Jaish-e-Mohammad (original) (raw)
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The use of violence by Muslim militants seeking an independent Islamic state has a long history in certain countries in Southeast Asia, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, which have entrenched religious and ethnic conflicts. The group took effective measures to reduce the risk that government officials would discover their footsteps in building a terrorist organization and carrying out their first bomber operations. It could go unnoticed, not only by the intelligence and police services of the countries where they operate, but also by the foreign intelligence services. However, JI does not appear to have achieved a similar success in its organizational learning of operational tactical security uses since it was unable to protect a significant portion of its key leadership.
After providing an overview of the organization and its ties to Pakistan's military and intelligence agency, I argue that hile Indians are likely correct to anticipate that the next attack on India may well come from the LeT; I encourage Indians to also remember the Jaish-e-Mohammad which launched the attack on India's parliament in December 2000. JeM had been dormant for years in part because their cadres had defected to the Pakistani Taliban. In recent years, the Pakistan army and ISI have resuscitated JeM in hopes of luring some of the of previous cadres back into the fold with the lure of killing Indians. JeM, it should be recalled, conducted its first attack-a suicide bombing in 2000-in Kashmir. JeM, unlike LeT, has long had ties to al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban, once the world leaders in murderous brutality, and JeM's operatives have been working with the Pakistani Taliban whose attacks have been nearly as savage as that of IS. Indians would be wise to keep on eye on JeM in addition to LeT. The Pakistan army and the ISI needs both of these groups if its twin goals of pacifying Pakistan and setting India on fire are to be advanced.
The Concept of Jihad in the Perspective of Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI)
2021
Jihad is a term that represents the ambivalence of religion. It will continuously become a media of debate for some groups including Muslim and non-Muslim. According to JAI, jihad is striving in studying the teachings of Islam, then trying to practice them in daily life, and preaching in the way of Allah SWT. According to Ghulam Ahmad, there are three concepts of jihad, namely, small jihad, big jihad, and greatest jihad. Small jihad is now over because present condition is different from the past, they are no longer contextual.
Jemaah Islamiyah Jihadist Movement in Indonesia
El-HARAKAH (TERAKREDITASI)
Democratic practice in the post-Soeharto era has widely opened and led to euphoria in the public life. Some social and politics activities which were previously banned are now starting to appear openly. The emergence of Islamic radical community along with their terror acts both psychological and physical which attracts people’s attention may be a cause of this openness. One of communities which is seen as the front guard of radical movement is Jemaah Islamiyah. This article explores the historical background of the aforementioned movement and its development for the last two decades. The discussion also includes the intern dispute and its metamorphosis from just being the under-ground community to be the public community. Despite so many opinions which relate the movement with the powerful Islamism influence from Mid-Eastern, this article argues that those opinions ignore the history of Islamic radical movement in the Social Politics landscape. The precise discussion about Jemaah I...
With the decline of ideologies such as anarchism, anticolonialism, nationalism and revolutionary politics, which were the foundation blocks of the terrorism phenomenon, religious extremism and faith have currently become the major triggers behind the widespread terrorism and terrorist attacks of our contemporary era (Rapoport, 2002; Walls, 2017). The Indian Administered part of the erstwhile princely State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) has not been an exception to this rule since according to the Global Terrorism Index, as the region suffered the highest amount of deaths in 2017, namely 102 deaths committed by five different terrorist groups (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018). To complicate matters, a cursory scan of J&K’s history further uncovers the recurring cycle of violence; ethno-religious conflicts, human rights violations, horrifying loss of life, vast expenditures on security, terrorism and crimes which have continuously been committed by various radicalized groups, including Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Badr and Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) (James & Özdamar, 2005; Akbar, 1991; Tham, 2011; Akhtar, 2010).
