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The Army Officer Corps in the All‐Volunteer Force
Contemporary Economic Policy, 2002
The remarkable success of the all‐volunteer force (AVF) in the past 30 years belies the controversial decision to implement such a force, which was the result of effective economic arguments and propitious political factors. In spite of significant work by the Gates Commission, the success of the AVF was not preordained, but was significantly influenced by ways in which the army adapted since 1973 to make the most effective use of volunteer soldiers. This adaptation included careful evaluation of standards, pay, education, training, non‐monetary compensation, quality of life, and promotion of diversity. Each of these factors had to be carefully managed to enhance the effectiveness of the military labor force. Military personnel policies have a long‐term impact not only on the military but also on society as a whole.
Review of Interventions for Reducing Enlisted Attrition in the US Military: An Update
2009
The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) has been conducting research on firstterm enlisted attrition as part of a broader research project entitled "STAY: Strategies to Enhance Retention." In support of the larger project, this report reviews past and ongoing interventions that support, either directly or indirectly, attrition interventions that assist Army recruits, trainees, and Soldiers in completing training and their first-term enlistment. This report provides a review of attrition interventions that deal primarily with social and behavioral factors affecting first-term attrition since 1973, the time of the transition to the all-volunteer force. The review is based on a number of sources, including published articles, papers, technical reports, previous reviews, and briefings. In addition, Subject Matter Experts were contacted to supplement the published information with anecdotal reports and feedback about interventions. Based on these reviews, recommendations are provided to guide research on and development of future enlisted attrition interventions.
Thoughts on the Future of Military Enlisted Selection and Classification
The purpose of this white paper is to provide an outlook for the future of military enlisted selection and classification over the next 20 years. The first section of this paper describes enlistment standards and related military research in 2014, using the Catell-Horn-Carroll framework as a guide for cognitive assessment and covering state of the art research on non-cognitive assessment. Section 2 provides an overview of new topics in individual differences measurement likely to be usable in the future. Sections 3 and 4 anticipate the circumstances surrounding military selection in the future. Section 3 discusses the future force requirements on military personnel, and Section 4 focuses on demographic trends likely to affect the future applicant population. The last section, Section 5, integrates the preceding sections into ideas and research questions for future military enlisted selection and classification.
The Effect of Different Enlistment Ages on First-Term Attrition Rate
2014
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2020
Background Soldiers in modern armies perform tasks that are increasingly technologically dependent. Training them to obtain necessary technological skills is both complex and expensive. Personnel attrition is costly and can affect military readiness. The purpose of this study was to examine the utility of pre-induction tests as a predictor of attrition in the rst year of infantry training. Methods infantry recruits participated in the study. Before beginning military service their health pro le was determined and they were given a Quality Group score, which is determined by psycho-technical tests, a personal interview and the quality of their education. Recruits were screened shortly following induction using a battery of tests including questionnaires, anthropometrics, functional movement screening (FMS), upper and lower quarter Y balance tests, dynamic tests, and followed by orthopaedists and their unit doctors for orthopaedic injuries and problems during the rst year of training. Results 165/303 (54.5%) recruits were diagnosed with injury or pain during the course of their rst year of training. 46 recruits (15.1%) did not complete their rst year of service as combatants and 18 (5.9%) were discharged from service. On multivariable analysis for attrition, protective factors were higher Quality Group scores (OR 0.78, CI 0.69-0.89) and recruits diagnosed with orthopaedic injuries or musculoskeletal pain (OR 0.21 CI 0.09-0.50). Pain in the balance test performed at the beginning of training was a risk factor (OR 3.39, CI 1.47-7.79). These factors together are only responsible for 15.4% of infantry attrition according to partial eta squared analysis. Conclusions The three variables found by multivariable analysis to be associated with infantry attrition in this study together are responsible for 15.4% of the attrition. Measuring these variables would seem to be most valuable in armies in which the number of candidates for a speci c infantry unit greatly exceeds the number of positions. The IDF approach of trying to keep attriters within the Army in non-combatant roles and not discharging them from service is a way to manage the problem of infantry attrition. Trial Registration Prospectively registered on clinicaltrials.gov, registration number NCT02091713 Background
Quality soldiers : costs of manning the active Army, June 1986
1991
The quality of the Army's active-duty enlisted recruits has advanced considerably in recent years. In fiscal year 1985, 90 percent held high school diplomas, up 40 percentage points from the low point of 1980. Scores on aptitude tests have shown comparable improvement. But concern has arisen over the Army's ability to sustain such success-let alone recruit even higher quality in coming years~at an acceptable cost. At the request of the House Armed Services Committee, this report looks at the costs and benefits to the Army of varying levels of recruit quality. In accordance with the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) mandate to provide objective analyses, the report makes no recommendations. Joel Slackman of CBO's National Security Division prepared the report under the general supervision of Robert F. Hale and Neil M. Singer. Robert Mechanic, also of the National Security Division, prepared extensive computer simulations. The author thanks Martin Binkin of the Brookings Institution for his assistance in reviewing an earlier draft. (External reviewers bear no responsibility for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.) Thanks go also to the Defense Department's Office of Accession Policy and its Defense Manpower Data Center, for kindly providing key manpower data. CBO staff members Richard Fernandez, Alex Manganaris, Rosemarie Nielson, and Christian Frederiksen all contributed helpful comments. Francis S. Pierce edited the manuscript, and Rebecca J. Kees prepared it for publication.
The Erosion of the Enlisted Force: A Study of Attrition
1999
Attrition happens when the service makes a ?bad match? and a person they have invested in leaves the military prematurely for civilian life. Unfortunately, this poor selection is made about 15 percent of the time. Attrition also happens when those who fall below standards are not rehabilitated or airmen separate for miscellaneous reasons on their terms; this loss takes another 20 percent out of the force. Attrition exacts both a human and monetary bill that we can not afford to keep paying. I contend that attrition is predictable, preventable and alterable; this report will point the way. First, I have isolated a set of characteristics proven to be related to attrition to screen potential recruits. Secondly, I assert that separation instructions are too permissive in nature and do not give the commander enough latitude to rehabilitate or retain members. Finally, I explore whether problems with the recruiting system aggravate attrition and if addressed, will lower the rate. The USAF does not have an attrition reduction plan; targets are set each year but there is no time phased coordinated plan for lowering attrition. I have built a plan for FY 2000 that would give an Attrition Tiger Team a place to start. The Air Force is not a victim of attrition: we have created the problem and we can fix it. 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Public Release 18. NUMBER OF PAGES 53