Individual Quota System for Anchovy Fishing and the Conservation of Hydrobiological Resources in Chimbote, Peru (original) (raw)
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Asian Journal of Education and Social Studies
Aims:The research was carried out with the objective of determining whether the individual anchoveta(Engraulisringens) fishing quota for direct human consumption constitutes a regulatory alternative for the administration and control of fishing activity to the extent that it allows greater efficiency of the industry, the increase in value total fisheries, the improvement in the safety of fishing and the sustainability of the hydrobiological resource. Methodology:The research is applied, non-experimental type and descriptive correlational design. The sample consisted of 50% of National and Comparative Legislation, Doctrine, Jurisprudence and Specialized Records on fishing issues; and by 30 experts in fisheries: lawyers 25% and representatives of fishermen 25%, from the District of Chimbote; Two questionnaires were developed to collect the data of the variables under study. Results:The results are presented in tables and statistical figures. The results showed that the individual quot...
Fisheries Research, 2009
Rights-based management (RBM) has been proposed during the last two decades as a means to counteract the race for fish in the Peruvian pelagic fishery. Recently, the government has decided to implement RBM in the pelagic fisheries in the form of a system that allocates individual quotas for vessels licensed to harvest Peruvian anchoveta. The aim of this paper is to analyse the introduced individual vessel quota (IVQ) system and to identify factors that may have the potential to either aid or undermine the achievement of the objective of reducing the race for fish. The non-transferability characteristic of the vessel quota may aid protecting the social fabric from concentration of rights. A substantial fleet reduction, however, may not be achieved. Measures to permanently eliminate redundant capacity and thus the threat of the race for fish may be required. Such measures should comprise either decommissioning schemes or instruments to regulate transferability.
Fishing Rights: The Case of Peruvian Anchoveta Fishery
2013
The implementation of the Maximum Catch Limits per Vessel (LMCE for is acronym in Spanish) in the industrial anchoveta fishery in the year 2009, has generated a wide range of changes in fisheries management. The fishing right, which should strickly represent the resource rent payment done by the owner for the use of a public good, was fixed for ten years in this regime. This research estimates the resource rent for the industrial anchoveta fishery for 2011, which implies a maximum rent, and compares the situation under open access effort and under LMCE system. It will also discuss the fishing rights and private sector’s payments versus the actual rent found in this study.
Fishing Quotas Regulation as the Embodiment of Fish Resources Protection
Proceedings of the International Conference on Innovation in Research (ICIIR 2018) – Section: Economics and Management Science, 2019
Act No. 45 of 2009 authorizes the Minister to determine the Total Allowable Catches (TACs) in the Fishing Area of the Republic of Indonesia (FARI). The determination of TACs is used as an effort to preserve fish resources in Indonesian marine. TACs is catch limit by all the fishing actor within a certain period that are set for most commercial fish stock in FARI. TAC is different from fishing quotas. TACs did not set fishing quotas, either for individual or corporation which have fishing activities. TACs mechanism is inadequate for over-fishing or over-exploitation to fish resources prevention because there are still some FARI that classified as over-exploited for certain species of fish. The aim of this study was to find a better legal mechanism than TACs which can be used to prevent overfishing. The research method used is the normative research method with the statute approach. The conclusion is the fishing quotas regulation is required for the protection of fish resources in Ind...
Pan-American Journal of Aquatic Sciences
The Peruvian anchoveta fishery began in the early 1950s and has become one of the most important fisheries in the world in terms of landings and fishmeal production. Fisheries management in Peru has evolved from regulated open access to recently introduced individual vessel quota management. This paper aims to examine the evolution of fishing capacity management and identify the management actions that have determined the current levels of fishing overcapacity. A lack of a solid policy to stop fishing capacity accumulation together with management susceptibility to industry pressure are likely the main causes of the historical levels of overcapacity, which has recently encouraged a drastic change in the management system. Resumen. Evolución y situación de la gestión de la capacidad de pesca en Perú: El caso de la pesquería de anchoveta. La pesquería de anchoveta peruana se inició a principios de los años cincuenta y se ha convertido en una de las pesquerías más importantes del mundo...
COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR IN STATE-RUN FISHERIES: SITUATING LAKE CHIVERO IN A POLICY PERSPECTIVE
Parks and wildlife facilities are intended to contribute people’s wellbeing socially and economically. This aim puts parks and wildlife management in policy. Appropriate management of parks and wildlife for wider social wellbeing is essential. This paper brings out the issues in compliance behaviour of fishers in Zimbabwe’s state-run lakes. The underlying aim of the study is to create policy options that sustain both the fish resources and the wellbeing of the fishers. Zimbabwe’s Parks and Wild Life Management Authority (ZPWMA) administers all state-run lakes in Zimbabwe in order to prevent their over-exploitation. Despite its strict management regulations, the following rather disturbing developments continue to be observed: a) An increase in disregard for the regulations among licensed fishers and an influx of unregistered fishers (poachers). b) A growing incapacity on the part of ZPWMA to contain the worsening non-compliance with management regulations among fishers. c) An increase in the number of illegal fishers entering the fishery. d) An increase in the amount of fish being sold illegally on open markets in Harare and neighbouring towns. The growing non-compliance with regulations could be a result of many factors. Firstly, the worsening economic problems, the rising unemployment as well as the ever-spiralling prices of beef mean that some people are finding fish to be the next cheaper substitute. Secondly, the rather narrow and state centrist approach to fisheries management little considers the practical concerns of fishers giving them no incentive to comply with the regulations. Thirdly, because of the above, the regulations are low in legitimacy, making them less self-enforcing and costly to enforce. At a policy level, the study attempts to find ways of making the existing fisheries management structures, policies and practices at the fishery command more respect and acceptance among fisheries, whilst creating a conducive environment for the fishers to enhance their wellbeing through fishing. The following main recommendations were made: a) Greater attention be paid to the legitimacy aspects of the regulatory institutions as well as the regulations; b) The interests of and concerns of the fishers be more fully incorporated into the management regulations to enhance their acceptance by fishers; and c) The job conditions of ZPWMA employees should be improved to curb corruption and to improve how they interact with fishers.
New regulations in Chilean fisheries and aquaculture: ITQ's and territorial users rights
Ocean & Coastal Management, 1999
The large industrial fishery development that turn Chile into the third fishing nation in the world is described, and recent regulatory innovations introduced by new Fishery and Aquaculture legislation are reviewed. In addition to classical Fishery management tools, different types of limited entry systems are now defined in the law and applicable to Chilean fisherie. These for the first time include allocation of resources in the form of Individual Fishing Quotas and Individual Transferable Quotas (IFQs and ITQs). Territorial User's Rights in Fisheries (TURF's) were incorporated in the law to enhance self-regulatory practices among artisanal fishermen. Among them, the Areas for Management and Exploitation for Benthic Resources (AME) represent an associative assignment of TURFs. Large-scale zoning is used to re-define Aquaculture Grants and to ritualise the conflicts between Artisanal and Industrial fishermen by establishing the Artisanal Reserve in which small-scale coastal fishermen have Priority Access. Performance of the new management instruments are documented with case studies, for the following fisheries: the loco (Concholepas concholepas) a carnivorous snail, keyhole limpets (Fissurella spp.), langostino or squat lobster (Cervimunida johni), Black hake (Dissostichus eleginoides) and the Yellow prawn (Pleuroncodes monodon).
Regulatory Compliance in small-scale fisheries in Old Providence Island (Colombia)
2011
This research evaluates how contextual variables such as knowledge of the rules, the perception about punishment and formal enforcement levels, perception of social control, fishers" attitudes about legitimacy of rules, and social/economic factors, affect compliance with fisheries regulations. The analysis is carried out in Old Providence Island [OPI]. A survey of 100 fishermen was completed and data from that survey is used to econometrically estimate a model of compliance choices. Results suggest that reports on compliance change depending whether the interviewed is asked about compliance or about violation. I argue that this seemingly inconsistency, reveals an implication on methodological approach. Contrary to the main literature on compliance behavior, in this research deterrence variables were not statistically vii significant in the econometric estimations. This result may be because sanctions and fines are not clearly established, reflecting the existence of structural problems in enforcement activities in the island. The results indicate that fishers adjust their violation with respect to other fishers" behavior, and the knowledge about regulations. The probability of being a violator is higher for divers, and this fact is recognized by the fishers themselves. The survey is discussed in section 6.1, results discussed in section 7, methodological and policy implications are discussed in section 8.
2006
This evaluation of compliance with Article 7 (Fishery Management) of the UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing (FAO 1995) is a 'living document' and may change with time. It is one of 53 such country evaluations covering the top 96% of the world fish catch. Using a wide range of cited source material, the document represents the best attempt by the authors at presenting a fair and objective evaluation of compliance using 44 questions derived from the Code. Questions are divided into six evaluation fields, (Management Objectives; Framework (data & procedures); Precautionary Approach; Stocks, Fleets and Gear; Social and Economic factors, and Monitoring, Control and Surveillance): the derivation of the 44 questions is described in Pitcher (1999). The first three fields cover intentions of a country's legislation to adhere to the Code; while the last three evaluation fields are intended to rate actual performance. Full details of the methods are published in Pitcher, Kalikoski and Pramod (2006). This evaluation has been subjected to several internal cross-checks and, where stated, has been validated by experts familiar with the country concerned. Uncertainty in assigning each score is shown explicitly. However, the authors are aware that omissions and errors of interpretation may still remain for some countries. An open protocol has therefore been adopted for all country compliance evaluations, and the team remains open at any time to comments, corrections or adjustments. Updated versions are made available online as necessary (ftp://ftp.fisheries.ubc.ca/CodeConduct). FAO (1995) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. FAO, Rome, 41pp. Pitcher, T.J. (1999) Rapfish, A Rapid Appraisal Technique For Fisheries, And Its Application To The Code Of Conduct For Responsible Fisheries. FAO Fisheries Circular No. 947: 47pp. Pitcher, T.J., Kalikoski, D. and Pramod, G. (eds) (2006) Evaluations of Compliance with the UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Fisheries Centre Research Reports 14(2). Copy edited by Janice Doyle General Validated by M. Moazzamm (Pakistan).