RADICALISATION OF YOUTH IN KASHMIR : STUDY OF INCREASED LOCAL TERRORIST RECRUITMENT
IIPA, New Delhi and Punjab University, 2020
ABSTRACT Purpose and Problem Statement Kashmir has been a battle ground for ideas and influence for a few centuries. Social media has made access to outside influence easier. The trend post 2013 if of an increasing number of local youth joining the terror tanzeems despite knowing the short shelf life of a jihadi. The reported figures for yearly local recruitment from 2013-17 were progressively increasing on a yearly basis numbering 6,53,66,88 and finally 126 in 2017. The spread of Al Qaeda in the 90s, followed by ISIS in 2014 has focused the world’s attention and effort on radicalization that has fed these global terror organizations. The influence of these more violent or radical streams of Islamic terror organisations are visible in parts of J&K. There is a need for research to get insight into the minds of the Kashmiri youth to understand their motivations and methods of recruitment into terror organisations. Such a study would give inputs for Policy Planners and Security Forces on measures to reduce instances of Kashmiri youth picking up weapons. Indian counter terrorism strategy in Kashmir rests on eliminating terror threat in Kashmir. Increased local recruitment is proving to be the Achilles’ heel of Indian counter terror strategy. This study focused on recruitment prevention strategy in Kashmir. Methodology The study involved an initial phase of secondary study to explore international research on understanding terrorist ideology, radicalization process and motivation of terrorist recruits. This was followed by a secondary study of the same facets specific to Kashmir, drawing parallels to world experience and identifying the local strands. This process involved interactions with experts that were used to prepare framework for a primary study. Based on acceptance of reality of access challenges in Kashmir the primary study had two parts. First, inputs of Kashmir experts and the second direct from Kashmiri youth. Summary of Findings The primary inputs were combined with the secondary understanding to build the summary of findings. These are covered under the following heads 1. The Policy and Research Environment - shortcomings and challenges that need to be addressed. 2. A review of the Security Policy and Processes Framework in Kashmir and what needs to be done to improve effectiveness. 3. Counter Radicalisation and de-radicalisation basic framework, as assessed by the study. 4. OGW and their Networks in Kashmir, and their critical role in sustaining terrorism in Kashmir. 5. An insight into Terrorist Recruitment and youth narrative in Kashmir. This phase confirmed the need for further studies to reveal the Kashmiri youth narratives. 6. Recommendations of the Study. 7. A proposal for De-radicalisation project in Kashmir. Recommendations. 1. In order to move to data based decision making initiate steps to create more databases of various aspects of Kashmir. These can then be accessed by government agencies and academics. This would need a multiagency and multidisciplinary expert task force for execution. 2. Steps should be taken to create an improved research environment for multidisciplinary studies on Kashmir to give inputs to various government agencies including police, army, civil administration and to the civil society in Kashmir. These steps would include making more data available for research, addressing security concerns of the research scholars, incentivizing additional research on subjects of interest to state agencies, increased government consultation and collaboration with Kashmiri academics. 3. Commission primary studies for detailed sociological assessment of Kashmir society with focus on the youth. The present study could form basis for a wider study with better samples and analysis to get inputs on the youth narrative in Kashmir. This could provide important inputs for policy makers and for strategic perception management. 4. Realign focus of intelligence and SF, on the OGW network and the terror ideologues. They have to be identified, exposed and neutralized to effectively remove terrorism from Kashmiri soil. 5. An important component of strategic communication in Kashmir has to be the conversation between the soldier and the Kashmiri youth. They have to understand each other better, this step maybe most potent to reduce youth local terrorist recruitment. 6. Initiate steps to invigorate surrender and increase arrests, for local terrorists. This includes fresh look at the surrender and rehabilitation policy. 7. Commission a ‘de-radicalisation project’ for youth identified to be vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. The outline of such a project based on this study has been given as part of the recommendations. De-radicalisation Project: Proposal The study has brought out that the government counter-terrorism strategy has a missing link – de-radicalisation. This is required both for the arrested or surrendered and the vulnerable population affected by radical propaganda. While there are efforts at counter-radicalisation by intervention in various forms of strategic communication and policing actions, there is no formalized structure and process for de-radicalisation of identified vulnerable or radicalized youth. The proposal has the following steps. 1. Methods to identify the vulnerable youth. 2. The overall recommended process for the project. 3. The recommended procedure for individual de-radicalisation effort. 4. Additional support measured to be taken by SF to prevent terrorist local recruitment. Conclusion The study provides a primer for academic understanding of terrorist recruitment in Kashmir supplemented by a limited primary study among Kashmiri youth. It brings forward policy options for GOI and state level functionaries, in Kashmir.
The Chechen Component of Jaish Al Muhajurun Wal Ansar
Jaish al Muhajurun wal Ansar (JMA) or The Army of immigrants and supporters, is one of the strongest hardline Islamist violent non-state actors involved in Syrian Civil War. The group is composed of non-Syrian jihadists and was initially named as the Battalion of Immigrants. JMA has started working in tandem with the Nusrah Front as early as 2012 but later tilted towards Nusrah's rival Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Another splintered faction of JMA led by Amir Abu Ansari joined hands with Jaish-e-Mohammad (Army of Mohammad) of Abu Ubaida al-Masri, becoming part of Mujahideen Shura Council, a conglomerate of Syrian Jihadist groups. As more and more foreign jiahdis flocked to Syria, the swelling size of JMA allowed it to independently select theatres of war and also renaming itself as Jaish al Muhajurun wal Ansar in Syria
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A new report by the IPAC team examines how Jemaah Islamiyah, the organisation responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing, recovered and rebuilt from near destruction in 2007. It rejects violence on Indonesian soil and has shown interest in above-ground political activity, but the combination of recruitment on the basis of salafi jihadism and the restrictions on using violence at home could lead to splintering.