A MODEST MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT (original) (raw)
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The correctness and relevance of the modal ontological argument
Synthese, 2020
This paper deals with some metaphilosophical aspects of the modal ontological argument originating from Charles Hartshorne. One of the specific premises of the argument expresses the idea that the existence of God is not contingent. Several well-known versions of the argument have been formulated that appeal to different ways of clarifying the latter. A question arises: which of the formally correct and relevant versions is proper or basic? The paper points to some criteria of formal correctness, and distinguishes two types of relevance for these versions: strong and weak. Its aim is to furnish a strictly worked out answer to the question, taking into account each of these types. As a result, a very simple, formally correct and (weakly) relevant version of the modal ontological argument is formulated. The results obtained are also used to criticize a popular belief about the relations in which the main versions of the modal ontological argument stand to one another.
The Modal (Realist) Ontological Argument
Philosophy and Theology, 2023
This article aims to provide a new ontological argument for the existence of God. A specific 'modal' version of the ontological argument-termed the Modal Realist Ontological Argument-is formulated within the modal realist metaphysical framework of David K. Lewis, Kris McDaniel and Philip Bricker. Formulating this argument within this specific framework will enable the plausibility of its central premise (i.e., the 'Possibility Premise') to be established, and allow one to affirm the soundness of the argument-whilst warding off two oft-raised objections against this type of natural theological argument.
A Modal Ontological Argument for the Existence of an Imperfect God
2023
This paper will present a modal ontological argument for an imperfect God, arguing that God is necessary, is the creator of the Universe, is omnipotent and omniscient, but is not omnibenevolent. It will dispute J.N. Findlay's 1948 contention that God must be a being worthy of worship, and all attempts to define God as morally perfect. It will thus account for the coexistence of an omnipotent creator with natural and moral evil.
Two Dimensional Modal Ontological Argument for the Existence of God
2016
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct a modal version of the ontological argument (MOA) in a two dimensionally extended way. This modification of MOA, I argue, might respond to Tooley’s (1981) and Findlay’s (1948) prominent objections against the argument. The MOA has two distinct key premises that are criticized by Tooley and Findley. According to Tooley, the structure of the argument allows to define further properties that exclude the existence of God-like beings. Findlay, however, argues against the proof in a Kantian way by claiming that the very property of necessary existence is contradictory, therefore no being can possess it. In this paper, I am going to show how Tooley and Findlay’s critique re-frame the original ontological argument debate. I will provide a comprehensive map over all possible ways of refuting the MOA. Finally, I argue that, once we apply a two dimensional framework, we are in a position to refute Findlay’s criticism.
V. A Modal Model for Proving the Existence of God
2008
IN the first section of this paper, I employ an ontological type argument to show that the possibility of God implies, in a standard system of quantified modal logic, the existence and uniqueness of God. In the second section, I argue that the very idea of a supreme being is meaningful. In the third section, I use a cosmological type argument to prove that it is possible for God to exist. In the fourth and final section, I briefly discuss the plausibility of adopting the modal logic used in the first section.
2009
Ontological arguments are deductive arguments for the existence of God from general metaphysical principles and other assumptions about the nature or essence of God. There have been three very signifi cant developments in the history of ontological arguments. The fi rst is the ontological argument developed by St Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century. The second is the argument sketched by Descartes in the late seventeenth century and completed by Leibniz in the early eighteenth century. And the third development consists of the numerous ontological arguments of the twentieth century that explicitly utilize modal logic, particularly those of Malcolm, Hartshorne, Plantinga, and Godel. My chief aim in this chapter is to logically evaluate logical reconstructions of each of these six arguments. I shall also present and logically discuss two of my own explicitly modal ontological arguments. The logical evaluation of a logical reconstruction of an argument often requires that we e...
MODAL LOGIC VS. ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
The contemporary versions of the ontological argument that originated from Charles Hartshorne are formalized proofs (in the metalogical sense of the word) based on unique modal theories. The simplest well-known theory of this kind arises from the B system of modal logic by adding two extra-logical axioms: (AA) "If the perfect being exists, then it necessarily exists" (Anselm's Axiom) and (AL) "It is possible that the perfect being exists" (Leibniz's Axiom). In the paper a similar argument is presented, however none of the systems of modal logic is relevant to it. Its only premises are the axiom (AA) and, instead of (AL), the new axiom (AN): "If the perfect being doesn't exist, it necessarily doesn't". The main goal of the work is to prove that (AN) is no more controversial than (AA) and-in consequence-the whole strength of the modal ontological argument lays in the set of its extra-logical premises. In order to do that, three arguments are formulated: ontological, "cosmological" and metalogical.
GIVING THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT ITS DUE
Philosophia, 2014
In this paper, I shall present and defend an ontological argument for the existence of God. The argument has two premises: (1) possibly, God exists, and (2) necessary existence is a perfection. I then defend, at length, arguments for both of these premises. Finally, I shall address common objections to ontological arguments, such as the Kantian slogan ('existence is not a real predicate'), and Gaunilo-style parodies, and argue that they do not succeed. I conclude that there is at least one extant ontological argument that is plausibly sound.
On the logic of the ontological argument
1991
Saint Anselm of Canterbury offered several arguments for the existence of God. We examine the famous ontological argument in Proslogium II. Many recent authors have interpreted this argument as a modal one.'But we believe that Jonathan Barnes has argued persuasively that Anselm's argument is not modal.