of the European Union (EU) with Australia is characterised by recent achievements, with a significant Framework Agreement and negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). At the same time, there remain some challenges in engagement, given they have some differences of interests and concerns. The Framework Agreement, which has been provisionally implemented since October 2018, embodies a treaty-level engagement between the EU and Australia and reflects mutual agreement on a wide range of issues. This Framework Agreement is complemented by bilateral EU-Australia actions and by shared concerns regarding both regional and multilateral issues. Yet common interests and shared concerns, although significant, do not indicate entire agreement, given the differing hierarchies of interests and preferences of each interlocutor. We suggest in this policy report that actor preferences-the way in which actors 'order possible outcomes of interaction' (Frieden 1999, p. 42) may diverge according to domestic, regional and international concerns. We make the case that each of the interlocutors has a distinct hierarchy of preferences and interests in their strategies. 1 We would like to thank Tamara Tubakovic and Nicholas Parry for their research assistance with this Policy Report.

France and European Defence Continuity in Long-Term Objectives , Change in Strategy

2018

Affairs is an independent research institute that produces high-level research to support political decisionmaking and public debate both nationally and internationally. All manuscripts are reviewed by at least two other experts in the field to ensure the high quality of the publications. In addition, publications undergo professional language checking and editing. The responsibility for the views expressed ultimately rests with the authors. DECEMBER 2018 253 • While the overall ambition (grandeur and status-seeking) in French foreign policy has been surprisingly stable, different strategies and approaches have been adopted. The French approach over the past 15 to 20 years has been to focus on status-seeking through legitimacy, and we have seen a gradual shift towards a French foreign policy that is increasingly guided by international law and multilateralism. • There are also elements of both continuity and change in French ambitions for European defence. While the long-term ambition is the same, the French approach towards European defence has changed from being concerned with developing the defence structures within the EU ("Europe de la defence") to becoming more concerned with the need to strengthen the European capacity to act.

FRANCE'S INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY 2022: AN ANALYSIS

NMF Website, 2022

France’s ‘Pivot’ from ‘Asia-Pacific’ to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ commenced in 2016 with mention of both the terms in the 2017 ‘Defence and National Security Strategic Review’. While the French 2016 edition of its policy on defence and security document was titled ‘France and Security in the Asia-Pacific’, the 2018 edition was renamed ‘France and Security in the Indo-Pacific’. With this Indo-Pacific was firmly part of the French strategic lexicon. In 2018, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, spelt out his country’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, on various occasions, and in end-February 2022, a 67-page document titled ‘France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and a nine-page summary were made available online. The strategy document has updates up to 11 February 2022 and is based on four pillars. A refreshing observation is the reference to the region as an “open and inclusive area”. Thus far, only India had been continuously using the term ‘inclusive’ in its reference to the Indo-Pacific, along with the universally used ‘free and open’ tag, and this convergence could imply a change in the overall European approach to the region. The tenets highlighted in the French 2013 white paper on defence, the 2017 strategic review, and the 2018 defence and security policy, have been extensively reflected in the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy document, with a detailed approach of France to the region as a resident Indo-Pacific nation. This paper authored by Captain Sarabjeet S Parmar, Senior Fellow, examines three main aspects that merit attention for the region: first, the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific and the French presence and role; secondly, multilateralism, partnerships and the four identified pillars that drive French objectives and actions in the region; and thirdly, strengthening the presence of the European Union (EU) in the region.