Minimal Pronouns 1 Fake Indexicals as Windows into the Properties of Bound Variable Pronouns (original) (raw)

Making a pronoun: fake indexicals as windows into the properties of pronouns

Linguistic Inquiry, 2009

This article argues that natural languages have two binding strategies that create two types of bound variable pronouns. Pronouns of the first type, which include local fake indexicals, reflexives, relative pronouns, and PRO, may be born with a “defective” feature set. They can acquire the features they are missing (if any) from verbal functional heads carrying standard λ-operators that bind them. Pronouns of the second type, which include long-distance fake indexicals, are born fully specified and receive their interpretations via context-shifting λ- ...

Features on bound pronouns : an argument against syntactic agreement approaches *

2018

The question of what mechanism allows φ-features on bound pronouns to be semantically inert has received a number of answers in the literature. According to a popular approach (Heim 2008, Kratzer 2009), a bound pronoun doesn’t carry interpreted φ-features at all; its morphological realization is merely an overt exponent of an abstract syntactic agreement with its binder. Alternative approaches deny syntactic agreement, and employ special semantic mechanisms to explain the seeming mismatch between the form of the pronoun and its interpretation in (1a) and (1b). This paper provides an empirical argument against agreement-based approaches. We show, based on observations by Sudo (2013) and McKillen (2016), that such approaches systematically undergenerate cases of uninterpreted φ-features on donkey (‘E-type’) anaphora co-varying pronouns whose relationship to their intra-sentential antecedent does not respect conditions usually considered necessary for syntactic agreement. Examples of t...

The logic of Person markedness: Evidence from pronominal competition

Language

In some languages, such as Hebrew and German, a D-PRONOUN (a pronominal demonstrative form) may refer to a human. When it does, the use of the d-pronoun may be associated with a pejorative effect, implying a negative evaluation of the denoted individual (henceforth N(EGATIVE)-EFFECT). The N-effect is triggered, however, only under certain conditions. For example, when the d-pronoun is modified, no N-effect arises. The paper examines the syntactic and pragmatic conditions under which this meaning emerges, and develops an account which integrates pronominal markedness and competition into the fold of conversational implicatures.

On the referential ambiguity of personal pronouns and its pragmatic consequences

Pragmatics, 2016

Canonical linguistic theory postulates a one-on-one referential link between linguistic elements and agents, experiencers, cognizers or patients of certain actions, beliefs, states etc. in the world. Likewise, personal pronouns and person marking through verb morphology have often been described as having a one-on-one referential link with an (interaction) participant. As with all deictic expressions, interpretation of personal pronouns is crucially dependent on the context (e.g. I referring to the speaker, you to the hearer). However, Bühler's well-known concept of Deixis am Phantasma (1934) already shows that reference can be established to items beyond the immediate discourse situation, with interlocutors jointly constructing reference even to hypothetical, future-oriented or counterfactual discourse scenarios. Reference, especially pronominal reference, is not always established easily, as the vast literature on referentiality in several linguistic and philosophical disciplines attests (to name but a few recent contributions: Abbott 2010 for an overview of mostly semantic conceptualizations of reference, Kibrik 2011 for a recent study on reference in discourse, and of course Siewierska 2004 for an in-depth discussion of person reference). Most contributions either focus on third person references (singular or plural, henceforth, 3sg and 3pl; e.g. Borthen 2010, Cabredo Hofherr 2003, and most articles in Enfield/Stivers 2007), or they discuss the inclusion and/or exclusion of the speaker in a group referred to using 1st person plural forms (henceforth, 1pl). Helmbrecht (2015) does offer a more general typology of non-prototypical readings of various persons. In languages without a morphological inclusive/exclusive distinction, the pragmatics of inclusive or exclusive readings have been analyzed as well (e.g. Temmerman 2008; Scheibman 2002 & 2004). On the other hand, reference to singular speaker and hearer (1sg and 2sg) is typically portrayed as unproblematic from a referential point of view, though attention has been drawn to the existence of different participant statuses (Goffman 1979; Ducrot's 1984 polyphony analysis; Halliday 1994). In order to complete our view of the use of speaker and hearer reference, this volume focuses on some uses of the 1 st and 2 nd person (singular as well as plural) where the canonical adscription of pronominal reference is 'violated' by the speaker for pragmatic reasons. This results in referential ambiguity of personal pronouns, which is understood in this volume as uses where the person being referred to cannot be pinned down unequivocally. Such uses can be exploited by interlocutors to their conversational advantage, but an important drawback of referentially ambiguous forms is, of course, the danger of being misunderstood. We want to discuss which linguistic strategies are employed by interlocutors to ensure conversational success and to avoid misunderstandings caused by referential ambiguity.

On the Syntax and Semantics of (Relative) Pronouns and Determiners

Journal of Comparative Germanic Linguistics, 1998

This paper addresses two related problems. The major empirical problem concerns the difference between two pronominal forms found in German: personal pronouns and so-called d-pronouns, which are also used as relative pronouns. The major theoretical question concerns the nature of relative pronouns in general. I will argue that d-pronouns are definite determiners, i.e., full Determiner Phrases (DPs) containing an empty

A unified non monstrous semantics for third person pronouns

Semantics and Pragmatics, 2017

It is common practice in formal semantics to assume that the context specifies an assignment of values to variables and that the same variables that receive contextually salient values when they occur free may also be bound by quantifiers and λ s. These assumptions are at work to provide a unified account of free and bound uses of third person pronouns, namely one by which the same lexical item is involved in both uses. One way to pursue this account is to treat quantifiers and λ s as monsters in Kaplan's sense. We argue that this move should be avoided and explore an alternative route based on the idea that there is a variable assignment coordinate in the context and a variable assignment coordinate in the circumstance of evaluation, with the definition of truth in context identifying them. One fundamental challenge that arises in pursuing a unified account is to explain the difference in the way the gender presuppositions of bound and free pronouns project. The proposal that emerges from the attempt to meet this challenge is a non-indexical account of free third person pronouns and a new conception of the role and structure of assignment functions.