Hazard Identification and Risk Management challenges throughout the Supply Chain (original) (raw)

Since the introduction of ICAO Annex 19 on Safety Management Systems (SMS), aviation organisations are expected to "take a systematic approach to identifying aviation safety hazards, including their own organisational hazards, to assess the associated risks, and to effectively mitigate their consequences" [EASA Terms of Reference (TOR) for rulemaking task RMT.0251(b) (MDM.055-MDM.060)]. Two of the fundamental challenges to successfully implementing an SMS is to (a) understand the basic risk management terminology to be applied to both aviation safety hazards and organisational hazards, and (b) to manage the safety management constraints and interfaces between relevant stakeholders. The aim of this paper is therefore to raise awareness of the challenges of "hazard identification" and "risk management" throughout the supply chain. This is accomplished by first seeking a common understanding of following lexicon: } What does the word "safety" mean? } What is a "Management System"? } What is a "hazard"? } What is "risk" and why do it? Due to the author's background, this paper may seem more Design Organisations focused, but it is hoped that it will also benefit the wider industry. After all, safety should be pro-actively built into the system in the first place and is less cost effective if added in afterwards. March 2018 White Paper Plus March 2018 Hazard Identification and Risk Management challenges throughout the Supply Chain © Baines Simmons 1. Background Safety Management Systems (SMS) are not new to the aviation industry: } Many military aviation authorities have promulgated SMS principles for some time now (e.g. in standards such as Def Stan 00-56 and MIL-STD-882), which have been focussed on end user product safety risk (but not necessarily organisational hazards). } In the civil aviation industry, Transport Canada worked closely since the mid 1990's with ICAO to issue the original ICAO SMS Manual. Unfortunately, it is only since 2015 (when the ICAO SMS "Recommended Practice" became a "Standard" via ICAO Annex 19), that the wider aviation industry started to take it seriously. National regulatory authorities (including many military authorities) are subsequently at various stages of introducing SMS into their regulatory frameworks and industry are in turn preparing for the challenges of its successful implementation. EASA are expected to facilitate the implementation of a single (safety) management system by multipleapproved organisations and streamline the related oversight. The EASA intent is stated in para 2.12.1 of Opinion 06/2016: "...potential of SMS not only to address the risks of major occurrences, but also to identify and tackle production inefficiencies, improve communication, foster a better company culture, and control more effectively contractors and suppliers" and "...by considering SMS as something implemented not solely to prevent incidents and accidents but to ensure the success of as many elements of an organisation's business as possible, any investment in safety should be seen as an investment in productivity and organisational success." This paper will therefore briefly explore the terminology impacting Risk Management within a Safety Management System by considering: } What does the word "safety" mean? } What is a "Management System"? } What is a "hazard"? } What is "risk" and why do it? Within the context of the above terminology the ultimate objective of this paper is to explore the challenges of "hazard Identification" and "risk management" throughout the supply chain. 2. Understanding the word "safety"? What do we understand by the term "safety"? From an industry point of view, the acceptability of safety is very difficult to discuss with customers, users, and, even worse, with society in general. The perception of "safety risk" is often influenced by any combination of biases [Kritzinger, Ch2]: