Evolutionary psychology (original) (raw)

Evolutionary psychology and social thinking: History, issues and prospects

2000

Psychology has undergone a profound paradigmatic shift in the past few decades. For most of the second half of the twentieth century, a kind of unquestioning belief in the power of environmental influences on social thinking and behavior has ruled supreme in the social sciences. This environmentalist ideology rested on some notably fallacious scientific claims, such as Margaret Mead's now debunked arguments that even patterns of mating behavior are essentially culturally determined. In hindsight, it is puzzling why well-meaning psychologists and social scientists should have chosen to deny the obvious for so long -that biological, genetic and evolutionary influences do play a fundamental role in understanding social behavior.

Evolutionary Social Psychology

We have argued that the evolutionary perspective to social psychology is not untestable, not reductionist, not a theory about rigid genetic determinism, not a justification for the status quo, and not incompatible with sociocultural or cognitive analyses. What it is, instead, is a set of ideas that have proved quite useful in generating novel hypotheses, and parsimoniously connecting findings from very different domains ranging from mate choice and family relationships to aggression and intergroup relations. Adopting an evolutionary perspective can help us appreciate not only the common threads that bind the people in our culture to those in other cultures, but also, beyond that, to the other species with which we share the earth. Taking this broad perspective, however, also makes us aware of the vast reaches of our own ignorance. As yet, we know very little about how evolved psychological mechanisnis inside individuals develop, or how they influence, and are influenced by, the complex cultures that humans construct. Bringing light to these questions will require a fuller integration of all the different theoretical perspectives on human social behavior.

Reviving Evolutionary Psychology: Biology Meets Society

Journal of Social Issues, 1991

This summary article discusses the impoverishment of biological reductionism and the limitations of genetic explanations for complex social arrangements. Because there are no direct links between evolutionary history and present behavior, theories of human evolution must be multidisciplinary. To escape the competitive individualism of sociobiological perspectives, we propose a new basis for evolutionary psychology that focuses on the group as the selection environment for the evolution of human sociality. Finally, we discuss the reasons for attempting to build a socially and scientifically responsible evolutionary psychology.

The need for an Evolutionary Perspective in Philosophy and in Psychology 1/4

The nature of human mind is a key subject for philosophy and for psychology. It is agreed that many of its characteristics and performances have been built during the last 7 million years of our primate evolution. That period began with what is called the pan-homo split, the divergence in primate evolution from the Last Common Ancestor (LCAncestor) we share with chimpanzees. The mental specificities that differentiate us from our chimpanzee cousins have been built up during that time. As consequence, philosophical and psychological investigations relative to the nature of human mind should analyze that period. But this has been done only in a limited way so far. On part because the recent discipline of Evolutionary Psychology covers only a limited segment of that period and also because Husserl, the founding father of Phenomenology, took the position to not address a possible evolutionary nature of human mind (the "proscription of anthropology in Phenomenology") [1]. We would like here to recall these limitations and introduce possible openings (this is a continuation of an already presented approach [18] [4]). Evolutionary Psychology is interested in the life and social habits of our hunter-gatherer ancestors in order to highlight mental states that were pertinent for them but do not fit with our today lives. The pre-human period considered by Evolutionary Psychology is the Pleistocene which began 2.5 million years ago. At about that time our homo-habilis ancestors were already significantly more evolved and more performant than the LCAncestor we share with chimpanzees (larger brain size, fabrication of stone tools, hands capable of precision grip, …). This means that at the beginning of the Pleistocene our ancestors were already well advanced in their evolution toward today humans. This shows that the build up of our human characteristics and specificities began before the Pleistocene, and neglecting the pre-Pleistocene time puts at risk of missing some root causes of our human specificities. This brings to consider that Evolutionary Psychology should take into account the pre-human period beginning at the pan-homo split, not only the Pleistocene. Regarding philosophy, the proscription of anthropology in Phenomenology is currently challenged with some interest in Evolutionary Psychology [9] [8]. To avoid the risk of limiting human evolution to Pleistocene Phenomenology should explicitly plan to use anthropology on the whole evolutionary period beginning at panhomo split. In such a perspective some help could come from an existing evolutionary scenario starting at pan-homo split and introducing a nature of self-consciousness associated to anxiety management [4]. The scenario introduces an Evolutionary Engine based on primate intersubjectivity which could have led our ancestors to build a representation of their own entity, thus leading to a natural build up of self-consciousness. Part of the scenario is also about identifications with suffering conspecifics which may have been the source of a huge anxiety, not taken into account so far and leading to an Evolutionary Anxiety intertwined with the nature of selfconsciousness. It is shown that a synergy between the evolution of self-consciousness and anxiety management happened before Pleistocene, making pre-Pleistocene a key period for understanding the nature of our human minds. Overall, the scenario proposes a rationale for the pan-homo split, a tentative explanation of the divergence in pre-human primate evolution. It is also recalled that the concept of Evolutionary Anxiety makes available an entry point to the nature of human evil [14]. We present the above points and use the proposed evolutionary scenario for a reading of human evolution from last common ancestor to today humas. Continuations are introduced.

