Stress Tests and Liquidity Crisis in the Banking System (original) (raw)
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Do stress tests affect bank liquidity creation?
Journal of Corporate Finance, 2020
We examine the impact of Federal Reserve stress tests from 2009 to 2016 on U.S. bank liquidity creation. Empirical results show that regulatory stress tests have a negative effect on both onand off-balance sheet bank liquidity creation and asset-side liquidity creation. As banks enter the stress tests, they reduce their liquidity creation to avoid failing the stress tests. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks manage their risk exposures to meet higher capital requirements. The negative effect of stress testing on liquidity creation continues to persist in the quarters after the stress tests. Finally, stress test banks appear to increase liability-side liquidity creation. These findings highlight that the enhanced financial stability from greater regulatory scrutiny may be achieved at the expense of financial intermediation.
Liquidity Stress-Tester: A Model for Stress-testing Banks' Liquidity Risk
CESifo Economic Studies, 2009
This paper presents a stress-testing model for liquidity risks of banks. It takes into account the first and second round (feedback) effects of shocks, induced by reactions of heterogeneous banks, and reputation effects. The impact on liquidity buffers and the probability of a liquidity shortfall is simulated by a Monte Carlo approach. An application to Dutch banks illustrates that the second round effects in specific scenarios could have more impact than the first round effects and hit all types of banks, indicative of systemic risk. This lends support policy initiatives to enhance banks' liquidity buffers and liquidity risk management, which could also contribute to prevent financial stability risks.
An Integrated Macroprudential Stress Test of Bank Liquidity and Solvency
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
We propose a new measure of systemic financial distress that incorporates idiosyncratic and systemic risks in the financial system network. Using this measure, we develop an integrated stress test of bank liquidity and solvency risks based on the dynamics of financial distress within the banking system network. We apply this stress test framework to the US banking system and identify systemic vulnerability of individual banks as well as the resilience of the system as a whole to an economic shock. The framework helps us identify and monitor systemic interdependencies between banks. The proposed stress testing framework is useful for practical macroprudential monitoring and is informative for policy making.
Do stress tests reduce liquidity risk opacity
American J. of Finance and Accounting, 2020
This paper examines the contribution of stress tests to reducing banking opacity and ensuring the financial resilience of liquidity risk in the face of adverse shocks. To this end, we survey a sample of conventional and Islamic banks operating in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries and observed between 2005 and 2015. The scope of this study bears on annual data collected from Bankscope and the World Bank. The sample includes 72 listed banks (48 conventional banks and 26 Islamic banks) in 7 MENA countries, during the 2005-2015 period. Moreover, like Abrigo and Love (2015), we used the generalised method of moments (GMM) to conduct two estimations of the panel-VAR approach. We run a liquidity risk stress test in response to macroeconomic and specific shocks for the 75 listed banks. In addition to these tests, we run impulse response functions (IRFs) to describe the response of liquidity risk to these shocks. We concluded that stress tests could play a fundamental role in reducing banking opacity by producing relevant information about banks' risk exposure, their current circumstances and their ability to resist adverse events.
Models for Stress Testing Czech Banks' Liquidity Risk
2011
We provide a macro stress-testing model for banks' market and funding liquidity risks with a survival period of one and three months. The model takes into account the impact of both bank-specific and market-wide scenarios and considers both the first-and secondround effects of shocks. The testing model has three phases; (i) the formation of a balance-sheet liquidity shortfall, (ii) the reaction by banks, and (iii) the feedback effects of shocks. During each phase we re-count the liquidity buffer and examine whether banks hold a sufficiently large amount of liquid assets to be able to survive the liquidity tension in their balance sheets. An application to Czech banks illustrates which bank business models are sensitive to liquidity tensions. Overall, we confirm that the Czech banking system is resilient to a scenario mimicking the international liquidity crisis of 2008-2009.
A macro model for stress-testing banks' liquidity risk
2008
This paper presents a macro stress-testing model for market and funding liquidity risks of banks, which have been main drivers of the recent financial crisis. The model takes into account the first and second round (feedback) effects of shocks, induced by behavioural reactions of heterogeneous banks, and idiosyncratic reputation effects. The impact on liquidity risk is simulated by a Monte Carlo approach. This generates distributions of liquidity buffers for each scenario round, including the probability of a liquidity shortfall. An application to Dutch banks illustrates that the second round effects have more impact than the first round effects and hit all types of banks, indicative of systemic risk. This lends support policy initiatives to enhance banks' liquidity buffers and liquidity risk management, which could also contribute to prevent financial stability risks.
The Journal of Financial Researches and Studies, 2021
Basel III liquidity regulation introduced two new metrics with a focus on time horizons up to 30 days (LCR: Liquidity Coverage Ratio) and beyond one year (NSFR: Net Stable Funding Ratio) respectively. This paper bridges the horizon gap by applying a yearlong liquidity stress test to the implied cash flow data of the seven biggest Turkish banks to gauge the extent (from 1 to 365 days) to which they can withstand a country-specific liquidity crisis. At the same time, this is the first study that has revealed the survival horizons of banks after a liquidity stress test at the institutional level. Results show that all banks fail each of the eight Turkey-specific liquidity stress scenarios (with a single exception) even under various Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) supports while complying with both LCR and NSFR ex-ante. As such, regulators would be better off employing the framework as a complementary local tool to the global Basel III liquidity regulation in order to account for medium-term liquidity risks between 30 days and one year. And therewithal, central banks could also use the results to draw up a contingency funding plan by reconsidering their hypothetical reactions to a liquidity crisis.
The role of stress tests in enhancing the rigidity and integrity of the banking system
The role of stress tests in enhancing the rigidity and integrity of the banking system , 2024
This study aims to find out the role of stress tests in measuring the ability of Qatari banks to withstand shocks after recovering from the corona epidemic; the study concluded that the Qatari banking sector can recover from the corona crisis, where the results of the stress tests applied according to the assumption of the worst scenarios, which is to reach high levels of non-performing loans from the private sector, the capital adequacy ratios of the Qatari banking sector are estimated at 12.6% - 12.9% - 12.8% for the years 2019, 2020, 2021, respectively, that is, according to the above scenario, the percentage of capital adequacy will remain higher than the minimum applicable in Qatar of 12.5%
Market and funding liquidity stress testing of the Luxembourg banking sector
This paper performs market and funding liquidity stress testing of the Luxembourg banking sector using stochastic haircuts and runoff rates. It takes into account not only the shocks to the banking sector and banks' responses to them, but second-round effects due to the effects of banks' reactions on asset prices and reputation. In general, banks' business lines and, therefore their buffers' composition, determine the net effect of the shocks on banks' stochastic liquidity buffers. So, results differ across banks. Second-round effects exemplify the relevance of contagion effects that reduce the systemic benefits of diversification. While systemic liquidity risk is low following a shock to the interbank market, for Luxembourg, with its high number of subsidiaries of large foreign financial institutions, the results indicate the importance of monitoring the liquidity of parent groups to which Luxembourg institutions belong. In particular, shocks to related-party deposits are important. Finally, the results, including those of a run-on-deposits shock, show the relevance of system-wide measures to minimize the systemic effects of liquidity crises.