Natural law and unwritten law in Classical Greek thought (original) (raw)
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Survey: Ancient Law - Introduction, Greece, Rome
Journal of Ancient Civilizations 33/2, 2018
Law is a key factor of understanding ancient societies. Though studies on law have often, and for a long time, been undertaken by legal historians, mainly in Law Departments, they did not substantially affect historical studies. This is particularly due to specific terminologies and frameworks of ancient laws, and modern attempts to systematize ancient legal cultures in a mere juristic sphere, rather than to look at the respective historical context. The present survey offers new perspectives on, and approaches to, understanding the mutual interdependencies between law and the respective ancient society. Experts present theoretical and methodological considerations, recently discussed models and newly published research literature that might shape our understanding of ancient legal cultures in the next decades. In part 1, Sven Günther offers introductory remarks and examines some new trends in Roman Law Studies while Edward M. Harris comprehensively guides readers to recent developments in Greek Law Studies.
The American Journal of Comparative Law, 1991
BOOK REVIEW 447 istration, human rights protection, the general principles of the civil law, the law of obligations, property, family law, urban and regional planning, successions commercial law, intellectual property, insurance law, business associations, admiralty and private maritime law, labor law, social insurance, judicial organization and civil procedure, conflicts of law, tax and investment incentives, and criminal law and procedure. Obviously, to have all of this in one volume requires summary and succinct description. The volume's major problem is that the one volume space limit constrains the scope and depth of each chapter. Yet the book provides tremendous comparative insight into a continental legal system. Indeed, it calls for many of the authors to produce a major comparative article or book in English on his or her topic of expertise. To provide a bit of the flavor, I will focus on a few of the chapters which I personally found of interest. Some were chosen because of their import for the comparativist as a bridge between the "civilian" and the common law models. Others I discuss, primarily because they are within my own interest and expertise. Some chapters, although done by masters of their subject, I do not discuss, because of my lack of expertise in the particular subject matter. Chapter 1,1 presents the Historical Development of Greek law and the Greek legal system, from the mysts of classical mythology and epic poetry to modern Greece. It provides the reader with more than that, however. It is a concise and pithy summary of the legal history of Greek Civilization. We are reminded that not only legal philosophy, but also comparative law, have their origins in the works of Plato, Aristotle and Theoprastus, legal philosophers concerned with the ideal of justice, the sources and function of law. We are also reminded that the origin of systematic elaboration on a legal system is to be found in the works of the Roman jurisconsults.2 We learn that some things have not changed that much, even since the Classical period: although tribunals were not bound by precedent, judges and juries were impressed by it and prior cases were frequently cited in court. Demosthenes not only cited cases in his speeches, but also strived to distinguish adverse precedent.3 We even see some affinity to ourselves: Aristophanies' comedies show how Athenians were fond of litigation, regarding it as a pleasant pastime.4 We also note that Greek law is the basis for Continental Civil Law and for Canon law, thereby influencing England, Continental Europe and America, as well.5 This is due to the early Greek con
'Ideas of law in Hellenistic and Roman legal practice'
P. Dresch and H. Skoda (eds.), Legalism: Anthropology and History, 2012
This opening chapter discusses two interconnected topics. First, it examines how the vocabulary of law, right, and justice (such terms as Latin lex, ius and iura, iustitia, regulum, and Greek nomos, nomimon, thesmos, dike, dikaios, philanthropa) was used in Hellenistic and Roman legal and administrative practice (both ‘governmental’ and ‘non-governmental’), and what kinds of rules and regulations were actually issued and enforced by imperial and royal governments, local communities, and private associations. Secondly, it considers the extent to which modern attempts to understand law and justice and to classify types of legal rules can properly be applied to Roman and Hellenistic material circa 300 BC -- AD 250. This bears a superficial resemblance to the old search for a ‘spirit of Roman law’ (von Jhering’s Geist des römischen Rechts, 1852 onward) or to analyses of the principles of Roman jurisprudence (most notably Schulz’s Principles of