Measuring Power and Satisfaction in Societies with Opinion Leaders: Dictator and Opinion Leader Properties (original) (raw)
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In this paper, we assess two alternative indicators of opinion leadership, selfreported opinion leadership and degree centrality, on the same dataset. We also investigate the interaction effect of these two indicators and the social network environment on opinion leadership. We use social network and survey data from the mobile telecom industry to analyze opinion leadership in smartphone adoption. We find that degree centrality indicates opinion leadership, but that self-reported opinion leadership indicates opinion leadership only under the right social circumstances. In case of weak to moderate network ties, the effect of self-reported opinion leadership is not significant. However, self-reported opinion leaders more effectively influence their strong ties. This study sheds light on indicators of opinion leadership and provides insights for managers to improve their social marketing campaigns.
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