New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property (original) (raw)
Related papers
Introduction to NEW FRONTIERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property (CUP, 2012)
The new frontiers in the philosophy of intellectual property lie squarely in territories belonging to moral and political philosophy, as well as legal philosophy and philosophy of economics – or so this collection suggests. Those who wish to understand the nature and justification of intellectual property may now find themselves immersed in philosophical debates on the structure and relative merits of consequentialist and deontological moral theories, or disputes about the nature and value of privacy, or the relationship between national and global justice. Conversely, the theoretical and practical problems posed by intellectual property are increasingly relevant to bioethics and philosophy and public policy, as well as to more established areas of moral and political philosophy. Perhaps this is just to say that the philosophy of intellectual property is coming into its own as a distinct field of intellectual endeavour, providing a place where legal theorists and philosophers can have the sorts of discussions - neither reducible to questions about what the law is, nor wholly divorced from contemporary legal problems - which typify debates about freedom of expression, discrimination and human rights. These are all areas in which legal and philosophical ideas influence each other at the level of method as well as of substance. My hope is that this collection of essays will appeal to those who, whatever their professional specialty or training, share an interest in the philosophy of intellectual property, and that it will build upon and advance existing interdisciplinary dialogue and research in this complex, fascinating, and important area.
Introduction : Philosophy of intellectual property – incentives , rights and duties
2012
The new frontiers in the philosophy of intellectual property lie squarely in territories belonging to moral and political philosophy, as well as legal philosophy and the philosophy of economics – or so this collection suggests. Those who wish to understand the nature and justification of intellectual property may now find themselves immersed in philosophical debates on the structure and relative merits of consequentialist and deontological moral theories, disputes about the nature and value of privacy, or the relationship between national and global justice. Conversely, the theoretical and practical problems posed by intellectual property are increasingly relevant to bioethics and philosophy and public policy, as well as to more established areas of moral and political philosophy. Perhaps this is just to say that the philosophy of intellectual property is coming into its own as a distinct field of intellectual endeavour, providing a place where legal theorists and philosophers can h...
The justification of intellectual property: Contemporary philosophical disputes
Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 2008
Once taken for granted as morally legitimate, legal protection of intellectual property rights have come under fire in the last 30 years as new technologies have evolved and severed the link between expression of ideas and such traditional material-based media as books and magazines. These advances in digital technology have called attention to unique features of intellectual content that problematize intellectual property protection; any piece of intellectual content, for example, can be simultaneously appropriated by everyone in the world without thereby diminishing the supply of that content available to others. This essay provides an overview and assessment of the arguments and counterarguments on the issue of whether intellectual property should be legally protected.
Intellectual property and theories of justice (Palgrave, 2008)
2008
Fourteen philosophers, economists and legal scholars address the question 'Can intellectual property rights be fair?' What differentiates intellectual from real property? Should libertarians or Rawlsians defend IP rights? What's wrong with free-riding? How can incentives be taken into account by theories of justice?
Laying Bare an Ethical Thread: From IP to Property to Private Law?
2012
I wish to claim that how we, as a society, deal with property resources is part of a moral context that reflects our values as a society or community. Indeed, I would go further to add that such a moral context imports what have been called the “social obligations” of property. Property rights are not unlimited. In examining how and why private property institutions ranging from ownership of land to ownership of a copyright are limited and indeed channelled or directed, and in analysing what justifications are offered for this in practice and theory, we inevitably expose larger ethical and moral principles: the common good, the development of individual goods, etc. Social obligations are most obvious in the various areas of intellectual property, even though we have grown accustomed to using individual, right-based vocabularies to frame IP discourse. As I shall argue, the areas of IP, especially copyright and patent, are all in some way subservient to a very ethical teleology. This ...
A Treatise on the First Principals of Ownership and a defense of Intellectual property..docx
Intellectual property is a controversial subject. Digital downloads and file sharing have made it easy than ever to create unauthorized copies of original works and distribute them. Some maintain that because of the intangible and abstract nature of Intellectual Property that it is metaphysically not property. It raises several fundamental questions such as what is property, to begin with, and how is it related to ownership? What is ownership and is it just? How does ownership play a role regarding ownership as an ethical system which is primarily concerned with distributive justice? Before any attempts to argue for or against Intellectual Property are made a right definition of property must be determined. Until this is accomplished, there can be no strong ethical arguments about whether one may own Intellectual Property. In truth, there are no moral arguments about whether any form of property may be owned. Ownership is an ethical system of distribution and is a primary concern in everyday dealings between human beings. Questions such as who should own property, should there be private property, and what is considered appropriate behaviors are determined by a property right? These are all primary considerations that may only be answered by the definition of property. The primary goal of this paper is to illuminate its boundaries to build a case for the ethical private ownership of intangible, and tangible objects. Exploring property from a rational and methodological point provide answers to practical questions about property laws and economic rights. This paper attempts to explore what the first principles of property should be from the view of the Austrian School of Economics and the Lockean Meta-Ethic.
A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property Revisited
What I will address in this Article, and one that I took up over fifteen years ago, is: should we consider intellectual works to be the proper subjects of Lockean property claims? My answer then and now is "yes," with the acknowledgement that such a view may require substantial revisions to Anglo-American systems of intellectual property. I will argue that intellectual property rights are no different from rights to lives, liberties, and estates - that is, intellectual property rights should not be seen as state-created entities offered as an inducement to bring forth new knowledge. The upshot of viewing intellectual property rights as state created monopolies, far too often controlled by the powerful and well-connected, is the seemingly pervasive opinion that systems of intellectual property represent the mafia family on a global scale. In my view, to be justified and to warrant worldwide coercion, systems of intellectual property should be grounded in a Lockean theory of property - a theory that acknowledges and protects the natural rights of authors and inventors. Part II of this Article will present the main outlines of a Lockean theory of intellectual property. Part III will take up several specific objections that have been leveled against my preferred view. Finally, Part IV will consider several general objections to intellectual property.
The concept of property is both ever-present and elusive. In light of various definitional problems, it has been popular for some theorists to adopt the view that it is a mere ‘bundle of rights’ and then to say little more about it; moving on to questions about the justification of property that appear more pressing. However, as I argue in this paper, this ‘sophisticated’ legal conception of property has the potential to obscure ontological questions; questions, that is, about the nature of property-objects. In the case of the most commonplace objects of social wealth – land and other tangible resources – ontological questions may seem less important. But with regards to the classification of intellectual property as a type of property, there is a more obvious need for sharp, ontological distinctions to be made and, as I will point out, these distinctions have a bearing on the way in which we view the strength of the rights that govern intellectual objects; and indeed, the question of whether intellectual objects are really property-objects in the first place.