Parallels and promising directions in the study of genetic, cultural, and moral evolution

arXiv: Populations and Evolution, 2018

Experimental evolution has yielded surprising insights into human history and evolution by shedding light on the roles of chance and contingency in history and evolution, and on the deep evolutionary roots of cooperation, conflict and kin discrimination. We argue that an interesting research direction would be to develop computational and experimental systems for studying evolutionary processes that involve multiple layers of inheritance (such as genes, epigenetic inheritance, language, and culture) and feedbacks (such as gene-culture coevolution and mate choice) as well as open-ended niche construction---all of which are important in human history and evolution. Such systems would also be a clear way to motivate evolution and computation to scholars and students across diverse cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds, as well as to scholars and students in the social sciences and humanities. In principle, computational models of cultural evolution could be compared to data, given tha...

COMMENTARY: Evolutionary Psychology: A View From Evolutionary Biology

Psychological Inquiry, 2002

Given the recent explosion of interest in applications of evolutionary biology to understanding human psychology, we think it timely to assure better understanding of modern evolutionary theory among the psychologists who might be using it. We find it necessary to do so because of the very reduced version of evolutionary theorizing that has been incorporated into much of evolutionary psychology so far. Our aim here is to clarify why the use of a reduced version of evolutionary genetics will lead to faulty science and to indicate where other resources of evolutionary biology can be found that might elevate the standard of the evolutionary component of evolutionary psychology.

Philosophical Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology

The aim and purpose of the manuscript is to summarize the common links between early schools of philosophy with contemporary topics in modern psychology (i.e., aggression, cooperative and prosocial behaviors) and to show how these disciplines have both converged and have established an exciting new discipline that is now referred to as evolutionary psychology. The text could be used in introductory courses in higher education courses including psychology, evolutionary psychology, and philosophy. There are 3 primary components of the text: 1. Part I of the monograph (chapters 1 and 2) will discuss the early philosophical arguments of human nature and the primary developments leading to modern psychology. Ancient Greek (Socrates and Plato) philosophy is discussed addressing some of the classic problems of human nature, including mind – body duality, Materialism, zeitgeist and the substance of knowledge. The topics address the questions that have long plagued both philosophers and psychologists, such as the distinction between mind / body, determining the substance, purpose and meaning of our thoughts, and finally distinguishing the role of spirituality from the mortal body. Chapter two will explore specific schools of thought in philosophy that have had a major influence in modern psychology, including British Empiricism (John Locke and Thomas Hobbes), Rationalism (Rene Descartes), Positivism (Auguste Comte), Romanticism (Jean Jacques Rousseau) and Idealism (George Berkeley). Part II of the monograph (chapters 3 and 4) will explore how philosophical theory has shaped and defined modern psychology that gradually led to the development of evolutionary psychology. Chapter 3 will explore how early schools of modern psychology (Structuralism and Functionalism) explained human behavior from understanding the basic nature of conscious experiences through our own perceptions and experiences in the environment. Chapter 4 will explore three primary behavioral influences in the development of evolutionary psychology (i.e., Wilhelm Wundt, Edward Titchener, and John Watson) with environmental experiences. This part will explore the relationship between evolutionary psychology and cooperative behaviors and provide an argument how cooperation and altruism coexisted with opportunistic and egoistic behaviors early in human evolutionary history. Part III (chapters 5 – 10) of the monograph will address the evolutionary components of natural selection and specifically explore how evolutionary psychology has influenced current important topics in the field of psychology. Chapter 6 will explore a specific emotion (aggression) and discuss the adaptive (and destructive) role of this emotion including causal influences. Chapter 7 will explore the role of evolutionary psychology with gender differences as they relate to reproductive fitness. Chapter 8 addresses the relationship between language and evolutionary theory and how cooperative learning is directly linked to the human capacity of learning languages. Chapter 9 explores the fundamental and evolutionary basis of cooperative behaviors, including “tit – for – tat” principles, empathy, revenge and forgiveness. Chapter 10 concludes the monograph with discussions about the future development of evolutionary psychology with related topics such as teaching basic principles of cooperative behaviors, social media, individualistic cultures and the role of human behavior with interdependency.

