Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on Strauss and Cain (original) (raw)
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Behavior and Social Issues, 1998
Political corruption is identified as the behavioral consequence of novel contingencies of reinforcement introduced immediately after a candidate for public office is victorious and assumes the powers of incumbency. An analysis of the contingencies surrounding the transition from candidate to criminal is presented and strategies for overcoming the corrosive effects of postelection reinforcers are offered. Citizen discontent with the institutions of self-government is becoming increasingly voluble. The nation's newspapers present the evidence on a daily basis. One popular viewpoint is that the structure of government is responsible for whatever problems are thought to exist. As a result, we are witness to robust efforts to change the structure of government such as reforming campaign finance, imposing term limits, forming additional political parties, and launching numerous proposals to alter state and federal constitutions. Just as structuralism invariably fails to address problems of function, these structural changes, however palliative, fail to confront the central cause of decline in the system, the behavior of political incumbents. We were warned that the system contained behavioral flaws more than 100 years ago by one of the most brilliant advocates of self-government, John Stuart Mill. In his essay "Representative Government," Mill asked: How can institutions provide a good administration if there exists such indifference to the subject that those who would administer honestly and capably cannot be induced to serve and the duties are left to those who undertake them because they have some private interest to be promoted? Of what avail is the most broadly popular representative system if the electors do not care to choose the best member of parliament, but choose him who will spend the most money to be elected? (1861/1952, p. 375
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This article argues that the 1990s have witnessed a sea change in the study of political corruption, especially in political science. It explores the reasons for the relative neglect of corruption by political science in the past, and suggests that a process is underway whereby the study of corruption is becoming more integrated into the mainstream of the discipline. It explores the paradox of the co-existence of unresolved disputes about the definition of corruption with a consensus on the severity of the problem, suggesting that corruption remains a worthwhile object of investigation. Finally, it summarises how the contributions to this special issue light possible new avenues in the study of the phenomenon.
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The financing of political campaigns is an area of active scholarly study. I review some of the recent literature and discuss important methodological issues that arise in empirical research on campaign expenditures and campaign contributions. The effects of campaign expenditures and advertising on candidate and ballot-measure elections are summarized, as are the impacts of contributions on contributors' welfare. Many states have changed their campaign finance laws in the past few years, and I describe work that exploits variations in these laws. A discussion of the strategies used by interest groups to allocate their campaign contributions provides insights into contributors' motives.
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According to recent conceptual proposals, institutional corruption should be understood within the boundaries of the institution and its purpose. Political corruption in democracies, prominent scholars suggest, is characterized by the violation of institutional ideals or behaviors that tend to harm democratic processes and institutions. This paper rejects the idea that compromises, preferences, political agreements, or consent can be the baseline of conceptualization of political corruption. In order to improve the identification of abuse of power, the concept of political corruption should not be related directly to democratic institutions and processes; rather, it should be related to ideals whose content is independent of citizens' preferences, institutions and processes. More specifically, I articulate the relations between political corruption and the notion of subjection, and include powerful citizens in the category of political corruption. Yet, I also suggest redefining under what conditions agents are culpable for their motivations in promoting private gain. By doing this, we better realize how democratic institutions can be the source of corruption and not just its victims. Such a redefinition, I propose finally, is the basis for the distinction between individual and institutional corruption.
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CESifo DICE Report, 2003
When candidates for democratic office run for election they are looking for funds to finance their campaigns. These funds allow them to get the word out about their positions, and their campaign advertisements inform voters about those positions. 1 Thus campaign advertisements can have the beneficial effect of helping voters to make more informed choices. However, candidates may promise policy favors to contributors in exchange for contributions. Some scholars argue that such quid-pro-quos give wealthy individuals and organizations an unfair advantage in the political process. Policies may be systematically tiled to donors at the expense of those who do not contribute to candidates' campaigns. Moreover, it has been suggested that voters will become disgusted with the political process when they believe that politicians are for sale, and thus may cease to participate in elections and lose trust in government.
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The American states provide a useful arena for testing models of the causes and consequences of political corruption. Substantial variation appears in the two frequently-used measures of corruption, (a) twentyfive years of data on state-by-state rates of corruption convictions from the U.S. Department of Justice and (b) a cross-sectional survey of statehouse journalists' perceptions of statewide corruption. We argue that current models of causes of corruption in the states, however measured, are misspecified
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Public Choice, 1994
Legislators in modern democracies (a) accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and (b) allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In our model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes.