Grounding and Inference to the Best Explanation: A Novel Argument for Theism (original) (raw)

Grounding and the Existence of God

Metaphysica, 2021

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the instantiation of the grounding relation that connects the various entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I seek to utilise the explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne within a specific metaphysical context, a ground-theoretic context, which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of grounding. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have a further reason to believe in the existence of God.

The ground of ground, essence, and explanation

Synthese, 2018

This paper is about the so-called meta-grounding question, i.e. the question of what grounds grounding facts of the sort 'φ is grounded in Γ '. An answer to this question is pressing since some plausible assumptions about grounding and fundamentality entail that grounding facts must be grounded. There are three different accounts on the market which each answer the meta-grounding question differently: Bennett's and deRosset's " Straight Forward Account " (SFA), Litland's " Zero-Grounding Account " (ZGA), and " Grounding Essentialism " (GE). I argue that if grounding is to be regarded as metaphysical explanation (i.e. if unionism is true), (GE) is to be preferred over (ZGA) and (SFA) as only (GE) is compatible with a crucial consequence of the thought that grounding is metaphysical explanation. In this manner the paper contributes not only to discussions about the ground of ground but also to the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between ground, essence, and explanation.

Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation

Attempts to elucidate grounding are often made by connecting grounding to metaphysical explanation, but the notion of metaphysical explanation is itself opaque, and has received little attention in the literature. We can appeal to theories of explanation in the philosophy of science to give us a characterisation of metaphysical explanation, but this reveals a tension between three theses: that grounding relations are objective and mind-independent; that there are pragmatic elements to metaphysical explanation; and that grounding and metaphysical explanation share a close connection. Holding fixed the mind-independence of grounding, I show that neither horn of the resultant dilemma can be blunted. Consequently, we should reject the assumption that grounding relations are mind-independent. This paper is about the grounding relation and the connection between grounding and explanation. Grounding is a relation of non-causal ontological dependence; a metaphysical determination relation which obtains between entities of various ontological categories including facts, properties, states of affairs, and actual concrete objects. Though discussion of grounding has become widespread, much of the literature about grounding is devoted to arriving at a proper characterisation of the notion. Difficulties arise because grounding is taken to be a metaphysical primitive – it resists reductive analysis. This leaves grounding vulnerable to the charge that it has no distinctive content, or no useful role to play. In response (as well as pre-emptively) grounding has been defended by appeal to intuitive examples of grounding; by highlighting the usefulness of a grounding relation; and by connecting grounding to other more familiar metaphysical notions. In particular, grounding has been connected to the notion of explanation (e.

Metaphysical Foundations of Theistic Argumentation

Path of Science

The proofs of God's existence is the subject matter of the article. Four main types of proofs are analyzed: cosmological, teleological, ontological and moral. It is argued that there is a general scheme of theistic reasoning present in all four types of proving. The principal feature of this scheme lies in recognizing a ground of everything existing which goes beyond the material (or natural) world. Possible naturalistic arguments excluding a non-material, super-natural foundation of the world are also analyzed. The objections to naturalistic arguments are formulated, making it possible to assert that the natural world cannot be explained from itself. Nor it can be explained from its physical (or natural) part. At the same time, the material world needs an explanation. To meet this need, the extended direct theistic arguments are formulated in the article. They begin with the fact of there being something and include two aspects of theistic argumentation: one is to establish the...

Fundamentality and the Existence of God

Manuscrito, 2021

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of certain entities within the layered structure of reality. More precisely, I assume the cogency of Swinburne’s explanatory framework and seek to resituate it within a new philosophical context-that of the field of contemporary metaphysics-which will enable me to develop a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the non-fundamental entities that fill up the various levels of the layered structure of reality. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we will have one more good reason to believe in the existence of God.

A Psychologistic Theory of Metaphysical Explanation

Many think that sentences about what metaphysically explains what are true iff there exist grounding relations. This suggests that sceptics about grounding should be error theorists about metaphysical explanation. We think there is a better option: a theory of metaphysical explanation which offers truth conditions for claims about what metaphysically explains what that are not couched in terms of grounding relations, but are instead couched in terms of, inter alia, psychological facts. We do not argue that our account is superior to grounding-based accounts. Rather, we offer it to those already ill-disposed towards grounding.

