PAK FA: Additional Points to Be Discussed (original) (raw)

Iran's Defence Industry What's in Stock for Russia

International Centre for Defence and Security Briefs, 2023

Albeit heavily sanctioned, Iran has, nonetheless, demonstrated a robust weapon system manufacturing capacity over the last decades. Exhausted by the Islamic revolution and an 8-year war with neighbouring Iraq, Teheran managed to upbuild a self-sufficient defence industry from the ashes of the war. It started with low-tech reverse-engineering of 3rd generation fighters and tanks and ended with indigenously producing high-accuracy and long-range ballistic missiles. Adding fuel to the regional fires, Iran exported 435millionworthofweaponrytoits′weaker′partners.However,Iranwasalsoimportingarms,havingbought435 million worth of weaponry to its 'weaker' partners. However, Iran was also importing arms, having bought 435millionworthofweaponrytoits′weaker′partners.However,Iranwasalsoimportingarms,havingbought5.5 billion in Russian weapons from the late 1980s till 2020. In 2022, the state of affairs has dramatically changed, and now Russia is desperate to procure Iranian-made drones and ballistic missiles.

2019 Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective

2019

Comparing current Russian military power to that of a decade ago, Russia has clearly made substantial progress in transforming its military into an efficient fighting force. Observing this achievement, it is relevant to ask: What military capability will Russia possess in another ten years? This report provides a forecast of Russian military capability towards 2029. It is based on analyses of the Armed Forces and their fighting power, and of political and economic factors that affect the development of military capability. The study’s primary focus is on regular warfare capabilities. The report finds that Russia’s authoritarian domestic policy and anti-Western foreign policy will continue. Recognition as a great power and establishing a sphere of interest in its neighbourhood will remain main objectives. The impressive pace of improvement of the Armed Forces in the past decade is probably not sustainable. Instead, the next ten years will consolidate previous achievements, notably the ability to launch a regional war. Strategic deterrence, primarily with nuclear forces, will remain the foremost priority. Towards 2029, Russia may only significantly increase its military capability further by sustained political support for determined policy implementation.