Without liberty and justice, what extremes to expect? Two contemporary perspectives (original) (raw)
Related papers
Assuring the Fair Value of the Political Liberties: The Need for an Ethos of Justice
Readings in Philosophy, 2013
In this article I explored the co-tenability of John Rawls’ two principles of justice by framing the problem in terms of the alleged compatibility of the equality of the political liberties vis-à-vis inequalities in income and wealth. I contend that historical considerations, as well as aspects internal to Rawls theory, present formidable difficulties for Rawls if he wants to maintain the lexical ordering of the first principle over the second. I questioned whether there are suitable institutions that could actually implement his principles. I then discussed and appled the insights of G.A. Cohen to resolve the objections articulated in the first half of this paper. While his insights do not specifically address my concern, they can be suitably modified to help illuminate and explain why Rawls’ assumption regarding the compatibility of political equality and socioeconomic inequality is untenable, given the conflicting demands of his two principles. I argued, ultimately, that a well-ordered society regulated by justice as fairness requires its citizens to affirm an ethos of justice within their everyday individual transactions if such a society is to be considered truly just in the Rawlsian sense.
Ever since reading one of Isaiah Berlin’s most popular essays “Two Concepts of Liberty” (1958) I am impressed by his way of analyzing a controversial and complex topic such as liberty with such depth and finesse. Berlin attempts to categorize the broad idea of liberty in two distinct concepts. He divides freedom into a ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ concept. Negative freedom describes the area under which an individual is prevented from any form of interference. Positive freedom is concerned with the source of control. It is automatically institutional depended. Negative and positive freedom, both such valuable concepts should be adequately secured in society. Is it possible, and if so should both concepts coexist in society? By this essay, I would like to elaborate how we have to weigh these two absolute concepts to satisfy human needs and will try to examine if we can find a way how these two concepts can coexists in society or if they are, as Berlin contends, rival and opposed concepts.
Conceptions Of Liberty Deprivation
Modern Law Review, 2006
This article adopts a theoretical and comparative perspective on the prisoner's legal status in England and Wales. Applying the principles of human rights, legality and proportionality, it argues that the prisoner's legal status must rest on a divisible conception of liberty. Such a conception must distinguish clearly between the liberty lost, and the rights restricted, by the imposition of the custodial sentence as opposed to the administration of prisons (the key distinction). In order for this to be achieved, the conception of the prisoner's legal status must also establish the purpose or purposes of the custodial sanction as distinct from the purpose of prison administration. Through comparison with Germany, the article demonstrates that the common law concept of the prisoner's legal status is unstable. Vacillating between a divisible and indivisible conception of the prisoner's liberty, the English conception of the prisoner's legal status lacks a foundation firm enough to satisfy the principles of human rights, legality and proportionality.
Political Liberties and Social Equality (Law & Philosophy, 2018)
This paper examines the link between political liberties and social equality, and contends that the former are constitutive of, i.e. necessary to secure, the latter. Although this constitutive link is often assumed in the literature on political liberties, the reasons why it holds true remain largely unexplored. Three such reasons are examined here. First, political liberties are constitutive of social equality because they bestow political power on their holders, leaving disenfran-chised individuals excluded from decisions that are particularly pervasive, coer-cively enforced, hard to avoid, monopolistic, and final. Second, they are constitutive of social equality due to their positional value, such that those who are denied such liberties are socially downgraded because and to the extent that others enjoy them. Third, they are constitutive of social equality due to their expressive value, in the sense that, by disenfranchising some individuals, the state publicly fails to recognize their equal moral agency. While unpacking these reasons, we address some criticisms of this constitutive link recently raised by Steven Wall and Jason Brennan.
Four Conceptions of Liberty as a Political Value
Civic Freedom in an Age of Diversity: The Public Philosophy of Jame Tully, 2023
What would it mean to have a suitably ‘realistic’ account of political liberty? What does it mean to exercise control, or to be self-guiding, in the kind of world we live in today? One response to these challenges and our current social and political context, of course, is to embrace a kind of anti-humanism; to claim that the regulative ideals of human agency underpinning our dominant conceptions of freedom today rest on an ultimately illusory, essentialist humanism. However, there has also been a kind of return to humanism in recent years, on at least two fronts. First, to a corporeal or ‘mortalist’ humanism, grounded in our shared mortality and vulnerability to suffering. And second, to an ‘agonistic humanism’, grounded in a contestatory stance towards that which is claimed to be in our nature or as normative for us . Any conception of the political entails not only a distinctive mode of collective human activity, but also of agency, and a domain in which power and disagreement are central to any proper understanding of it. Thus, grasping liberty as a political value is also to explore the different ways in which we want this value to actually shape our practices and institutions.
Beyond Liberty Unpacking the Layers of Freedom and its inherent Limitations
This paper explores the intricate concept of freedom and its inherent limitations. It delves into the various dimensions of freedom, including political, economic, and social aspects, highlighting their evolution and contemporary understandings. The interplay between individual liberties and collective well-being is examined, emphasizing the need to balance personal freedom with societal norms and responsibilities. The importance of recognizing and navigating psychological and emotional barriers is underscored, as they can impact personal growth and well-being. The significance of fostering inclusive and equitable societies while upholding freedom is emphasized, emphasizing the importance of equal rights, non-discrimination, and social justice. The paper concludes by stressing the continual exploration and understanding of freedom's layers and limitations, as it contributes to personal and societal growth, empathy, and the promotion of a just and inclusive world.
The Oxford Handbook of Freedom
Oxford Handbooks Online, 2016
Debates about freedom traditionally focus on a few central themes. The chapters of this volume update those debates and launch new ones. Whether the freedom worth pursuing is one or many, whether it conflicts with equality, whether it can be secured by the institutions of the modern state, and whether it is compatible with a deterministic understanding of the universe are some of the central questions that animate the chapters in this volume. Our contributors show both that we have made real progress in our understanding of the many faces of freedom and its enabling conditions, and that threats to our freedoms remain various, serious, and real.
The Legal Balance Between Liberty and Equality
ANALI PRAVNOG FAKULTETA U BEOGRADU, 2021
The paper explores the specific legal balance between liberty and equality, distinguishing it from political theories and constitutional settings, where they are often considered in opposition. In order to find the specific legal balance between liberty and equality, and after identifying some of their relevant meanings for the purpose, it becomes necessary to focus on the rule of law, and to examine the relationship between liberty and equality in its different versions. Once the core meaning of the rule of law in terms of liberty and equality is enucleated, it is possible to consider extending it to the international field.