"In case of disintegrating state institutions and a failing economy, Ukrainian nationalists will have strong opportunities to establish their power" (Interview for Révolution Permanente) (original) (raw)
The Ukrainian Far Right and the Ukrainian Revolution
New Europe College Black Sea Link Program Yearbook 2014-2015, 2015
The article discusses two far right movements that took part in the Ukrainian revolution in 2014. The author argues that, although the fact of the involvement of the far right in the revolution cannot be denied, the Russian media deliberately exaggerated this involvement to discredit the opposition to former President Viktor Yanukovych. Thus, the articles provides a more nuanced picture of the Ukrainian far right before, during and immediately after the revolution. This research draws on the interviews conducted by the author, video and photographic evidence, online and offline publications, results of public opinion polls, and secondary literature on the Ukrainian far right.
The mass protests of Ukrainian citizens and the ascendance of the new government in Kyiv were accompanied by an intense informational campaign, which had not always corresponded to the truth. In the terms of this campaign, Maidan's activists, the political opposition – and, correspondingly, the new government that was formed after the revolution ended in victory – were depicted as ultra-nationalistic, extremist, and xenophobic. Under these circumstances, it is extremely important for both Ukrainian citizens and foreign observers to understand the real role of national-radicals in the Maidan protests and the events which followed. Is it truth that the " banderovtsy " 2 made up the bulk of the protesters? Is the victory of the Maidan also the victory of the political ultra-right? What kind of future does the far right have in the new Ukrainian political reality?
the editors of this collection decided to use the more common, anglicised, version of Russian and Ukrainian words in order to make the publication readable for a diverse audience.
2014
Thanks largely to the Kremlin’s information war, Ukraine’s ultranationalists have become global media stars of a sort, depicted in Western and other reports as key players in Ukraine’s third major political upheaval in less than a quarter-century. How do we explain the paradox of ultranationalist parties becoming involved in a protest movement whose thrust is toward greater integration between Ukraine and the European Union? And are the fears that swirl around these parties justified?
The Far Right in Ukraine During the "Euromaidan" and the War in Donbas
This paper analyzes the role of far right in the Ukrainian politics during the “Euromaidan” and the war in Donbas. The issue of the involvement of Ukrainian far right organizations in the “Euromaidan” and the war in Donbas have been politicized and polarized. Russian and separatist politicians and the media often presented the “Euromaidan” as a “fascist coup” and the Maidan government as a “fascist junta.” In contrast, the governments and the mainstream media in Western countries tended to present the role of the far right in the “Euromaidan” and in post-Maidan Ukraine, specifically in the conflict in Donbas, as marginal. Previous academic studies generally reached similar conclusions. They focused on numerical strength and electoral support for the far right parties and ignored other aspects of influence of the radical nationalist and neo-Nazi parties, specifically their role in the political violence, such as the Maidan and Odesa massacres and the war in Donbas. However, the number of academic studies of the contemporary far right in Ukraine is generally limited. The research question is as follows: What is the role of the far right in the Ukrainian politics during and after the “Euromaidan”? This study analyzes the involvement of specific Ukrainian radical nationalist and neo-Nazi organizations in the “Euromaidan,” the Odesa massacre, and the war in Donbas, their performance in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2014 and the 2015 local elections in Ukraine. The analysis focuses on major Ukrainian far right organizations, such as Svoboda (Freedom), the Right Sector, the Social-National Assembly, the White Hammer, the UNA-UNSO, Bratstvo, and C14, and paramilitary formations or special police and National Guard units organized and controlled to various extent by them, such as the Azov regiment, Dnipro, Donbas, Aidar, Sich, and St. Mary’s battalions, and the Volunteer Ukrainian Corps. It uses various sources of data, such as online recordings of live broadcasts and videos of the Maidan and Odesa massacres and the war in Donbas, official database of court decisions in Ukraine concerning investigations of the involvement of the far right in major cases of political violence, video recordings of the Maidan massacre trial, information posted on websites and social media groups of far right organizations, and media reports in Ukrainian, Russian, and English languages. The study shows that the far right organizations had significant but minority representation among the Maidan leadership and protesters, the post-Maidan governments, and in the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. However, the analysis also shows that the far right organizations and football ultras played a key role during violent attacks, such as attempts to storm the presidential administration on December 1, 2013 and the parliament of Ukraine in January and on February 18, 2014. There is also various evidence of the Right Sector involvement in a violent attack of the Berkut police during its highly publicized dispersal of protesters on November 30, 2013. The Right Sector and Svoboda and smaller organizations had a crucial role in the violent overthrow of the Viktor Yanukovych government, in particular, in the Maidan massacre of the protesters and the police on February 18-20, 2014. The study demonstrates that the Right Sector, the Social-National Assembly/ Patriot of Ukraine, and groups of football ultras were involved in the Odesa massacre on May 2, 2014. This paper also shows that the far right organizations and their volunteer battalions and paramilitary units had a significant role in the civil war in Donbas but a comparably minor role in fighting with several regular Russian military units during direct military interventions by Russia in August 2014 and February 2015. Major implications of this study for the Ukrainian politics and the conflict between the West and Russia over Ukraine are discussed in the conclusion. This paper implies that the far right has significant but not dominant role in the Ukrainian politics during and after the “Euromaidan.” But far right organizations and their armed units had a key role in major cases of political violence during and after the “Euromaidan,” and they attained ability to overthrow by force the government of the one of the largest European countries.
Introduction: The Ukrainian Crisis
Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 2015
In the realm of social life, unimaginable and obvious often go hand in hand. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia is one such unimaginable, alas, obvious event. For many Russians and Ukrainians, who believe in the fraternal relationship of these two nations, the conflict would have been unimaginable even as armed 'green men' occupied Crimea in March 2014. For others, the conflict is an obvious and inevitable extension of what Anatol Lieven called 'fraternal rivalry' (Lieven 1999). In the mainstream academic discourse and media, the unfolding events in Ukraine have been referred to as the 'Ukrainian Crisis'. Yet, this terminology is somewhat problematic, as the word 'crisis' does not tap into the scope of the conflict and seems to confine it to Ukraine alone (Wilson 2014). However, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia is a crisis not merely for Ukraine. It is also a Russian crisis, which exposes the ambitions and weaknesses of Russian political and economic power. It is also an international crisis, which leaves many unanswered questions for interstate cooperation, peace, and security. The four articles presented in this feature section seek to unpack the nature of the 'crisis' from a variety of perspectives. Ukrainians refer to the last year as 'the year that changes us forever'. This statement seems to describe not merely the political changes that have taken place in the country over the last year, but also the citizens' perceptions of themselves and their country. The debate over the nature and origin of the Ukrainian nation are not new, as Taras Kuzio and Mykola Riabchuk's in-depth analyses of Ukraine's national identity vividly illustrate. Ukraine has often been described as a divided county. The ethnic, linguistic, and regional divisions received a great deal of traction in academic literature and have been credited as the source of Ukraine's political woes . Moreover, Ukraine's national identity or lack thereof is closely related to its relationship to its neighbours to the east and west, thus further splitting the country . Both Kuzio and Riabchuk investigate the alleged divisions between Ukrainians and offer new perspectives on Ukrainian politics. Riabchuk rejects common wisdom and suggests that division of Ukraine's population into 'two Ukraines' is ideological rather than ethno-linguistic. An ongoing academic debate in the study of nationalism and national identity distinguishes civic and ethnic forms of nationalism. In the case of the latter, the identity is based on primordial kinship ties between members of the same ethnic group. The former, however, is a more inclusive identity centred on state symbols and citizenship, and is more closely related to patriotism. During the last year, the bs_bs_banner
The Far Right in the Conflict between Russia and Ukraine
From the very beginning, the armed conflict that broke out in the Donbass in the spring of 2014 drew in right-wing radicals, on the Ukrainian as well as on the Russian side. Organised ultra-nationalist groups and individual activists established their own units of volunteers or joined existing ones. The ideology, political traditions and general track record of these right-wing extremists meant that it was both natural and inevitable that they would take an active part in the conflict. Yet the role of right-wing radicals on both sides has on the whole been exaggerated in the media and in public discussion. This article demonstrates that Russia’s use of right-wing radicals on the side of the “separatists” in Donetsk and Lugansk provinces had greater military and political repercussions than the involvement of Ukrainian far-right groups in the “anti-terrorist operation”. The general course of the conflict, meanwhile, caused the importance of far right-groups on both sides to decline.
WHITHER UKRAINE: THROUGH THE GLASS DARKLY
The article offers an analysis of the two main trends in Ukrainian politics that offer different approaches in addressing the problems faced by Ukrainian society. One tendency advocates reliance on government institutions and formal bureaucratic practices. The other represents the radically inclined militant activists who insist on immediate radical action that will eliminate corruption and treason in the country. The standoff between these two trends prolongs the war in Ukraine and is harmful to the country. It hinders the resolution of the military conflict that is ruining the country and makes rebuilding its economy and improving the life of Ukrainian citizens more difficult, if not impossible. The article also analyzes the political practice of president Zelensky who largely pursues the approach advocated by the radicals. Key words: Ukraine, Zelensky, corruption, radicals, “Right Sector,” Maidan