Ontological Toleration as the Basis of Mutual Recognition in Hegel (35th International Hegel Congress, Tbilisi, 2024) (original) (raw)

Hegel on Recognition: Moral Implications of ‘Lordship and Bondage’ Dialectic

An attempt at moral interpretation of Hegelian ‘struggle for recognition’. The Author shows how the Hegelian figures of ‘Lord’ and ‘Bondsman’ (from The Phenomenology of Spirit) can be used to explain social role and importance of the idea of tolerance in the context of (intolerant) group moralities and the universal morality. The text is built of three parts: (1) the author sketches the connection of the traditional idea of tolerance and sociological understanding of morality on the basis of Hegel’s understanding of recognition (Anerkennung). In the second step (2), he gives an outline of Hegelian two accounts of mutual recognition, finally (3) the author shows the moral dimension of recognition, as referred to the idea of tolerance and universalistic morality.

Freedom and identity in Hegel's dialectic of recognition (2013)

Self-published

In the paper I reconstruct Hegel's account of the development of self-consciousness to mutual recognition from self-consciousness as an argument that an individual can be free only if those around him or her are free, and compare this argument with the argument to the same conclusion that Robert Pippin finds in Hegel's works.

Hegel on the 'Other': introducing the concept of recognition in Hegel's Phenomenology

2009

This paper introduces the notion of Recognition in the section of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit entitled ‘A. INDEPENDENCE AND DEPENDENCE OF SELFCONSCIOUSNESS: LORDSHIP AND BONDAGE’ by way of a commentary. Hegel’s view is that in order for any self-consciousness to obtain it must be acknowledged as such by another self-consciousness. For Hegel, acknowledgement emerges as a necessary condition for self-consciousness. As such, Hegel’s account of self-consciousness raises the problem of intersubjectivity, or the account of the relation between more than one self-consciousness and I suggest, without attempting to establish, some intuitive lines of defence of the Hegelian position. I suggest that the dialectic of lordship and bondage, or as it is commonly referred to, the Master-Slave dialectic, cannot be fully comprehended without an adequate understanding of Hegel’s account of Recognition.

What Hegel Missed About Recognition

Internationale Hegel-Gesellschaft e.V., 2019

Hegel’s system grasps that we need recognition because we can gain self-consciousness as autonomous beings only by interacting with and receiving recognition from others. Despite the influence of Hegel’s portrayal of recognition, a significant lacuna in Hegel’s portrayal is insufficiently discussed. Recognition is more complex than Hegel portrays it, especially given that social diversity is greater now than in Hegel’s time. Hegel assumes that recognition relations are binary and places those recognition relations under the auspices, if not domination, of institutionalized orders. Thus, Hegel’s systematic conception of recognition binds the journey of self-consciousness to social spheres and institutions, leaving outside of this system a vast area of social phenomena in which individuals seek recognition in various ways under various conditions. To enhance recognition as a useful concept for contemporary philosophy and the social sciences, we need to fill in what Hegel missed about recognition.

Is Hegelian recognition second-personal? Hegel says "no"

European Journal of Philosophy, 2020

The aim of this paper is to consider the relations between the Hegelian conception of recognition, which is championed by Axel Honneth and others, and the conception of second-personal authority put forward by Stephen Darwall. It is argued that despite appearances to the contrary, they are not to be as easily aligned as some might suspect or hope, and in particular that an individual can be granted recognition in an Hegelian sense, without being granted second-personal authority. This view is defended by appeal to key texts on Hegelian recognition from Hegel's Phenomenology of Sprit: the account of confession and forgiveness, and of the master/slave dialectic.

Ethicality and the Movement of Recognition in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit

In this paper, I consider the contribution that Hegel’s discussion of “ethicality” (Sittlichkeit) makes to his account of recognition in the Phenomenology of Spirit. While the famous relation of lord and bondsman might prompt us to think of all failures of recognition as failures of reciprocity, in his account of ethicality, Hegel shows that it is possible for forms of social life to be structured so that no one is recognized. This failure of recognition is unique since its source does not lie in a lack of reciprocity between individuals, but rather in the absence of an explicit and shared conception of the “self.” I conclude by pointing to the importance of the idea of the self to Hegel’s account of reciprocal intersubjective recognition in the text, contrasting it with Pippin’s recent interpretation.

The dialectic of recognition: A post-Hegelian approach

European Journal of Social Theory, 2018

This article aims to make two points. First, seeking and granting recognition is an ambivalent process that may lead to results completely the opposite from what was intended. Certain social pathologies, including reification, develop because of the way the desire for recognition is expressed and satisfied. Nevertheless, the concept of recognition remains central to critical theory. A normative concept of recognition is needed in order to identify these pathologies. Second, a critical theory of society that understands itself as praxis must justify the possibility of its 'reception' by members of society. The theory's addressees must 'recognize themselves' in the theory. They must recognize in it the conceptual expression of their own experience of society. Therefore, social theory must account for the emergence of a critical standpoint on society. These two main points are addressed by means of a 'dialectical' approach. The tensions and interactions between global society, states, and value-communities-the dialectic within and between these spheres-account for the diverse and conflicting meanings of the concept of recognition. At the same time, such a dialectic makes it possible to understand the emergence of a critical viewpoint on society. Keywords critical theory, dialectic, feeling of injustice, feeling of meaninglessness, recognition This article's aim is to make two connected points. First, recognition is not merely a response to social pathologies or disrespect, it is a process that generates its own pathologies. In particular, the search for recognition may paradoxically contribute to a process of reification. In order to make this point I will use the distinction between

Philia, Recognition, and Justice between Aristotle and Hegel

Justice and Freedom in Hegel, ed. by P.D. Bubbio and A. Buchwalter, Routledge, 2024

This chapter shows in what sense the Aristotelian notion of philia is relevant for Hegel's understanding of the social presuppositions of justice. The path from Aristotle to Hegel is bidirectional. On the one hand, this chapter valorizes the largely Aristotelian heritage present in Hegel's understanding of political dispositions (Gesinnung). But, on the other hand, such a reconstruction will be conducted from a Hegelian perspective, insofar as it will argue that some Hegelian notions-in particular the notion of "recognition"-can help us to make explicit and reconstruct the Aristotelian theory of philia and its relation to the notion of justice.