Drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism-MOROCCO-CONNEKT H2020 (original) (raw)
2020
Similar to many other countries in the region, violent extremist groups and ideologies pose a significant threat to Moroccan society and the stability of the country. In response, the government has pursued a highly security-based approach, which has resulted in the arrest of over 3,000 (alleged) jihadis and the dismantling of 186 terrorist cells between 2002 and 2018. While the root causes are multi- faceted, Morocco’s ongoing socio-economic challenges, which have reinforced economic and political grievances, have fueled radicalization. For this reason, some have demanded that the government prioritize greater domestic engagement instead of increasing investment in countries south of the Sahara
2022
When ideology is all that matters! Exploring non-violent Islamism through Fetullah Gülen and Taqiuddin An-Nabhani Elisa Orofino, Anglia Ruskin University (UK) Yavuz Çobanoğlu, Munzur University (TR) Extremism goes far beyond the use of violence and the presence of long-living vocal (and non-violent) extremist groups tells us how complex this phenomenon is. Vocal extremists are characterised by strong anti-government and anti-establishment agendas but they do not use violence as a viable means to achieve their goals. Often labelled as “preachers of hate”, vocal extremists are hard to ban in Western democracies as they mostly stand as protest groups who are granted the freedom of speech and association. They are therefore free to disseminate their ideas, which have worked as a conveyor belt to violence for some individuals over the years. This paper aims to investigate this type of non-violent extremism and its problematic manifestations.
Violent Radicalization: Beyond Ideology or Religion
Workshop: The Narrative of Islamic violence in History. Creation, artifice and reality, 2018
Narratives that consider Islam as a violent religion have been reinforced in recent times by the rise of jihadism, i.e. those radical Islamist movements that advocate the use of violence through a distorted concept of jihad. At present, jihadism represents a global movement with a considerable popular base of followers even in secular Western societies. One of the characteristics of jihadist organizations is their ability to commit attacks in these Western societies, either directly and deliberately or through inspiring and encouraging the creation of autonomous cells. This fact, on the one hand, has led the respective governments to declare jihadist terrorism as one of the main threats to security. But, on the other hand, it has also contributed to the association between Islam and violence, a tendency that, although clearly erroneous and unjust, often becomes inevitable. However, recent research suggests that the process of violent radicalization of jihadist nature that some individuals experience in Western societies does not differ essentially from other processes based on political or nationalist ideologies. If this hypothesis is confirmed, the different political, religious, etc. contexts where the process of radicalization takes root would lose relevance in favor of the individual and the interpretation he makes of each of them. In other words, the arguments that support the consideration of Islam as a violent religion would lose weight in favor of the misuse, intentional or not, that some individuals make of religion to satisfy their own ends.
The Limits of Morocco's Attempt to Comprehensively Counter Violent Extremism
After terrorist attacks in 2003, Morocco launched an ambitious and wide-ranging strategy to counter violent extremism. Intended to both target existing terror groups and address the roots of radicalization, this comprehensive strategy sought to combine security measures with efforts to improve socioeconomic conditions and promote the state’s moderate interpretation of Islam. In this Brief, Mohammed Masbah assesses this strategy and finds that, while it has been largely successful at hindering jihadi groups from operating inside Morocco over the past 15 years, it failed to prevent hundreds of Moroccans from radicalizing and joining groups fighting abroad. Masbah argues that the domination of security agencies in implementing the strategy sidelined its non-security aspects, which also suffered from being too broad, unfocused, and lacking in complementarity. As a result, Morocco seems to have failed to make sufficient progress in achieving its broader objective of fighting poverty and social exclusion. The Brief concludes by discussing the implications of the assessment for the expected return of hundreds of Moroccans who fought in Syria and Iraq with ISIS.
Radicalisation and resilience case study : Morocco
2020
This case study is part of a series of in-depth reports on religiously motivated violent radicalisation - and resilience to it - in 12 countries. The series examines periods in which religious radicalisation and violence has escalated and analyses relevant policy and political discourses surrounding them. While seeking to identify factors that drove radicalisation and violence in each country, the case studies also critically assess programmes of prevention and resilience-building, identifying good practices. This series was produced by GREASE, an EU-funded research project investigating religious diversity, secularism and religiously inspired radicalisation.This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement number 770640
Community Approaches to Preventing Violent Extremism: Morocco as a Case Study
Center for Global Policy, 2019
The threat posed by violent extrem- ism, from groups such as Daesh1 and al-Qaeda affiliates as well as right wing extremists in the West, requires a multi- pronged and sustainable response. Both types of extremist groups desire a world divided into existential fault lines. Both have inflicted thousands of casualties and caused senseless deaths. Prevention of violent extremism (PVE) needs to move beyond military and aggressive security measures. Unless the root causes of violent extremism are adequately addressed, violent ide- ologies will continue to metastasize via online and offline networks. A long-term solution requires a complex approach that addresses violent extremism in all its forms. Despite territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, Daesh continues to evolve its tactical and propaganda strategies to draw recruits and to further its political agenda. Through its innovative and media-savvy techniques, Daesh has offered youths an outlet for their grievances and dreams. Existing PVE programming has failed because of its one-size-fits-all approach and overemphasis on ideology. Effective programs must be community-led and designed to respond to the strengths and challenges of local circumstances. Policies to prevent violent extremism should anchor women as frontline decision makers and youths as active Policies to prevent violent extremism should anchor women as frontline decision makers and youths as active partners in peacebuilding. partners in peacebuilding. From a com- munication perspective, policy makers must reduce the emotional and rational appeals of all violent extremist groups. Based on Daesh recruitment propa- ganda analysis and extensive fieldwork in Morocco, this policy brief enriches established understandings of PVE and outlines recommendations and les- sons learned for PVE practitioners and grassroots leaders on future programs seeking effective community approaches to peacebuilding in the region.
Buckingham University Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies, 2019
Understanding what drives “radicalisation” of people, and specifically how they are voluntarily drawn into violent enterprise in sub-Saharan Africa will help us develop more specific ways to counteract this. At present we are constrained by approaches developed in Europe, which may not be entirely applicable elsewhere. The literature on the causes of this phenomenon (Radicalisation to Violent Extremism, RVE) is fragmented, and no one theory dominates. We are not sure if the same pathway to violence is followed in different geographies, nor are we certain of the degree of consistency and homogeneity of the various underlying factors of radicalisation into extremist violence. In fact, according to a long-running project at the University of Amsterdam entitled SAFIRE (Scientific Approach to Finding Indicators for & Responses to Radicalisation) “...more than 200 different factors have been identified by research which could play a role in the radicalisation process” (SAFIRE, 2013). The research itself focuses, as best as possible, on examining studies of the causes of individuals becoming radicalised to the commission of acts of extremist politico-religious violence, omitting far-right; far-left and criminal violence. This study draws for methodology on work done analysing processual models of radicalisation by Stephanie De Coensel (2018); derives a meta-model of the factors influencing RVE for the Western World (as applied in Europe) and compares it with what we know of sub-Saharan Africa. Clear differences were found between the meta-model derived for RVE in Europe and the general themes emerging from the studies in sub-Saharan Africa, most notably in the factors pushing individuals toward a pathway leading to radicalisation to extremist violence. This provides indications for the need to have different approaches to counter-extremism interventions in the two regions.