The Health of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (original) (raw)
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Emerging Security Trends and Legitimacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
2015
The contemporary emerging security trends seem destined to marginalising the potential and legitimacy of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The transformation in the international settings have modified state actors’ behaviour at the domestic level and resultantly, states have started orienting themselves to a changed environment contrary to the set non-proliferation norms. This study investigates some pertinent questions: why was the regime created in the first place? What are the problems attached to the regime and how have emerging trends further undermined the scope and role of this regime? Why is the regime important for the future security environment? What could possibly happen if the regime is not made effective with renewed realisable objectives? The study asks why there is an urgent need to establish a stringent norm against proliferation of nuclear weapons and make it consistent with emerging realities. This study concludes that most of the non-proliferation problems fr...
Challenges to the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime
2003
For international peace and security, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime has played an extremely important role. However, the recent state of affairs, including Iraqi and North Korean issues, and a new U. S. nuclear policy under the Bush Administration, reveal several challenges to the regime. In this paper, I examine the development of the situation since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and address eight specific challenges to the regime. This paper argues that in order to strengthen the regime, it will be necessary to maintain and strengthen international consensus and motivation toward the regime because the regime ultimately depends on the commitment of States to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. K e yw o r d : nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear weapons, NPT, safeguards, security assuarances, nuclear-weapon-free zones TProfessor of International Law and Relations, Osaka School of International Public Policy,Osaka University, ...
Regime Change in Nuclear Weapon States
The threat of losing control of nuclear weapons during political crises is not sufficiently prepared for by either individual nuclear powers or the international community. The relative success of securing the Soviet nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the USSR has lulled the world into a false sense of security, but the threat is real and may be increasing. Drawing upon historical case studies in which the government of a nuclear weapon state failed, the author recommends policy options for future scenarios in the hope of preventing potential nuclear disasters in newly proliferating states such as North Korea and Iran.
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime at a Crossroads
The articles compiled in this volume grapple with questions and dilemmas that arise from a growing sense in recent years that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has reached a critical juncture, and that its continued role as the centerpiece of the nuclear nonproliferation regime is at risk. This is the result of a process that has unfolded gradually since the end of the Cold War, which also spelled the end of the bipolar global structure that, in the minds of many, helped keep nuclear proliferation in check.
Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 2022
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a central element of the global nuclear order, the primary goal of which is to prevent nuclear war. But this understanding is being threatened by a number of developments. Frustration about the lack of nuclear disarmament and concerns about humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons led to the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The new treaty has further exposed existing fault lines within the NPT and exacerbated unresolved conflicts over the proper approach to disarmament and the weighting of the NPT pillars. Currently, disagreements over the compatibility of the two treaties and the approach to the TPNW in particular divide the membership of the NPT. At the same time, real proliferation cases test the regime’s ability to act, as norm enforcement is regularly hampered by interference from the great powers. These developments—the absence of genuine disarmament, disputes among NPT members, competitio...
Evaluating Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime-Case Study: North Korea
2012
This paper try to explain why a country refused to join the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime. The main argument of this article is the failure of the nuclear weapons nonproliferation regime to create a state-nuclear negara abandon their nuclear weapons because the regime does not successfully complete the core problem that triggered the decision to develop nuclear weapons. The decision will be difficult to change when it is done in order to maintain domestic power in the country that has nuclear weapons. Moreover, the perception of threat also came from rival states with nuclear weapons or non-nuclear states in alliance with the nuclear state. This article uses a case study of North Korea to prove the argument the author. Keywords : nuclear weapon, nuclear nonproliferation regime, nuclear politics, North Korea, Juche
Making It Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation
American Journal of Political Science, 2013
Research on nuclear proliferation has identified numerous factors associated with states' decisions to pursue nuclear weapons, including the nature of the security environment, alliances with great powers, technological resources, and regional status aspirations. Yet study after study has found that regime type has little or no effect on the decision to pursue nuclear weapons. Indeed, in a literature that features little consensus, one point of "specific agreement" is that "regime type has only a minimal effect on proliferation" (Sagan 2011, 236). We argue, however, that conventional approaches comparing the behavior of democracies to that of non-democracies have resulted in incorrect inferences. We combine insights from the study of comparative authoritarianism with those on the causes of nuclear proliferation and argue that leaders of highly centralized, "personalistic" dictatorships have more to gain, and less to lose, by pursuing nuclear weapons than leaders of other regime types. Using our more nuanced classification of regime types, as well as a more theoretically-appropriate modeling approach, we find that regime type in fact has a significant impact on states' decisions to seek nuclear weapons: personalistic regimes are substantially more likely to pursue these weapons than other regime types. This finding is robust to different codings of proliferation dates and a wide range of modeling approaches and specifications. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for both theory and policy.