Metaphysical and Conceptual Grounding

Erkenntnis, 2019

Recently, many philosophers have claimed that the world has an ordered, hierarchical structure, where entities at lower ontological levels are said to metaphysically ground entities at higher ontological levels. Other philosophers also recently claimed that our language has an ordered, hierarchical structure. Semantically primitive sentences are said to conceptually ground less primitive sentences. It’s often emphasized that metaphysical grounding is a relation between things out in the world, not a relation between our sentences. But conflating these relations is easy to do, given that both types of grounding are expressed by non-causal “in-virtue-of” claims. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relation between metaphysical and conceptual grounding. I argue that conceptual and metaphysical grounding are exclusive: if a given in-virtue-of claim involves conceptual grounding, then it does not involve metaphysical grounding. I also develop some heuristics for deciding which type of grounding is relevant in a given case. These heuristics suggest that many proposed cases of metaphysical grounding do not actually involve metaphysical grounding at all.

Dependence, Justification and Explanation: Must Reality be Well-Founded?

Erkenntnis, 2014

This paper is about metaphysical 'infinitism', the view that there are, or could be, infinite chains of ontological dependence. Its main aim is to show that, contrary to widespread opinion, metaphysical infinitism is a coherent position. On the basis of this, it is then additionally argued that metaphysical infinitism need not fare worse than the more canonical 'foundationalist' alternatives when it comes to formulating metaphysical explanations. In the course of the discussion, a rather unexplored parallel with the debate concerning infinitism about justification is suggested. ''Just as the epistemic foundationalist thinks all warrant must originate in basic warrant and rejects limitless chains of warrant and circular warrant, so the

Truth's Light and Supereminent Darkness: The Problem of Concepts in Analogical Predication of God

Matthew J. Coté, 2024

The doctrine of analogy is of paramount importance in religious epistemology and philosophical theology; one which affects what is communicated about the knowledge of God. If quidditative knowledge begins in the senses, and God is not directly part of sensible reality, it follows that knowledge of God is not quidditative. Further, if the intellectual concept is a product of abstracting quiddities from sensible reality, then it also follows that there is no quidditative concept of God. Aquinas, following from this reasoning and leading into his demonstration of God’s existence with his five ways, states that one can know that God is, but not what God is. Given this, it seems to follow that when one is predicating of God, that such predications are not ultimately a matter of any type of conceptualization through abstraction, but rather a matter of a series of necessary metaphysical judgments rooted in negation, causality, and supereminence, even though originally stemming from our knowledge of delimited acts of being in sensible reality. It is contended that any predication of God that is not purified through this threefold way ends up entailing a delimiting of the Simple Pure Act of Being Itself Subsisting, i.e., God. This dissertation serves to more clearly identify and enunciate the problem of concepts in relation to analogical predication of God, and reiterates a consistent method already proposed by Aquinas, and found augmented in the works of Étienne Gilson, Joseph Owens, and Gregory Rocca. In contrast, those views of predication of God that use or entail abstraction and conceptualization without the necessary purification by the threefold way are shown to be both inconsistent with an existential Thomistic metaphysic and philosophy of human nature, and bring the implication that God’s being is not Qui Est, but rather a delimited being according to some relation of act/potency and essence/existence according to human sensible experience.

Modal Metaphysics and the Existence of God

Metaphysica, 2022

In this article, I seek to assess the extent to which Theism, the claim that there is a God, can provide a true fundamental explanation for the existence of the infinite plurality of concrete and abstract possible worlds, posited by David K. Lewis and Alvin Plantinga. This assessment will be carried out within the (modified) explanatory framework of Richard Swinburne, which will lead to the conclusion that the existence of God provides a true fundamental explanation for these specific entities. And thus, given the truth of this type of explanation, we have another good abductive argument for God's existence and grounds for affirming a weaker form of the principle of methodological naturalism in our metaphysical theorising.