Zavitz British Haitian (original) (raw)

Abstract

So read the preamble to the British General Consul's 1826 treaty project. Following on the tails of French recognition in the summer of 1825, consul Charles Mackenzie arrived in Haiti the next spring with an assignment from the Foreign Secretary, George Canning, to record information on the internal state of Haiti, its relations with France, and the status of agricultural production, especially in regards to the use and control of free labor. 2 This data would help Mackenzie in his larger mission of drawing up a treaty with Haiti. Additionally, Canning supplied Mackenzie with drafts of the recently signed treaties from the new Spanish American republics. 3 Mackenzie quickly moved to open negotiations with the Haitian plenipotentiary, Secretary General Balthazar Inginac. Unfortunately, within a year, Mackenzie was headed back to England for health reasons and negotiations were at a standstill. Canning instructed Mackenzie to reassure the Haitian Government that this was only a temporary delay and not abandonment by the British. 4 To illustrate continued interest, the British Foreign Office maintained the consul post in Port-au-Prince and created multiple vice consul seats at Haiti's major ports, Cap Haitien, Jacmel, Les Cayes, and Santo Domingo. Over a decade would pass before negotiations would reopen and fifteen years until both governments ratified a treaty. The document, however, was no longer Mackenzie's "Convention of Amity, Commerce and Navigation," but a treaty to

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References (22)

  1. David Geggus, "British Opinion and the Emergence of Haiti, 1791-1805" in Slavery and British Society, 1776- 1846, ed. James Walvin (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 113-14, 130.
  2. H.B.L. Hughes, "British Policy Towards Haiti, 1801-1805," Canadian Historical Review 25.4 (1944): 403.
  3. David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 51. Mackenzie claims the British duty was lowered by Alexandre Pétion to 7%, while Madiou states for 1819 "manufactures anglaises qui ne payaient jamais que cinq pour cent," Madiou 6: 18. In either case, the British had an advantageous commercial position.
  4. Latin American data from D.C.M. Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 1806-1914,42; Haitian from Robert Lacerte, "Xenophobia and Economic Decline: The Haitian Case, 1820-1843," The Americas 37.4 (1981): 499.
  5. Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, "The Specter of Saint-Domingue: American and French Reactions to the Haitian Revolution," in The World of the Haitian Revolution, eds. David Geggus and Norman Fiering (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 320. Sepinwall explains that under Thomas Jefferson American planters were able to persuade the president and Congress to impose a trade embargo. However, northern merchants disregarded the legislation and continued trade with Haiti. Sepinwall does not provide any statistics on the volume of trade, both legal and illegal, under Jefferson so it is difficult to estimate the impact of the embargo.
  6. London Times, 18 Aug. 1825, 2, col. C. commercial treaty with" Haiti, the consumption of British goods was notable. 37 British exports to Haiti were comparable to those of Peru and Mexico, countries that had more substantial populations than the island. 38 In addition, the new consul Captain Courtenay reported that by 1832 "Haitian exports were valued at £ 1, 250,000 annually of which the British share was one- half." 39 Britain also dominated the import market, with 51% of the share in 1838 and 47% in 1839. 40 Britain may have been regaining a sizeable share of the Haitian trade; however, moves to formalize relations moved slowly. And, as in the 1820s, tenuous relations between Haiti and France shaped both British and Haitian approaches to these negotiations. Beginning in 1830, both President Boyer and Secretary General Inginac expressed "their anxious wish" to renew talks. 41 Deliberations with France were at another impasse, thus the Haitians turned back to the British in hopes of gaining greater international recognition. In communications with the British consul and other international visitors, Boyer and Inginac hinted at the possibility of British mediation with France. 42 Writing to the vice-consul in Port-au- Prince, Inginac aptly described British recognition as "a measure that would give a permanent security to their independence." 43 While no response came in 1830, the following spring a new British consul reiterated the Haitian government's desires. Explaining that Haiti wanted "to unshackle" itself from French obligations, he suggested "if His Majesty's Government should still entertain an intention of entering into more defined and permanent Relations with the 37 Privy Council for Trade to F.O., 15 Dec 1831, PRO F.O. 35/13. These sentiments were shared by Mackenzie and a contemporary British merchant, James Franklin, see Mackenzie, Notes on Haiti, made during a residence in that republic, (London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1830) and Franklin, The present state of Hayti (Saint Domingo) with remarks on its agriculture, commerce, laws, religion, finances, and population, etc., (London: J. Murray, 1828).
  7. Thomas Ussher to Lord Palmerston, 12 Nov 1837, PRO F.O. 35/19.
  8. Cited in Lacerte, 504.
  9. Schenley to Aberdeen, 24 April 1830, PRO F.O. 35/12.
  10. During a visit from a papal legate, Boyer raised the question of having Great Britain intervene in Franco-Haitian affairs, see Courtenary to Palermston, 24 May 1836, PRO F.O., 35/18. See also Thomas Ussher to Palmerston, 5 Oct 1837, 28 Oct 1837, PRO F.O. 35/19.
  11. Ussher to Palmerston, 28 Oct 1837, PRO F.O. 35/19.
  12. Privy Council for Trade to Foreign Office, 15 Dec 1831, PRO F.O. 35/13.
  13. F.O. to Courtenay, 12 March 1832, PRO F.O. 35/14.
  14. Foreign Office, "Memorandum," Oct 1836, PRO F.O. 35/18.
  15. Brière, 244-245 and Blancpain, 70.
  16. Foreign Office to Courtenay, 15 Dec 1838, PRO F.O. 35/20.
  17. For a more complete discussion of the Haitian objections see Courtenay to Palmerston, 4 April 1839, PRO F.O. 35/22.
  18. "Le commerce à établir entre Haïti et la Jamaique ne pourrait jamais être assez important, pour le payer au prix qu'en demandait la Grande-Bretagne,"Ardouin, 11: 58.
  19. Palmerston to Courtenay, 21 Dec 1838, PRO F.O. 84/259. The suppression of the slave trade convention formed part of Britain's larger agenda to stamp out the illegal trading carried on by Spain, Portugal, and Brazil during the 1830s. By signing conventions with European and American countries, it hoped to create a formidable foe to traders.
  20. Even in 1826, Mackenzie had remarked upon the Haitians willingness to suppress the slave trade, see Mackenzie to Canning, 30 Dec 1826, PRO F.O. 35/4. The move to suppressing the slave trade is also representative of larger British foreign relations in the 1830s, see Kielstra, 163, 178.
  21. Inginac to Courtenay, 18 Nov 1839, PRO F.O. 84/293.
  22. "Convention for the Suppression of the Slave Trade," 23 Dec 1839, PRO F.O. 84/330.