The need for an Evolutionary Perspective in Philosophy and in Psychology

The nature of human mind is a key subject for philosophy and for psychology. It is agreed that many of its characteristics and performances have been built during the last 7 million years of our primate evolution. That period began with what is called the pan-homo split, the divergence in primate evolution from the Last Common Ancestor (LCAncestor) we share with chimpanzees. The mental specificities that differentiate us from our chimpanzee cousins have been built up during that time. As consequence, philosophical and psychological investigations relative to the nature of human mind should analyze that period. But this has been done only in a limited way so far. On part because the recent discipline of Evolutionary Psychology covers only a limited segment of that period and also because Husserl, the founding father of Phenomenology, took the position to not address a possible evolutionary nature of human mind (the "proscription of anthropology in Phenomenology") [1]. We would like here to recall these limitations and introduce possible openings (this is a continuation of an already presented approach [18] [4]). Evolutionary Psychology is interested in the life and social habits of our hunter-gatherer ancestors in order to highlight mental states that were pertinent for them but do not fit with our today lives. The pre-human period considered by Evolutionary Psychology is the Pleistocene which began 2.5 million years ago. At about that time our homo-habilis ancestors were already significantly more evolved and more performant than the LCAncestor we share with chimpanzees (larger brain size, fabrication of stone tools, hands capable of precision grip, …). This means that at the beginning of the Pleistocene our ancestors were already well advanced in their evolution toward today humans. This shows that the build up of our human characteristics and specificities began before the Pleistocene, and neglecting the pre-Pleistocene time puts at risk of missing some root causes of our human specificities. This brings to consider that Evolutionary Psychology should take into account the pre-human period beginning at the pan-homo split, not only the Pleistocene. Regarding philosophy, the proscription of anthropology in Phenomenology is currently challenged with some interest in Evolutionary Psychology [9] [8]. To avoid the risk of limiting human evolution to Pleistocene Phenomenology should explicitly plan to use anthropology on the whole evolutionary period beginning at panhomo split. In such a perspective some help could come from an existing evolutionary scenario starting at pan-homo split and introducing a nature of self-consciousness associated to anxiety management [4]. The scenario introduces an Evolutionary Engine based on primate intersubjectivity which could have led our ancestors to build a representation of their own entity, thus leading to a natural build up of self-consciousness. Part of the scenario is also about identifications with suffering conspecifics which may have been the source of a huge anxiety, not taken into account so far and leading to an Evolutionary Anxiety intertwined with the nature of selfconsciousness. It is shown that a synergy between the evolution of self-consciousness and anxiety management happened before Pleistocene, making pre-Pleistocene a key period for understanding the nature of our human minds. Overall, the scenario proposes a rationale for the pan-homo split, a tentative explanation of the divergence in pre-human primate evolution. It is also recalled that the concept of Evolutionary Anxiety makes available an entry point to the nature of human evil [14]. We present the above points and use the proposed evolutionary scenario for a reading of human evolution from last common ancestor to today humas. Continuations are introduced.