Roman Law, 1936), but the aim here is in fact quite different. It is neither to establish the underlying ‘mindset’ nor to unpack ideas about what is just, which Roman jurists supposedly did not quite articulate themselves, but instead to understand the significance in practice of terms such as ‘law’ and ‘justice’, and to compare this with modern terminology and modern concepts. Even though (or, perhaps, because) European thinking about law and justice grew largely out of Romanist theory, it often imposes unhelpful preconceptions. The anthropologist’s concerns with ‘translating culture’ deserve more prominence. Whilst thinking of ancient law in the categories developed by the German nineteenth-century Pandektistik is now widely criticized, no systematic attempt has so far been made to deal in other terms with concepts of law implied in Roman and Hellenistic legal practice. The applicability, or otherwise, of more recent attempts to grasp ancient law through concepts of law, justice, and rules of conduct drawn from legal philosophy and anthropology also remains largely unexplored. The chapter concentrates on the Hellenistic and Roman period, to about AD 250, for which the ideas of legal thinkers can be compared with abundant (if rather unevenly spread) documentary material from different regions of the Graeco-Roman world. This is of particular comparative interest for historians dealing with other periods and settings and for anthropologists, since during the Hellenistic period we can explore understandings of ‘law’ and ‘rules’ at many different levels, from empire to village or trade association, rather than just at the city-state level characteristic of the preceding age.
The Rule of the People and the Rule of Law in Classical Greek Thought. Editorial
Jakub Jinek (ed.), The Rule of the People and the Rule of Law in Classical Greek Thought, Filosofický časopis, Special Issue, 2021
The legitimacy of modern liberal democracies is based on the implicit assumption that democracy is closely aligned with the rule of law. Their connection seems to be the keystone of any community that considers itself democratic and based on the universal values of equality and human rights. 1 However, if we leave the level of declarations and self-presentations of regimes and look at real politics, the situation no longer seems so clear-cut. First of all, the connection between the rule of the people and the rule of law does not apply universally, but is rather a historically limited phenomenon. At a time when the modern understanding of the rule of law or the Rechtstaat was being established, the rule of the people was seen as a threat to it rather than as its natural constitutional base. 2 Only after democracy began to be considered the best, and in fact the only acceptable form of government (roughly, from 1915), 3 has the connection between the two concepts come to seem necessary and natural. The model of a political system thus conceived, in which democracy, as a way of selecting those who hold power, and the rule of law, as the way in which this power is exercised, exist simultaneously, has long been considered normative; this model corresponded typically to the political reality of the countries of postwar Western Europe and North America, i.e. those that, in the view of political scientists, belonged to the stable "canon" of Western democracies. 4
SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STUDY OF ANCIENT GREEK LAW
Journal of Ancient Civilizations, 2018
This is a survey of recent work in Ancient Greek Law and covers several areas such as the unity of Greek Law, law in the Archaic period, literacy and Greek Law, legislation (nomothesia), the sources for Greek Law, homicide law at Athens, law and economy, and law and religion.
E. Harris and M. Canevaro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Law
This chapter deals with the impact of Roman legal institutions and political realities of Roman dominance on legal institutions in the Greek world, and with developments of Greek law within the imperial framework from the fall of Corinth to its last traces in late imperial legislation. It addresses in particular the specific characteristics of sources for Greek law in the Roman period, conflicts of jurisdiction between Greek poleis and imperial authorities, the law of personal status in the new imperial context and new developments in the law of property and obligation. The concluding sections deals with the demise of Greek law in late antiquity and its afterlife in late imperial legislation.
A prolonged birth of a concept: the unity of Greek law. Response to S. C. Todd
Symposion 2022. Vorträge zur griechischen und hellenistischen Rechtsgeschichte (Gmunden, 22.–24. August 2022), 2023
This article should be read closely and in conjunction to S. C. Todd's article in the same volume. It concerns the origo of a deeply contested concept and existential question: is there a Greek law or Greek laws issued by the various Greek poleis?