Study Resource 4, Philosophy of Mind (original) (raw)

Kripke and the Illusion of Contingent Identity

1999

ABSTRACT Saul Kripke's (1971, 1972) modal essentialist argument against materialism remains an obstacle to any prospective Identity Theorist. This paper is an attempt to make room for an Identity Theory without dismissing Kripke's analytic tools or essentialist intuitions. I propose an explanatory model that can make room for the Identity Theory within the constraints of Kripke's view; the model is based on ideas from Alan Sidelle's,“Identity and Identity-like”(1992).

The problem of Identity in the Identity Theory of Mind

The identity theory of mind is advocated and developed by different philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. The main thesis of this theory isstates and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. This theory leaves many things unexplained with regard to the relation between mind and body, which have been questioned by different thinkers in different periods. Hence, in this article I am going to find out only the problem of identity in the "Identity theory of mind".

Kripke on Psychophysical Identity

Physicalism Consciousness and Modality Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, 2002

This paper deals with Kripke's influential criticism of the view that mental states are physical in nature, i.e. that such states are identical with certain physical states or processes. ("Physical" is here used in a broad sense, in which this term refers to natural sciences in general, and not just to physics.) In his discussion, Kripke focuses on sensory states, such as pain, and argues against their identification with neurological states or processes that take place in our brains. Kripke's argument is presented in the last lecture in Naming and Necessity. It is developed on just eleven pages at the very end of that fascinating book 1 , but Kripke's thoughts on these matters are firmly based in his preceding discussion of the central issues in the metaphysics of necessity and in the theory of linguistic reference. Identity Theory Consider this paradigm example of a psychophysical identification: Pain = the stimulation of C-fibers. The example is quite problematic, even though it has been in constant use among nearly all the parties in the debate, Kripke included. C-fibers are not in the brain. These so-called "nociceptors" (pain receptors) are nerve fibers that lead painful stimuli, in the form of electric impulses, from the skin or muscles to * An earlier version of this paper was presented at a Rolf Schock Prize symposium on the philosophy of Kripke, that was organized by the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences in Stockholm, in October 2001. Apart from Saul Kripke himself, I wish to thank Sten Lindström and Caj Strandberg for their helpful comments and discussion. I am also indebted to Ingvar