Generalizations of the General Lotto and Colonel Blotto games (original) (raw)
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Economics Letters, 2013
In this paper we relax the Colonel Blotto game assumption that for a given battle the player who allocates the higher measure of resources wins that battle. We assume that for a given battle, the Colonel who allocates the higher measure of resources is more likely to win that battle. We have a simpler model for which we are able to compute all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for any valuations pro…le that players might have. Something that is not possible for the original Blotto game. JEL: C72, D74, H56.
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