Agenda Power in Brazil's Câmara Dos Deputados, 1989–98 (original) (raw)
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In recent years, four approaches about executive-legislative relations in Brazil have emerged: i) the perspective that points out limitations and constraints of multiparty presidential systems; ii) the building of government coalitions; iii) coalition management; and iv) the role played by institutions including the prerogatives of party leadership inside the House. In this paper, we review the literature on these approaches , offering a guide for studies about the Brazilian multiparty presidential system. " Manuscript
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… LASA Congress, Guadalajara, Mexico, 1997
and Alain de Remes for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper; and Ana Caillaux for her invaluable research assistance. Amorim Neto's work was funded by fellowships awarded by the Brazilian Ministry of Education (CAPES), the Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies (CILAS),