Routledge Handbook of Democratization in Africa (original) (raw)
Related papers
Anarchy and the Problems of Power Sharing in Africa
McGill-Queen's University Press eBooks, 2005
Power sharing has been repeatedly advocated as a method of postconflict governance in Africa. In virtually all cases, however, the results have been the same: inclusive power-sharing agreements have been resisted by local leaders or, if accepted, have rarely been fully implemented or adhered to over the long term. Given this unimpressive record, it is remarkable that power sharing nevertheless continues to be the centrepiece of so many African peace initiatives. To expect power sharing to work in Africa is to expect it to work under the most difficult conditions, and this, in fact, is part of the problem. For the conditions of anarchy 1 that accompany civil war and state collapse often require solutions that are prior to, or in addition to, power sharing-or ones that exclude power sharing altogether. Power sharing is admittedly a broad term and can involve a number of different approaches and models. As used here, following Timothy D. Sisk, it refers to "practices and institutions that result in broadbased governing coalitions generally inclusive of all major ethnic groups in society." 2 In Africa, however, in many cases, the allocation of power to representatives of broadly defined ethnic groups has led to the exclusion of the specific parties, movements, or "liberation fronts" that were involved in the conflict-and whose continued existence poses a direct threat to the peace process. 3 Providing political voice to disenfranchised ethnic groups, in other words, does not necessarily mean the end of violent conflict. In cases where power sharing is determined 9
The International Journal of Human Rights, 2013
While Africa has made recent significant democratic gains, the problem of rigged elections tends to persist. Elections in Africa mostly tend to lack transparency and are often skewed in favour of the incumbent. Recent events on the continent have shown the tendency of incumbents to manipulate electoral processes so as to remain in power. This often leads to violent backlash from those who believe that they have been robbed of electoral victory. In some instances, the violence has spiralled out of control, requiring regional intervention. The African Union (AU) tends to resolve these disputes by resorting to power-sharing. However, power-sharing is inconsistent with the right to democracy which has emerged within the normative framework of the AU. This article argues that post-electoral power-sharing is at odds with the right to democracy. Consequently, in the resolution of post-electoral disputes, significant consideration should be given to the right to democracy and the power-sharing option should receive a minimalist consideration. More importantly, the AU should support institutional reforms and strive for more credible and transparent elections. Powersharing should be a solution of last resort and should be crafted in such a way that it does not form an incentive for rogue leaders who, having lost elections, might tend to exploit the situation so as to force a power-sharing settlement.
The Perils of Power-Sharing: Africa and Beyond
2009
The purpose of international conflict-resolution efforts is, in the short term, to bring an end to violent armed conflict, and, in the medium to longer term, to prevent the revival of conflict. However, at least one of the mechanisms often utilised in conflict resolution and peace agreements, power-sharing, may not only prove problematic in early negotiation and implementation, but may potentially be at odds with the longer-term goal of preventing resurgence of conflict. Why might this be the case? Longer-term peace-building seeks to prevent conflict in part by building strong and sustainable states. Such states should be able to avoid reverting to armed conflict because they would be more responsive to grievances and more effective in dealing with violent dissent. However, power-sharing arrangements may undermine such efforts by placing in power individuals and groups not fully committed to, or unable to take part in, governance for the benefit of the entire populace; in part because it necessarily places in power those who have engaged in significant violence to achieve their ends. This is likely to create less democratic states, although we do not insist that democracy is or should be the only goal of peacebuilders. Rather, we suggest that power-sharing arrangements may tend not only towards undemocratic states, but towards states which are not responsive to the needs of the citizenry for security in ways which may undermine human security and state legitimacy.
Africa: The Limits of Power-Sharing
Journal of Democracy, 2002
An examination of recent high-profile peace processes in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Rwanda suggests that power-sharing is a surprisingly unstable form of government that, even at the best of times, provides only a short-term reprieve from violent conflict. Other than as transitional remedies, power-sharing agreements are virtually unworkable. As I have argued elsewhere, in the aftermath of civil war, power-sharing agreements are difficult to arrive at, are even more difficult to put into practice, and when implemented rarely stand the test of time. 1 Indeed, the problem with power-sharing is even more fundamental: It does not resolve conflict but instead may only temporarily displace it or disguise disputants' more malevolent intentions. There is much that is intuitively appealing about power-sharing, and it is no surprise that it is repeatedly proposed as a form of postconflict governance. Since each group is given a slice of power and access to state resources, disputants should find, at least in theory, less to fight about. Moreover, since recent efforts at power-sharing have also included provisions that allow each group to contribute its own troops to an integrated military, a semblance of group security is sustained. Indeed, former South African president F.W. de Klerk noted in his memoirs that his attachment to power-sharing was not "out of step with constitutional theory relating to the maintenance of democracy in divided societies," and he cites Vernon Bogdanor's claim that "some kind of power-sharing has been a feature of government in all societies that have successfully overcome their internal divisions." 2 Scholars have also argued that power-sharing is the only means of managing deeply divided societies. In the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, Crawford Young noted that the "haunting question remains: whether
CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: APPLICABLE OR NOT?
In Africa, countries that are deeply divided into distinct religious, ethnic, racial, or regional segments usually find themselves resistant to the growth of democracy because these conditions are usually considered unfavorable for a stable democracy. Therefore, to what extend Consociationalism, which is basically government by grand coalition and segmental autonomy is applicable in the African context will be discussed in this paper. This paper also discusses the key definitions and perspectives of consociational democracy, and it’s characteristics. It uses the case studies of South African and Rwanda to illustrate the factors of power-sharing that led to a relatively smooth transition of South Africa from apartheid to a unitary democratic state and why northward in Rwanda the Arusha Peace Accords ended in genocide. It concludes by discussing the advantages and criticisms of consociational democracy in Africa.
Democracy and Conflict Generation in Africa
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT, SOCIAL SCIENCES, PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES, 2021
Democracy is described as majority rule over the minority. The values of democracy which are although relatively fair also have the capacity to be tyrannical in the face of the minority. With virtually absolute authority in the hands of the higher number under a democracy, a groups worth is based on the result of political and economic competition (Horowitz, 1986).There is a very close relationship between the concepts of democracy and conflict. The democratic system of governance is based on representatives as many interests as are found in society. Representation to a very large extent has been a major source of positive transformation and negative fracture of many developing 'societies. The act and art of sidelining or mainstreaming representatives make or mar societies. The human needs theory clearly explains the impact of; inclusion, survival, participation, recognition and autonomy in society, John Burton (1979), and how they drive the cause of violence in the absence of good governance. Democracy is an instrument for development. The values of democracy which are although relatively fair also have the capacity to be tyrannical in the face of the minority. With virtually absolute authority in the hands of the higher number under a democracy, a groups worth is based on the result of political and economic competition (Horowitz, 1986). There is a very close relationship between the concepts of democracy and conflict. The liberal theory was adopted. John Locke made tremendous contribution to the theory of classical democracy.. He regarded the consent of the people as the basis of political power. His contention was that political power is the trust of the people in the hands of the Government. He was also of the view that people in the state of nature had three natural rights: right to life, liberty and property. The researchers contend that the government of Africa should adhere to rules of law and good governance.