Qualities and Consciousness (original) (raw)
Revue Roumaine de Philosophie
Many today take mental qualitative character to be intrinsically conscious. But that view not only lacks serious support, but also results in significant undesirable consequences. That view can't be supported by claiming that we know about mental qualities only by way of consciousness, since we have reliable third-person knowledge about the qualitative states of others, and so about their mental qualities. Nor can so-called intuitions provide support, since they are arguably disguised theoretical claims cast as appealing one-liners. And taking mental qualities to be intrinsically conscious results in being unable to say anything informative about their nature, making it seem ineluctably mysterious. Happily, the view that consciousness is intrinsic to qualitative character is wholly optional. Compelling empirical findings demonstrate the occurrence of mental qualitative character that isn't conscious. So the way is open for an informative account of mental qualities based not on their being conscious, but on their role in perceptual discrimination. Such an account is richly informative about the nature of qualitative character and avoids any sense of mystery. And it fits well with an independent theory that explains both what it is for a state to be conscious and how conscious qualitative states differ from those that aren't conscious.
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