Aristotle on the Human Good (review) (original) (raw)
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Aristotle on the Essence of Happiness
Recent discussions of Aristotle's doctrine of the good often take up the question whether his doctrine is inclusive or dominant. The distinction between an "inclusive" and a "dominant" conception of the final good can be briefly explained as follows. Let us suppose, first, that A, B, and C are the only goods which are desirable for their own sake and, second, that A is more desirable than B or C. According to the "dominant" conception, the final good will be identical with A, and one who seeks to be happy should devote all of his energies to the pursuit of A. On the "inclusive" conception, the good will consist of A, B, and C together, and one can achieve a happy life only by pursuing all three of these goods, paying special attention to A on account of its superiority. W. F. R. Hardie, who first introduced this distinction some years ago, argued that Aristotle did not have a clear grasp of it, and, as a result, the discussion of the final good in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE I) suffers from a basic confusion. l In some passages Aristotle speaks of the good as if it were an inclusive end, but in other places he clearly treats it as a dominant end. Hardie's view has been challenged by J. L. Ackrill, who tries to show that Aristotle's concep
Happiness in Aristotle's Ethics
For Aristotle, happiness corresponds to the highest kind of virtue. In Book I of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle treats practical virtues, and in Book X, he treats theoretical contemplation as the best practice that might guarantee happiness. Thus, Aristotle might be said to have given two answers (naturalistic and theological) to the question of the nature of happiness. This is because the self-sufficient character of happiness implies its intrinsic value, and practical activities-which are deemed intrinsically valuable in Book I are treated as having secondary value, in Book X, as a means to the higher (theoretical) happiness. Some people believe that Aristotle has finally failed to remain committed to the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental good, falling into a contradiction in his definition of happiness. In this paper, in the first place, we draw on the analytic method and revisit the notion of kalon to show that the function of theo
Happiness and Contemplation in Aristotle
Revue Roumaine de Philosophie, 64, 1, pp. 117–124, 2020
I shall show in this paper that happiness in Aristotle should not be understood one-sidedly and restrictively as actualization of a single virtue, even though the latter might be deemed the most important among virtues. Happiness cannot be exclusively reduced to contemplative activity. I intend to approach the happiness problem in the larger context of seeking the human good, which is, after all, the same as happiness. In the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that there are three ways of life to be taken into account and further analysed with regard to human happiness: life of enjoyment, political and contemplative life (1095b, 18–19)1. Delving analytically into these ways of life, Aristotle concludes, according to some commentators, in book X of Nicomachean Ethics that the happiest life is the one dedicated to contemplative activity. What is the significance of this conclusion seeing that it seems to not tally with the ideas developed in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics? I shall try to show that there is no contradiction between the two stances of Aristotle if happiness is understood in an inclusive and hierarchical manner – as actualization of all virtues (ethical and dianoetic alike), with an emphasis on the virtue, which leads man towards the highest possible accomplishment: resemblance with the divine through contemplation.
Aristotle On Well-Being And Intellectual Contemplation: David Charles
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1999
Aristotle, it appears, sometimes identifies well-being (eudaimonia) with one activity (intellectual contemplation), sometimes with several, including ethical virtue. I argue that this appearance is misleading. In the Nicomachean Ethics, intellectual contemplation is the central case of human well-being, but is not identical with it. Ethically virtuous activity is included in human well-being because it is an analogue of intellectual contemplation. This structure allows Aristotle to hold that while ethically virtuous activity is valuable in its own right, the best life available for humans is centred around, but not wholly constituted by, intellectual contemplation.
Human ability to freely choose requires knowledge of human nature and the final end of man. For Aristotle, this end is happiness or full flourishing, which involves various virtues. Modern scholarship has led to debate over which virtues are absolutely necessary. Taking into account the hierarchical nature of the soul and the fact that relationships with the divine and with others are necessary for human flourishing, it can be seen that human flourishing requires contemplation, phronesis and all the moral virtues, as perfections of the various parts of the soul. The truly happy person has actualized all of his faculties and potential relationships. Rather than taking one of the standard exclusivist or inclusivist viewpoints on this 'problem of the two lives,' this paper argues that a holistic reading of Aristotle's ethical works requires a hierarchical and relational view of the virtues, with all of them necessary for human flourishing.
Aristotle's Pursuit of the Good Life
Aristotle's Pursuit of the Good Life , 2017
In Book I of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, three types of lives that are generally observed to be conventional permutations of ways of living are presented as candidates for the good life. They are the life of pleasure, the political life, and the life of philosophical contemplation. The life of pleasure is immediately dismissed as a viable candidate because those that equate the good with pleasure lack the essential qualities that are required for the cultivation of a good and meaningful life. The political life, i.e. a life that is centered on action and doing good deeds for the benefit of other citizens is not so easily dismissed as a candidate for the good life due to the moral virtues that are practiced in such a life. In Book X Aristotle declares that it is indeed the life of philosophical contemplation that is the best candidate for achieving the good life. The greatest good and the goal of all action is to attain eudaimonia, i.e. happiness, or well-being, which is, according to Aristotle, not a state but an activity. Choosing a life dedicated to philosophical contemplation, however, in itself, does not necessarily assure the attainment of eudaimonia, which is a permanent possession of the soul. In addition to choosing the right kind of life to live, Aristotle argues, one's life must also be comprised of partaking in good, correct actions, which, throughout time, lead to the development of virtues. Aristotle states that there are two different kinds of virtues, moral virtues and intellectual virtues, which are, respectively, developed through practice and instruction, and are, in almost all circumstances, achieved by striving for what is moderate in things and situations. Additionally, the external goods, as in sufficient material possessions, and having a few good friends are also essential constituents of the good life. This paper will examine the components required for attaining the good life according to Aristotle's arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics, and will propose that an awareness of the teleological aspect of human nature is indeed necessary for the acquisition of eudaimonia.
An Examination of Aristotle's Concept of Virtue and its Relationship to Well-Being
My professional career has ended and I am now happily retired. However, there are a few unpublished papers that I would like to make available. While research on the hedonic view of happiness and well-being has flourished very little has focused on Aristotle's eudaimonic theory. These might add something to the existing literature.
Aristotle´s views on happiness
This article aims to give a general description of Aristotelian ethics in its immediate context, and more particularly, shed some light upon what the philosopher might have conceived by happiness, hereby also to address critically some of the raised arguments with which scholarship has tried to grasp this notion hitherto. One of the main issues of philosophical endeavour is analysed: the tied bounds between knowledge and happiness. It is in light of Aristotle´s ethical views, moreover, that there will be discussed how far the lack of the former seems to preclude the last one. This point will be addressed by resorting, first, to Greek popular creeds on happiness as well as to some evidences on papyri. Arguments expounded theretofore will be afterwards nailed down by lingering the discussion in regard to the career of a renowned contemporary scholar.
The Highest Good and the Best Activity: Aristotle on the Well-Lived Life
2011
The question of how Aristotle characterizes eudaimonia, or living-well, in the Nicomachean Ethics has long been a contentious issue amongst Aristotelian scholars. The secondary literature has been roughly divided between inclusivist readers, who argue that Aristotle designates both theoria, or contemplation, and the practical virtues, and exclusivist readers, who argue that Aristotle singles out theoria alone. This thesis seeks to forge a middle ground between these two perspectives by focusing on the central claim of Book I that the eudaimonia is virtuous activity. Reading Book X in light of Book I's claim then allows one to show that both the practical virtues and theoria are able to attain eudaimonia, and that the well-lived life will be one that draws upon both activities.